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From a military perspective, the best way to avoid war is to 
prepare for it.
GEN. MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The missile fast-attack craft and amphibious fleets of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) have undergone significant modernization over the past 
fifteen years. The capabilities of both categories of vessels have improved even if their 
actual numbers have not increased dramatically. Examined from the perspective of PLA 
doctrine and training, the missions of these forces represent the PLAN’s past, present, 
and future.
Taken together, these two categories of ships and boats enhance China’s deterrence pos-
ture, help defend its coastal waters, warn Taiwan of the dangers of further moves toward 
independence, add to China’s long-range sealift capacity, and assist in the PLA’s abil-
ity to conduct nontraditional security tasks. In the newer ships entering the inventory, 
we see both capabilities to conduct the PLA’s traditional mission of defense of China’s 
18,000-kilometer coastline and 6,500 islands and hints of the missions of the future. 
These two fleets represent the yin and yang of the PLAN: its enduring “offshore opera-
tions” missions and its future “blue-water” or “far-seas” tasks.
The Missile-Craft Fleet
China’s naval missile-craft force consists of a variety of small vessels, each displac-
ing about five hundred tons or less. They usually are called daodan kuaiting (导弹快
艇), daodanting, or just kuaiting. These terms are translated variously as “patrol boat,” 
“patrol craft,” “missile fast-attack craft,” “fast-attack craft,” “missile escort boat,” “missile 
speedboat,” “missile boat,” or “fast boat.” Some vessels of this size are called huweiting (护
卫艇), sometimes imprecisely translated as “corvette.”1 This paper focuses on fast, small 
vessels equipped with antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and uses the abbreviation FAC 
(for “fast-attack craft”) to refer to the various types of missile speedboats in the PLAN. 
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In addition to FACs armed with ASCMs, The Military Balance 2013 lists three types of 
coastal-patrol craft and one type of patrol boat in the PLAN that are not equipped with 
missiles and perform antisubmarine or other missions. These will not be discussed in 
this treatment.2
The first missile FACs in the PLAN, the Type 021 Huangfeng and Type 024 Houku 
classes, were based on Soviet designs (the Osa/Komar class). Because of their small size 
and lack of seaworthiness, these early FACs were employed relatively close to shore. 
They took advantage of their speed, but were limited in the length of time they could 
stay at sea and by adverse weather. Two versions of a more modern FAC (based on the 
Type 037 submarine chaser), the Type 037II Houjian class and Type 037IG Houxin 
class (often called corvettes, but displacing only slightly more than five hundred tons), 
were introduced in the early 1990s. About a decade later the stealthy, 220-ton Type 022 
Houbei-class catamaran entered the force.3
The Military Balance 1996/97 estimated there were “about 185” missile craft in the 
PLAN. These numbers included “some 100” Type 021 Huangfeng-class, “about 75” Type 
024 Houku-class, nine Type 037IG Houxin-class, and one “Huang-class [sic]” FAC.4 In 
the subsequent fifteen years, nearly all those craft were retired and replaced by a smaller 
number of more-modern, more–technologically advanced, and more-capable vessels.
Current estimates of the size of the missile FAC fleet vary among sources. The Pentagon 
reports a total of “roughly” eighty-five “coastal-patrol (missile)” craft. It counts sixty 
Type 022s, but does not specify the other types of FAC in service. It also states that the 
new Type 056 Jiangdao-class corvettes will “augment” the Type 022s in the fleet.5 The 
new Type 056 corvettes provide the PLAN the capability to patrol China’s littoral waters 
for several days or weeks, while the Type 022s are optimized for fast attack at high 
speeds for shorter periods.
The Military Balance 2013 lists four types of FAC in the inventory, totaling over one 
hundred vessels; however, its count of sixty-five Type 022s is higher than the Pentagon’s 
and its figures do not account for the likely retirement of the older Type 021 from the 
active inventory.6
Type Number Missile
Type 022 Houbei 65+ (60 reported by U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense)
two quad YJ-83 launchers
Type 021 Huangfeng 11 (likely no longer in the fl eet) two twin HY-2 launchers
Type 037II Houjian 6 two triple YJ-8 launchers
Type 037IG Houxin 20 two twin YJ-8 launchers
Table 1. FACs in the PLAN
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With about eighty-six vessels, the PLAN FAC fleet has a higher percentage of modern 
boats (Type 022) in operation (about 70 percent) than the percentage of modern equip-
ment in most other units and services. In 2011, the Pentagon reported that, as of 2010, 
only about 26 percent of the PLAN surface fleet was considered “modern,” compared 
with about 56 percent of the submarine force, 25 percent of the air forces, and 40 percent 
of the air-defense forces.7 The percentages of modern systems in the PLA have increased 
in recent years as newer equipment is commissioned and older weapons are retired, but 
the FAC force is better off than most units, and its equipment is better than most sectors’, 
in the PLA. Throughout the PLA, advanced systems must operate in conjunction with 
legacy platforms, logistics must support both old and new, and doctrine and tactical 
techniques must be developed that incorporate all existing capabilities and units.
The PLAN’s FACs are distributed to units in all three fleets. Five division leader–grade 
FAC units (kuaiting zhidui, 快艇支队), often called flotillas, have been identified. Each 
flotilla is composed of multiple (probably up to three) regiment leader–grade dadui, var-
iously translated as squadrons or groups, each with six to twelve vessels. A FAC flotilla 
may command sub chasers, patrol boats, and amphibious vessels in addition to its mis-
sile boats. Each FAC flotilla probably commands twelve to eighteen FACs.8 Both Type 
022 and Type 037IG FACs are found in each of the three fleets. The five FAC zhidui and 
the locations of their FAC squadrons are listed in table 2. Two additional FAC squadrons 
have been identified subordinate to the Shantou Naval Garrison.9
Type 037IG Houxins have three-digit pennant numbers (images show them ranging 
from the 750s through the 760s), indicating they are battalion leader–grade vessels, 
and are named after counties in China, such as Fuqing or Dong’an.10 Four Type 037II 
Houjians are assigned to the naval component of the Hong Kong garrison, with pennant 
numbers 770 through 773.11
Type 022 Houbeis have four-digit hull numbers, indicating they are company leader–
grade units.12 Boat number 2208 (2208艇) was the first Type 022 to enter service; it was 
Unit Designator Fleet Location of FAC 
Squadrons (dadui)
1st FAC zhidui 91208 budui North Sea Fleet Qingdao, Shandong
16th FAC zhidui 91765 budui East Sea Fleet Ningbo-Shipu, Zhejiang
21st FAC zhidui 91792 budui East Sea Fleet Fuding, Fujian
11th FAC zhidui 91367 budui South Sea Fleet Sanya-Yulin, Hainan
26th FAC zhidui 92962 budui South Sea Fleet Shangchuandao, 
Guangdong
Shantou Naval Garrison 91960 budui South Sea Fleet Shantou, Guangdong 
(two squadrons)
Table 2. FAC Units
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delivered to the East Sea Fleet (ESF) in 2004.13 Hull numbers for other boats of this type 
begin with 21 for North Sea Fleet (NSF) vessels and 23 for South Sea Fleet (SSF) craft.
In a 2009 report, the Office of Naval Intelligence issued what is perhaps the most suc-
cinct description of the mission of the FAC fleet: “[T]he Houbei’s ability to patrol coastal 
and littoral waters and react at short notice allows the PLAN’s larger combatants to 
focus on offshore defense and out-of-area missions without leaving a security gap along 
China’s coastline.”14 The Pentagon concludes, “These boats have increased the PLA Na-
vy’s littoral warfare capabilities.”15 Andrew Erickson observes: “The Houbei’s impressive 
anti-surface weapons system, consisting of 8 YJ-8A ASCMs fired from stern-mounted 
canisters, each with a range of approximately 50 nautical miles, would be highly effective 
in attacking surface warships in the waters around China, though the catamaran’s limited 
endurance (300 nautical miles) would not allow it to operate for extended periods at 
much greater distances.”16
These statements all point to the role of the PLAN’s FAC fleet in offshore defense (近海
防御), the naval component of the PLA’s “military strategy” or “military strategic guide-
line” of Active Defense (积极防御). In 2000, China’s defense white paper announced 
the PLAN had “acquired the capability of offshore defensive operations.”17 The 2013 
white paper stated that as “the PLAN endeavors to accelerate the modernization of its 
forces for comprehensive offshore operations,” it is developing “blue-water capabilities of 
conducting mobile operations, carrying out international cooperation, and countering 
nontraditional security threats.”18 Owing to the requirement to operate relatively near 
the coast (at most a couple of hundred miles from shore) and probably only in rela-
tively good weather, the PLAN FAC fleet therefore will be employed mainly to conduct 
“offshore operations,” while other PLAN ships and aircraft operate farther out at sea in 
“blue-water” or “far-seas” operations.
According to doctrine, offshore defensive operations will include surface, subsurface, air 
(fixed- and rotary-wing), cruise- and ballistic-missile, and electronic-warfare capabilities 
and units, supported by People’s Armed Police, militia, and civilian assets. PLAN FACs 
are expected to work in groups, operating on multiple vectors, in conjunction with other 
forces, taking advantage of the range of their missiles. Their effectiveness will depend on 
the ability of other Chinese assets to provide them accurate and timely intelligence and 
targeting data for enemy warships beyond the horizon. Throughout their operations at 
sea, the PLAN FAC fleet will be vulnerable to enemy air forces and electronic-warfare 
operations. Chinese FACs have some short-range air-defense and electronic counter-
measures capabilities of their own; for example, the Type 022 mounts a 30 mm close-in 
weapons system and two four-cell launch tubes for smoke and chaff. However, the key to 
their survivability and success is realistic training.
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PLAN FAC training has been reported widely in the Chinese civilian and military me-
dia, including several television reports about the telegenic Type 022 as well as the older 
Type 037IG. Exercise reports usually reveal FACs operating with other surface vessels, 
such as minesweepers and frigates. The FACs perform both offensive and defensive tasks 
and are themselves frequently the target of “enemy” air and electronic-warfare attacks. 
Exercises reportedly take place both during the day (including in light fog) and at night, 
although exactly how much time is spent in night training is not specified. Live-missile 
launches and live-ammunition antiaircraft drills using drones as targets are reported 
frequently.19 Coordinated attacks by FACs and PLAN aviation units on enemy forces also 
have been reported. One report describes a naval aviation and FAC attack following a 
first wave of attacks performed by other surface and air forces. Helicopters provided tar-
geting information for enemies beyond visual range; however, details of exactly how that 
information was passed and processed among units were not provided. Another report 
indicates coordination for a missile attack in conjunction with an aviation unit while 
experiencing enemy jamming within the context of a larger ESF exercise.20
It should come as no surprise that the first Type 022 FAC, Boat 2208 of the ESF, has been 
the subject of numerous media reports. According to one article, Boat 2208 conducted 
its first missile live fire in the Yellow Sea in the winter of 2006—approximately two 
years after it entered the fleet.21 Another report, from Xinhua, noted that when the first 
“new type missile fast boat squadron” was formed, it faced many issues, particularly 
concerning the complex technology of the new equipment. As a result, the unit under-
went a two-year training period, which included sending personnel to the shipyard that 
produced the boats (a technique used by many PLA units that have received new equip-
ment).22 In the ten years it has been in the force, Boat 2208 has participated in more 
than twenty exercises and has developed “more than fifty combat methods and train-
ing methods,” something one might expect the first vessel of its type to do. It has been 
named “‘first sharp sword’ (第一利剑) of the Chinese Navy’s fast-attack craft forces.”23 
While this seems like a lot of training, the numbers reported average out to two or three 
exercises per year.
It is difficult to judge the quality of FAC training, exercise realism, and crew proficien-
cies on the basis of Chinese media reporting. But since these units mainly will operate 
relatively close to shore, it would seem possible that they could practice many of their 
tasks in short exercises and drills that last no more than a day or two. These units are 
focused on protection of China’s littoral; other units look more toward the far seas.
The Amphibious Ship Fleet
The PLAN amphibious or landing ship (登陆舰) fleet has undergone significant mod-
ernization over the past fifteen years, but these efforts have not resulted in as much of an 
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increase in sealift capacity as might be expected. The force also has been active in train-
ing exercises and has begun to be used in operations far from China’s coasts.
Estimates of the size of the amphibious ship fleet vary among sources. Estimates are 
complicated further by inconsistency in what exactly should be reported. In 2013, 
the Pentagon listed fifty-five medium and large amphibious ships, consisting of three 
amphibious transport docks (LPDs), twenty-six tank landing ships (LSTs), and twenty-
six medium landing ships (LSMs), but did not break them down by class.24 The Military 
Balance 2013 counted two LPDs, twenty-six LSTs, and fifty-nine LSMs, for a total of 
eighty-seven large and medium amphibious ships.25 Most of the twenty-eight Type 079 
Yulian-class LSMs included in The Military Balance have been retired, leaving only 
about five in service.26 When these twenty-three ships are subtracted, the numbers from 
The Military Balance and the Pentagon are much closer. Table 3 compares the numbers 
found in The Military Balance from 1996 with those from various sources in 2013.
Calculating the maximum troop capacity for the ships in 2013 yields a result of fifteen to 
sixteen thousand personnel, although the number would vary according to the amount 
of equipment transported in addition to personnel. This total (fifteen to sixteen thou-
sand personnel) represents at least a 50 percent increase from the Pentagon’s judgment 
from 2000 through the following decade that the PLA is capable of sealift of one infantry 
division of approximately ten thousand troops and equipment at a time.27 Current PLAN 
amphibious lift capacity would be sufficient to lift the PLAN’s two marine brigades (ten 
Ship Type Number 
1996
Number 
2013
Capacity
Type 071 Yuzhao LPD  0  3 500–800 troops, 15–20 amphibious 
vehicles, 4 landing craft
Type 072 Yukan LST  7  7 200 troops, 10 tanks
Type 072-II Yuting LST  4  9 250 troops, 10 tanks
Type 072-III 
Yuting II
LST  0 10 250 troops, 10 tanks
US LST-1 Shan LST 13  0 150 troops, 16 tanks
Type 073 Yudeng LSM  1  0 180 troops, 6 tanks
Type 073A Yunshu LSM  0 10 180 troops, 6 tanks
Type 074 Yuhai LSM  0 11 250 troops, 2 tanks
Type 074A Yubei LSM  0 10 150 troops or 10 tanks
Type 079 
Yulian/Yuling
LSM 32  5 250 troops, 5 tanks
Table 3. PLAN Amphibious Fleet, 1996 and 2013
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1996/97, p. 180, and The Military Balance 2013, p. 290, with the number of LPDs found 
in U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments 2013, p. 6. Information on the numbers of Type 074 and Type 079 
comes from Graae e-mail, May 20, 2013. Also used in compiling this table was the “Naval Vessels” page of the website  
SinoDefence.com, available at www.sinodefence.com/navy/vessel.asp.
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to twelve thousand personnel) assigned to the SSF or one Army infantry division, but 
not much more—not enough for a major cross-strait operation.28
The PLAN has two landing ship flotillas (登陆舰支队), one in the SSF and the other in 
the ESF, and a landing ship squadron (登陆舰大队) in the NSF subordinate to the 1st 
FAC Flotilla.29 Each flotilla has two or three subordinate squadrons, with the SSF flotilla 
being larger than the ESF’s. The 16th FAC Flotilla in the ESF and the 11th FAC Flotilla 
in the SSF each command a landing ship squadron. Each landing ship squadron in the 
SSF and ESF probably commands about six large or medium landing ships, while the 
NSF squadron has two LSTs and eight LSMs.30 Major PLAN amphibious units and their 
locations are listed in table 4.
A variety of smaller landing craft are used to transfer personnel and equipment from 
ship to shore. These include many small ten-man boats with outboard motors and a 
few small and medium-sized air-cushioned craft. In April 2013, the PLAN received (in 
Feodosiya, Ukraine) the first of four Zubr air-cushioned landing craft to be built (two in 
China and two in Ukraine). These large craft can carry up to three tanks or five hundred 
troops at more than sixty knots over land and water.31
Most large PLAN amphibious ships and some medium-sized landing ships have three-
digit pennant numbers beginning with the numeral 9, indicating they are battalion 
leader–grade vessels; they are named after mountains (shan). However, the three Type 
071 LPDs are regiment leader–grade ships. Some medium-sized landing ships (Type 074 
and Type 074A) and smaller vessels, including air-cushioned craft, have four-digit bow 
numbers, indicating company leader–grade vessels.
The three Type 071 Yuzhao-class amphibious transport docks, Kunlunshan (No. 998), 
Jinggangshan (No. 999), and Changbaishan (No. 989), represent the most significant 
Unit Designator Fleet Location Comments
1st Amphibious Ship 
dadui
Not known NSF Qingdao, 
Shandong
Subordinate to the 1st FAC
zhidui
5th Amphibious Ship 
zhidui
91860 budui ESF Shanghai (Qiujiang 
wharf)
Two dadui
3rd Amphibious Ship 
dadui
92529 budui ESF Ningbo-Shipu Subordinate to the 16th FAC 
zhidui
6th Amphibious Ship 
zhidui
92692 budui SSF Zhanjiang and 
Guangzhou, 
Guangdong
Three dadui
4th Amphibious Ship 
dadui
91782 budui SSF Haikou, Hainan Subordinate to the 11th FAC 
zhidui
Table 4. PLAN Amphibious Units
Sources: Directory of PRC Military Personalities, October 2011, pp. 41, 47, 53, and 54; Graae e-mail, May 18, 2013.
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upgrade to the PLAN’s amphibious fleet.32 In addition to their troop and vehicle capac-
ity, these ships are capable of supporting flight operations for four medium helicopters 
and launching up to four air-cushioned craft.33 All are assigned to the SSF and, as the 
Office of Naval Intelligence has noted, they signal “a developing capability for expedi-
tionary warfare and over-the-horizon amphibious assault.”34 They also have the potential 
for use in nontraditional security missions, such as international disaster relief. Unlike 
the LST fleet, these ships give the PLAN the capacity to perform missions requiring 
extended periods at sea (months instead of weeks) far from China’s shores. Kunlunshan 
was deployed on antipiracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden in 2010. Jinggangshan, along with 
three other surface combatants, was involved in a high-profile exercise to the southern 
limits of the South China Sea (James Shoal) in March/April 2013, which included both 
amphibious operations and nontraditional security tasks.35
SSF amphibious ships train mostly with the two marine brigades, but also can support 
army training. PLAN amphibious units in the ESF and NSF train more with army units, 
because no marine units are assigned to those fleets. Amphibious training usually begins 
in the spring and continues through the fall. The Chinese media frequently highlight 
this training, which can be exploited, as necessary, for its propaganda and deterrence 
value.36
The PLA ground forces have approximately fifteen transport ship squadrons or groups  
(船运大队), each with from five to twenty landing craft assigned to two or three smaller 
units (中队). These units appear to be equipped mostly with Type 271–series and Type 
068 (Yuqing-class) landing craft and are found in the army coastal-defense force, some 
joint logistics subdepartments, and the Nanjing Military Region Army Reserve Logis-
tics Support Brigade. Additionally, a ship group (船艇大队) is located at the Dongshan 
Island training area and provides support to army amphibious training. These units 
potentially add about another two hundred small landing craft for amphibious opera-
tions in coastal waters. Army landing craft can be identified by bow numbers that start 
with the Roman letter for the military region to which they are assigned (B, G, N, J, or 
S), followed by another letter and three numbers.37
PLAN amphibious assets may be augmented by incorporating civilian vessels into opera-
tions. Maritime militia units have organized ship units, and civilian fishing and trans-
port vessels also may be mobilized. In many cases civilian ships require modifications 
to transport military equipment. Civilian ships also could secure artillery and rocket 
launchers to their decks to provide fire support for landing operations. Under most 
conditions, civilian shipping would not be suitable for conducting amphibious assaults; 
they would be more appropriate for landing in ports or at piers captured in the early 
phase of an operation. In 2012, the first civilian roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ship designed 
to national defense specifications made its maiden voyage out of Yantai, Shandong. The 
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36,000-ton Bohai Emerald Bead is the first of four such ships to be built. Each can carry 
over two thousand personnel and more than three hundred vehicles.38 Perhaps a dozen 
or more smaller civilian RO/RO ships could be made available to the PLA. While these 
ships were not designed specifically to transport military vehicles, they could add sig-
nificantly to the PLA’s lift capacity if a port was available for off-loading.39
Analysis
The Science of Military Strategy, published by the Academy of Military Science, states, 
“Warfighting and deterrence are two major functions of the armed forces.”40 The PLAN 
FAC and amphibious fleets have important roles in China’s war-fighting and deter-
rence posture. Both fleets demonstrate the continuing relevance of People’s War theory 
to the PLA. More than the FAC fleet, the amphibious force, particularly the Type 071 
LPDs, also has a role in nontraditional security missions, such as sea-lane protection (as 
demonstrated in Kunlunshan’s antipiracy deployment), and potentially in international 
disaster relief or civilian evacuation missions.
Although most foreign analysis that addresses China’s deterrence posture focuses on its 
nuclear dimension, the Chinese doctrine subsumes many more deterrence objectives 
than simply deterring nuclear war, including deterring a land or sea invasion of China; 
protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; deterring further steps toward 
Taiwan independence, along with the related mission of deterring U.S. military support 
to Taiwan in the event of conflict; and deterring “terrorism, separatism, and extremism.” 
Deterrence is based on possessing an “adequate deterrent force,” having the will to use 
that force, and ensuring the opponent understands China’s capabilities and will. The Sci-
ence of Military Strategy states that “[t]he more powerful the warfighting capability, the 
more effective the deterrence.” Military forces must be capable and well prepared; “those 
making purely bluffing threats and intimidations hardly can afford deterrence.”41
The modernization of the FAC and amphibious fleets meets all three requirements for 
deterrence. An “adequate force” has been built, and China’s will to use it has been pub-
licized through the Chinese media. There is little doubt that those China seeks to deter 
have understood the war-fighting potential these forces represent.
The Science of Military Strategy states that deterrence is considered a means of attaining 
both military and political objectives, but war fighting is to be used “only when deter-
rence fails and there is no alternative.”42 Moreover, caution is emphasized in making the 
decision to go to war: “Therefore, imprudent decision to use force is never permitted. . . . The 
reason for the existence of the army is to prevent and win a war. . . . We may not launch 
a war in a hundred years but we can never be unprepared for war for even one day. . . . 
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Only when an army is fully prepared for war, can it be prudent to start a war and react 
quickly in war.”43
People’s War is closely related to China’s deterrence posture. The Science of Military Strat-
egy states that China has a “massive capability” for deterrence through People’s War.44 
The book’s final chapter on guidance for future high-technology wars describes “five 
combinations” of People’s War that mix (1) regular troops with the masses, emphasiz-
ing China’s inland and coastal border regions; (2) regular naval warfare with guerrilla 
warfare on the sea, developing the strategy and tactics of People’s War on the Sea  
(海上人民战争); (3) “trump card” (杀手锏) weapons with flexible strategy and tactics, 
especially in playing “hide and seek” with the enemy; (4) high-tech weapons with legacy 
weapons, understanding the “phenomenon that several generations of weapons and 
equipment” will “coexist” for a long time; and (5) military warfare with political and 
economic warfare to present the widest front possible to the enemy.45 Both the FAC and 
amphibious fleets display these elements of People’s War as adapted for the twenty-first 
century. 
The PLA FAC and amphibious forces are “regular troops” that would be supported by 
the militia and civilian forces in their operations. FAC units especially would be involved 
in “guerrilla warfare on the sea” using hit-and-run, ambush-style tactics. The Type 022 
Houbei force, with its stealth and missile capabilities, can be considered a “trump card” 
weapon, which demonstrates that the “concept of People’s War is not confined to the war 
of low technology.”46 As with nearly all other PLA units, both fleets also illustrate how 
more-advanced weapons are integrated with older legacy systems.
But the FAC fleet will be used primarily in China’s coastal waters as an essential element 
of offshore defensive operations. While the amphibious fleet can be used in offshore op-
erations, its newest additions, the Type 071 Yuzhao LPDs, are joining other surface com-
batants in operations and training in distant waters. These ships, along with the civilian 
RO/RO ships and other transport capacity, are an important development in overcoming 
the PLA’s well-recognized shortcoming in long-distance sealift capacity.
In coming years, we can expect to see more far-seas training, with the Type 071s being 
active participants. At the end of 2012, ESF deputy commander Qiu Yanpeng noted that 
the PLAN had conducted seven “open-sea training” exercises that year.47 This doubled 
the operations tempo that PLA Navy commander Wu Shengli described in 2009 of more 
than thirty combat group operational/campaign exercises (作战集团战役演习) over the 
previous ten years.48 The earlier numbers equated to an average of one such exercise per 
fleet per year—a tempo that now has more than doubled.
This increase in training is necessary, however, because the PLA and PLAN leadership 
sees PLAN capabilities as falling short of those displayed by other modern navies. Qiu 
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Yanpeng said so directly at the same time he noted the increase in training for 2012: 
“There is still a considerable [sic] room for improvement in the intensity and effective-
ness of our open-sea training, whether it is compared to the naval forces of other coun-
tries or concerned with the requirements of Chinese navy building and development.”49
That same day, the Chinese-language PLA Daily newspaper carried an article stating that 
the level of naval training is incompatible with the requirements of winning naval battles 
in a local war under informationized conditions (海军军事训练水平与打赢信息化
条件下海战的要求不相适应). The article stressed the need to improve navy training 
through the “2015 Naval Military Training Reform Implementation Program” (《2015
年前海军军事训练改革实施方案》).50
The need for more training, along with the size of the amphibious fleet, suggests that the 
PLAN still sees itself preferring to play its deterrent role and participating in nontradi-
tional security missions in the near future. Nonetheless, as a loyal servant of the Chinese 
Communist Party, the PLA will obey the orders of the Party leadership and seek to con-
duct any assigned mission to the maximum extent possible with the forces and capabili-
ties at hand.
The 2004 white paper described the Chinese government’s general intentions for PLAN 
modernization:
In accordance with the principle of smaller but more efficient troops, the PLA Navy com-
presses [i.e., reduces or flattens] the chain of command and reorganizes the combat forces 
in a more scientific way while giving prominence to the building of maritime combat 
forces, especially amphibious combat forces. It also speeds up the process of updating its 
weaponry and equipment with priority given to the development of new combat ships as 
well as various kinds of special-purpose aircraft and relevant equipment.51 
That statement was consistent with the general policy of making the PLA smaller and 
more technologically advanced, and specifically identified the aim of improving amphib-
ious capabilities and developing new combat ships, although it did not mention the FAC 
fleet. Over the past decade, the PLAN has done what the white paper stated it would do.
The modernization of the PLAN’s FAC and amphibious fleets has resulted in an increase 
in the PLA’s lethal and assault capabilities in China’s immediate offshore regions and at 
greater distances from the Chinese coast. The two forces, which will be used in coor-
dination with other naval units and civilian assets, add to China’s capabilities for both 
deterrence and war fighting. However, the PLA leadership understands that more needs 
to be accomplished, especially in both the quality and quantity of training, before these 
forces are on par with those of other advanced navies.
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The introduction of the Type 022 Houbei FAC has improved China’s coastal-defense ca-
pabilities greatly, making it more dangerous for enemy surface vessels to conduct combat 
operations within a few hundred miles of China. But for these craft to be effective they 
must be integrated with other PLA capabilities, particularly intelligence, command-and-
control, and air-defense units. These boats illustrate the Chinese leadership’s continued 
concern for defense of the mainland. It therefore is not surprising that more Type 022s 
have been built than any other single naval ship or craft. The Houbei exemplifies the 
adaptation of People’s War to twenty-first-century requirements.
The existing amphibious fleet apparently is considered sufficient for China’s deterrence 
requirements. It is too small for a major campaign across the Taiwan Strait unless aug-
mented by large numbers of civilian ships and other craft. The distribution of the force 
along the entire coast minimizes the chance for strategic surprise, as units would have to 
be assembled from all over the country to prepare for a large-scale amphibious opera-
tion. Chinese shipyards could surge amphibious craft production, but that too would be 
discovered easily. The size of the force is sufficient for smaller operations along China’s 
east coast or in parts of the South China Sea. The Pentagon concludes: “With few overt 
military preparations beyond routine training, the [People’s Republic of China] could 
launch an invasion of small, Taiwan-held islands such as Pratas Reef or Itu Aba. A PLA 
invasion of a medium-sized, defended, offshore island such as Mazu or Jinmen is within 
the mainland’s capabilities.”52
Currently, major PLAN amphibious operations are constrained by the requirement 
to stay within the range of land-based air support. The range of such operations will 
increase when an amphibious task force can operate under the cover of carrier-based 
aircraft.
While the Type 071 Yuzhao has some utility in a Taiwan scenario, it better represents the 
PLA’s vision for longer-range operations in far seas. The appearance of Jinggangshan at 
the southernmost extent of the South China Sea in March 2013 demonstrated these new 
capabilities, although the Chinese leadership recognizes the need for more training be-
fore the PLAN is ready to tackle the full scope of its potential future missions. The PLA 
has announced that there will be more far-seas training, which is expected to increase 
PLAN readiness levels and also contribute to the PLAN’s deterrence posture and the 
pursuit of other national security objectives.
The PLAN FAC and amphibious fleets are likely to continue to modernize and improve 
their capabilities. They will focus on operations in both the near seas and more-distant 
waters. They constitute both soft (deterrence and nontraditional security) and hard 
(war-fighting) elements of Chinese military power.
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A maritime strategy is designed primarily to defend a nation’s homeland and associ-ated vital national security interests on the oceans and seas. It also may incorporate 
nontraditional naval missions, which seek to maintain the security of the commons 
against threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy and 
international criminal activity, and terrorism, and to perform humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief ashore.
But maritime strategy is not simply a matter of naval forces and national security objec-
tives; a nation’s domestic political priorities and economic demands are major, indeed 
vital, influences on developing and executing a maritime strategy. Maritime strategy sub-
sumes naval strategy. Developing effective strategy does not result primarily from com-
posing “overarching, erudite strategic theories” but from “day by day policy and program 
choices, backed up by thorough training and experience . . . and by a modern, multi-
faceted fleet capable of swift deployment and effective employment” of naval forces.1
Elements of China’s Maritime Strategy
China has not promulgated a formal maritime strategy, a failure criticized by represen-
tatives at the spring 2012 meeting of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. They 
called for the government to “formulate and promulgate a complete, comprehensive, and 
systematic maritime development strategy, with all the national political, economic, and 
military factors being brought into consideration!”2
But important Chinese governmental and Communist Party documents do address 
maritime strategic issues. One is the 1998 National Ocean Policy of China.3 The 1998 
Ocean Policy identifies several maritime concerns that remain pertinent today. These 
tasks have been placed within a framework of “four coordinations”: between national 
and international maritime law; among China’s many agencies concerned with the man-
agement of maritime issues; between traditional and nontraditional maritime security 
issues; and between national priorities and international paradigms.
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Another is the series of biennial defense white papers first published in 1998, the most 
recent of which at this writing was published in early 2015. These papers contain impor-
tant indicators of maritime strategic thought.4 The concept of “offshore defensive opera-
tions” was addressed in the 2004 white paper, which stated that “the Navy has expanded 
the space and extended the depth for offshore defensive operations.” This verbiage was 
repeated in the 2006 iteration, then expanded in the 2008 white paper: “[S]ince the 
1980s the Navy has realized a strategic transformation to offshore defensive operations.” 
The 2010 paper discussed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) strategy 
in terms of “the requirements of offshore defensive operations” in three maritime areas 
of concern: the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. Sometimes referred to as the 
“three seas” or the “near seas,” these waters clearly are considered by Beijing to form the 
maritime arena of greatest strategic concern to the nation.5
“Offshore defensive operations” within the three seas represent a formidable national 
strategic focus. For instance, on July 8, 2010, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson 
stated, “We resolutely oppose foreign military ships and aircraft coming to the Yellow 
Sea and other Chinese adjacent waters and engaging in activities that influence China’s 
security interests.”6 This view, combined with aggressive actions against foreign fish-
ing craft in the South China Sea and against U.S. surveillance aircraft and ships, points 
toward a view of these waters as “sovereign” and of vital strategic concern to China.
The 2013 white paper continued to emphasize the PLAN’s responsibility “to protect the 
seas and oceans, and build China into a maritime power.” The navy was “responsible for 
safeguarding [China’s] maritime security and maintaining its sovereignty over its territo-
rial seas” while executing “its offshore defense strategy.”
Additionally, China’s civilian and military leaders have addressed maritime strategy in 
speeches and articles. President Hu Jintao’s “Four Historic Missions” speech in 2004, for 
instance, reflected important maritime strategic interests. These included Taiwan’s status, 
maritime border issues, and “protection of China’s expanding national interests,” includ-
ing missions other than war.7 Hu returned to these themes in a December 2006 speech 
to the Party’s Central Military Commission, in which he urged the PLA “to develop 
capabilities to deal with many kinds of security threats and complete diversified military 
tasks . . . in distant waters.”8
Adm. Liu Huaqing, who may be called the father of modern China’s first global navy, 
developed a strategic plan of sorts in the 1980s. His program for modernizing the navy 
was well thought out, recognized internal PLA budget priorities (and his goal to alter 
those to increase PLAN funding), and was essentially defensive.
Liu’s “island chains” construct is best viewed as a reactive strategic paradigm, as he re-
sponded to perceived U.S.-imposed lines at sea. Liu viewed the island chains as barriers 
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to be overcome, not as limits on China’s maritime objectives or as bases for maritime 
defensive perimeters.9
In sum, China’s “maritime strategy” is traditional: it is concerned primarily with defense 
of the homeland. Secondarily it is concerned with the other missions addressed above: 
defense against threats on the maritime commons; safeguarding economic interests, 
including the security of sea lines of communication; and responding to humanitarian 
crises afloat and ashore. Beijing’s “maritime strategy” also supports the continued rule of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), suggesting that China would employ its navy in 
situations for political reasons that other nations might not anticipate.
The Strategic Maritime Missions
Although China’s maritime strategy is not formally promulgated, it includes traditional 
naval missions. These support both domestic political goals, especially sovereignty con-
cerns, and traditional economic objectives.
Defending China’s Littoral
Defense of the homeland and its littoral waters is Beijing’s number one strategic priority 
for its navy. The U.S. Navy is concerned with the regional plan of operations China ap-
parently is developing, what non-Chinese analysts describe as antiaccess and area-denial 
(A2/AD). This plan is intended to guarantee China control of the sea in the maritime 
area deemed vital to its national security. More specifically, it is intended to prevent an 
opponent—the United States—from intervening in a scenario involving armed conflict 
with Taiwan, or other military operations in the three seas.
China presumably would rely primarily on submarines, antiship cruise missiles  
(ASCMs), and antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) to defend its maritime interests in the 
area between the Chinese coast and the second island chain, a distance of approximately 
1,600 nautical miles (nm).10 This would constitute an application of China’s policy of 
“Active Defense,” in its own view—whereas a U.S. analyst might well consider it “of-
fensive.” The PLAN’s surface combatants likely would be responsible for a defensive line 
relatively close to the coast.
The PLAN will not be constrained by lines or Western defensive concepts in defend-
ing China’s maritime interests. Its doctrine is one of “strategically defensive and active 
self-defense counterattack,” which could be triggered “as soon as the enemy splits and 
invades China’s territory, severely harming China’s interests, . . . equivalent to firing the 
first shot at China at the strategic level.” Furthermore, the PLA’s mission is “to do all we 
can to dominate the enemy by striking first . . . as far away as possible.”11
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The 2006 Science of Campaigns ascribed to maritime operations shifting battle lines and 
the maneuverability and offensive power of naval forces. It discussed naval campaigns 
at length, noting the sea’s characteristics of openness and lack of defensive lines, which 
require taking the initiative with offensive operations to neutralize enemy forces. The 
volume emphasized flexibility and the clever employment of tactics and forces, with 
asymmetric operations on, above, and beneath the sea. Even naval defensive operations, 
in the PLAN’s view, should be imbued with an offensive spirit based on taking the initia-
tive and attacking the opponent’s weak points.12
PLAN strategists are focused on mobile, noncontiguous, nonlinear operations that by-
pass the island chains to achieve specific objectives for specific periods.
Sea Lines of Communication Defense
Chinese analysts have expressed concern that the United States might intervene in 
navigational choke points to intercept seaborne energy supplies destined for Chinese 
ports. From a naval operational perspective, this so-called Malacca Dilemma is base-
less, but apparently real at least to some in Beijing, and might provide maritime strategic 
rationale for PLAN planners. Maritime sovereignty disputes are a more serious strategic 
concern. So the region presents a Chinese maritime strategist with serious maritime 
security concerns, most of them attributed to U.S. containment.
Military Operations Other Than War
Military operations other than war (MOOTW) form a relatively new mission for the 
PLAN. The 2013 defense white paper assigned the navy responsibility for “law enforce-
ment, fisheries, [and securing] oil and gas exploitation” as well as ensuring “the safe flow 
of traffic in sea areas of responsibility.” The navy also regularly performs one traditional 
naval mission not specifically addressed in these documents: presence, or naval support 
for diplomacy.13
On a cooperative tack, the white paper touted the PLAN’s role in UN peacekeeping 
operations (UNPKOs), as well as its exercises with foreign navies. The paper took a posi-
tive slant on events and was worded for the public, but remains an important document, 
reflecting China’s maritime security concerns.
Despite the lack of a single authoritative description of China’s maritime strategy, a 
review of various Chinese documents and speeches reveals the missions that form a de 
facto maritime strategy for Beijing. This strategy seems to be driving PLAN moderniza-
tion, particularly in terms of the surface ships being acquired.
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Who Is the Strategic Opponent?
It is clear the PLAN views the U.S. Navy as “a strategic opponent of the Chinese Navy.” 
In addition, a 2012 article written by a nongovernmental analyst described Japan as an 
immediate concern, noting “naval hatred stretching over one hundred years, Diaoyu 
Islands sovereignty, maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, and the possibility of 
Japanese military interference in the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea.” Vietnam 
and the Philippines were categorized as “local tactical opponents” and India as a “poten-
tial blue-water opponent.” Summing up the strategic situation, the author concluded that 
the “Chinese navy now faces a maritime competition structure that involve[s] a broad 
maritime region, great depth, and multiple opponents.”14
The Fleet
China’s continuing economic growth, so crucial to continued CCP rule, is supported by 
one of the world’s largest and most modern merchant marines. Its effectiveness depends 
to a significant degree on the security of the maritime commons. Beijing believes that 
security requires a strong, capable navy.
For it to perform the strategic maritime missions that policy makers have outlined, they 
have directed the PLAN to continue developing and deploying “new types of subma-
rines, frigates, aircraft, and large support vessels” while building “a shore-based support 
system which matches the deployment of forces and the development of weaponry and 
equipment.” Particularly important is “the Navy [accelerating] the building of surface 
logistical platforms [and] working to improve its surface support capabilities,” to include 
“new methods of logistics support for sustaining long-time maritime missions.”15
Purchasing Soviet combatants in the 1950s and copying Soviet models in the 1960s and 
1970s marked the first era of PLAN growth. China’s maritime strategy during this period 
focused on coastal defense or army support.
The second era was marked by acquisition of the Sovremennys from Russia and Chinese 
construction of the Luhu and Luhai classes. In the 1990s, China made a commitment to 
build a navy with a new strategic mission, usually described in the United States as “mis-
sions other than war.”
China moved into a third and most significant period of naval surface ship modern-
ization after the turn of the twenty-first century, with indigenous construction of four 
new classes of guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) and several classes of guided-missile 
frigates (FFGs). This latest phase of ship acquisition is equipping the PLAN with its first 
warships able to support a maritime strategy focused beyond China’s littoral, throughout 
the three seas.16
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The navy’s most recent addition to the PLAN’s auxiliary forces is China’s first dedicated 
hospital ship, the Type 920, named Peace Ark, commissioned in 2008. This 23,000-ton- 
displacement ship has a combat mission, but to date has been Beijing’s primary platform 
for pursuing soft power, making humanitarian cruises to the western Indian Ocean and 
to the Caribbean Sea.
Future Intentions at Sea?
The decision early in the current decade to build additional underway replenishment 
ships indicates Beijing’s inclination to deploy a navy capable of operating at sea for ex-
tended periods. Two Fuchi-class oilers joined the fleet in 2005; one each was assigned to 
the East and South Sea Fleets. These are the first PLAN logistics-support ships capable 
of simultaneously providing destroyers and frigates with fuel, provisions, and ordnance. 
Two more of this class joined the fleet in 2013.17
Beijing has emphasized the navy’s increasing role in international efforts in general, 
striving “to maintain maritime security through multiple peaceful ways and means.” It 
highlighted PLAN ship visits to foreign ports, with “more than twenty naval ships” visit-
ing “more than thirty countries.”18 Additionally, the PLAN played its first prominent role 
in MOOTW in 2011, when the frigate Xuzhou, on antipiracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden, 
was dispatched into the Mediterranean to assist in evacuating Chinese citizens trapped 
by the civil war in Libya.19 That this frigate did not actually evacuate any Chinese citizens 
is not as significant as the fact that Beijing had the confidence to dispatch a warship on 
such a mission and that the PLAN was able to execute the mission successfully.
China’s naval building program remains focused on missions in the three seas, but the 
PLAN is adapting gradually to new missions in distant seas. Only the newer destroy-
ers and frigates are being deployed on the Gulf of Aden mission. These are the PLAN 
surface combatants well suited to escorting China’s developing carrier fleet.
During the past two decades, the PLAN has added to its fleet approximately seventeen 
DDGs, twenty-four FFGs, at least ten corvettes, and more than sixty Houbei-class patrol 
craft capable of firing cruise missiles. Additionally, three Yuzhao-class amphibious 
transport docks (LPDs) and twenty-four tank landing ships (LSTs) have been added to 
China’s amphibious force.
China’s program of naval modernization has accelerated since 2000, with most of these 
new ships commissioned during that period. This pace reflects Beijing’s expanding but 
carefully modulated strategic maritime ambitions.
As the new century’s second decade proceeds, China is deploying ships capable of 
operating in coherent, if not yet integrated, naval task forces able to project power on the 
seas. These new platforms are the beginning of the first really modern Chinese navy that 
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may serve to deter Taiwan, thwart U.S. intervention, and secure China’s territorial claims 
in the East and South China Seas.
New Destroyers. The PLAN continues to acquire new classes of frigates and destroy-
ers, each more technologically advanced and capable than its predecessors. These ships 
remain few in number, although not as few as the support ships necessary for the PLAN 
to execute long-range, long-term deployments on a regular basis.20
China’s new DDG classes—which should give pause to the U.S. and other navies—began 
with the Luzhou class, or Type 51C. The first ship in this class is Shenyang (DDG 115), 
launched in 2003 and commissioned in 2004. The second class member is Shijiazhuang 
(DDG 116), also launched in 2003 but commissioned in 2005. The ship’s formidable 
antiair warfare (AAW) system is built around the Russian SA-N-20 Rif-M missile, the 
naval version of the S-300; acquired by China in 2002, this is a twenty-year-old but still 
daunting missile system, with an 81 nm range and maximum speed of Mach 6.
The Luzhous are also equipped to participate in the antisurface warfare (ASUW) mis-
sion area, armed with eight potent C-803 surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). The ship 
exhibits the typically limited PLAN antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability. Its primary 
ASW weapon should be the helicopter it is capable of embarking, but operating this 
aircraft is limited by the lack of a hangar.
Joining the fleet contemporarily with the Type 51C are the three Luyang ship classes, 
the Types 52B, 52C, and 52D, displacing approximately the same seven thousand tons as 
the 51C. The 52s appear to be a Chinese version of the Soviet Sovremenny-class DDGs, 
intended as a multimission naval task group’s primary ASUW platform. Their main bat-
tery is the same box-launched C-803 SSM found on the 51C.
The several Type 52C and 52D DDGs appear to be built on the same hull as the 52B 
and equipped with the same propulsion plant, guns, and ASW and electronic counter-
measures capabilities. However, their primary mission is AAW; the ships’ most notable 
topside feature is an Aegis-like phased-array radar system. They apparently are armed 
with the Hongqi (HQ-9) AAW missile system, with a range of 54 nm and speed of Mach 
3, relying on semiactive radar homing. The ship also has a very capable ASUW suite, 
composed of eight C-802 SSMs in two cylindrical launchers amidships. These are the 
first Chinese combatants capable of area AAW, a key requirement for operating multi-
ship formations.
New Frigates. The PLAN is acquiring the Jiangkai I and II–class FFGs, which, while 
significantly less capable than the DDGs, exhibit the most “stealthy” characteristics of 
any PLAN ship. They may have been designed to operate primarily in littoral waters, but 
apparently have been performing very well during extended operations in the Gulf of 
Aden.
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China also is building a new, smaller class of multimission-capable escort, the Type 056 
corvette. This 1,300-ton-displacement warship will be ideal for sale to foreign nations, 
but also provides the PLAN with an escort vessel well suited to coastal waters.21
New Amphibious Warfare Ships. Since 2000, the PLAN’s shipbuilding program has 
included modernization of its amphibious force, without significantly expanding that 
force’s capacity—the PLAN is still limited to transporting approximately one mecha-
nized division of fully equipped troops.22
China has built more than twenty new LSTs and smaller medium landing ships (LSMs) 
since 2000, all capable of landing troops and equipment directly on a beach, over a bow 
ramp, and all equipped with a flight deck. However, all these ships have been built with-
out hangars or aviation maintenance facilities.
These ships could serve in a Taiwan scenario, but the paucity of suitable landing beaches 
on that island and the positive trend at this writing in the relationship between Beijing 
and Taipei make an amphibious assault unlikely. Instead, recent events in the South 
China Sea and the new PLAN bases in that theater indicate that China’s amphibious 
force has a strategic focus on the disputed land features south of Hainan.
New Fast-Attack Craft. China’s newest class of small combatant is the Houbei-class cata-
marans, which the PLAN began building in 2004. At least sixty are now in commission 
or under construction. They are small, displacing just 250 tons, but remarkably seawor-
thy because of their wave-piercing hull. Each Houbei is armed with eight C-803 SSMs. 
If equipped with a datalink capability, they provide the PLAN with a new capability to 
deploy anti–surface ship barriers in coastal waters that would be nearly immune from 
submarine attack and would offer a difficult target to attacking aircraft.23
Mission Capability
The surface combatant force has made major strides in the past decade, now mustering 
its first area AAW defense destroyers and more-capable ASW ships. The next destroyer 
class is reportedly well into the design process and will represent a significant increase 
in size, perhaps displacing over ten thousand tons, matching the size of the U.S. Arleigh 
Burke–class destroyers. The PLAN is focusing on the Luyang and Jiangkai classes as its 
primary surface combatants.24 The Chinese navy is building a numerically large class for 
the first time since the Luda DDGs.
Despite its new platforms, the PLAN’s command-and-control (C2) information manage-
ment remains problematic, although “link” systems are in place, allowing coordinated 
operations both among ships and between a ship and its embarked helicopter. It seems 
clear that the PLAN, even in its newest ships, has yet to demonstrate the C2 capability 
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necessary to conduct net-centric operations successfully in the twenty-first-century 
maritime battle space.
In sum, the Chinese navy at the beginning of the century was still severely limited in 
several warfare areas necessary to a modern strategic maritime force. Currently the 
PLAN is developing that credibility in all warfare areas—even if it remains marginal in 
AAW, antimine warfare (AMW), and force integration, and simply inferior in ASW.
State Oceanic Administration
China deploys a large number of smaller vessels organized under various national min-
istries. Beijing is attempting to increase the utility of these organizations, marked by the 
March 2013 announcement that the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) would retain 
or take administrative control of the coast guard, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, 
China Marine Surveillance, and Border Maritime Police.25 This very logical step poten-
tially will provide a single national ministry, Land and Resources, with the capability and 
authority via which Beijing can exercise rational control over its maritime enforcement 
organizations.
Several points of uncertainty remain, however. First is the as yet unclear role of the State 
Oceanic Commission, also recently announced. Second is the unclear role and chain 
of command of the Maritime Safety Administration. Third is the issue of operational 
control of the SOA’s newly assigned units. Will the coast guard, for example, no longer be 
operationally controlled by the Ministry of Public Security? Finally, and most impor-
tantly, will the newly authoritative SOA be able to maintain its independence from the 
PLAN, which reportedly for many years has sought the ability to call on China’s “coast 
guard” forces and resources to supplement its maritime missions?
PLAN Strategic Readiness Today
The PLAN’s number of state-of-the-art ships does not yet give it the ability to dominate 
East or South Asian waters, when measured against the U.S. Navy, the Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force, or possibly even the Indian navy. However, measuring total naval 
forces against one another is not particularly useful in strategic terms; what is more 
meaningful is a Clausewitzian measure: How large and effective a naval force can China 
deploy against a given objective at a time of Beijing’s choosing? Whether this mission 
concerns Taiwan or an East or South China Sea objective, Beijing likely will be able to 
seize the initiative when employing its new navy.
China’s recent naval exercises and deployments have demonstrated the PLAN’s ability to 
employ twenty-first-century ships on operations to far seas. More significant than the 
number of advanced technology platforms joining the PLAN, however, is the strategic 
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maritime direction they indicate Beijing has adopted. As discussed above, the shorthand 
by which U.S. observers refer to this perceived goal is A2/AD.
The PLAN presumably is writing operational doctrine to enable its ships to play an 
important role in accomplishing A2/AD in the three seas. This comprises a coherent 
maritime strategy that reflects PLAN capabilities.
China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, joined the fleet in 2012. The ship has yet to receive 
a full carrier air wing, but organization of the PLAN’s first such wing was announced in 
May 2013.26 Beijing almost certainly will build two or more additional carriers, pos-
sibly nuclear powered. More important than the carriers themselves is their symbolism 
of Beijing’s apparent intention to deploy a navy capable of out-of-area operations on a 
sustained basis.
Beijing’s focus on maritime issues is understandable, given China’s dependence on 
seaborne trade, its 10,250 nm of coastline, and its more than 6,500 claimed islands. 
China is also the world’s leading shipbuilder and its shipping fleet is the world’s fourth 
largest. China has eight of the world’s ten largest harbors, and its “ocean-related activi-
ties” constituted almost 10 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 
2009.27 Finally, while Chinese government officials have listed as “core interests” only the 
sovereignty status of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, classifying the East and South China 
Sea disputes as “sovereignty issues” suggests that these also could be considered “core 
interests.” These disputes would then rise significantly in Beijing’s priorities and pose a 
greater chance that the PLAN would be employed to enforce strategic policies.
In a long 2011 article, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Dai Bingguo argued that China 
had been following and would continue to follow a national policy of “peaceful develop-
ment” rather than following “the western powers’ practice of invasion, plunder, war, and 
expansion.” That is a very selective view of China’s history. Furthermore, as a professor 
at China’s National Defense University noted, “peaceful development . . . does not mean 
that military means are not employed.” 28
Will the beliefs embodied in Dai’s discourse affect the PLAN’s future composition, 
capability, and strategic employment? China’s mantra about future naval modernization 
includes the claim that the country never has been expansive or aggressive, nor has it 
stationed military forces overseas. All these claims are extremely debatable, given China’s 
dynastic history of expansion and foreign expeditions, but it is too soon to know to what 
extent current PLAN modernization will take Chinese forces overseas.
The PLAN’s near-term strategic focus will remain on potential Taiwan scenarios, which 
include U.S. naval intervention. East and South China Sea concerns are secondary. Fu-
ture out-of-area PLAN operations likely will expand, particularly after the Taiwan issue 
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is resolved. Such operations may focus on sea lines of communication security, but more 
practically will reflect the historically typical move by a nation gaining global economic 
status: deploying a global navy.
Two issues of particular concern to the PLAN are, first, India’s apparent maritime 
strategy of effectively controlling the Indian Ocean and, second, the potential for the 
United States to control navigational choke points crucial to China’s trade, and hence to 
its economy. Beijing may be exaggerating both concerns, but that does not reduce their 
influence in China’s maritime strategic thought, which seems to assume that the United 
States is determined to contain and encircle China. One analyst at the influential PLA 
Academy of Military Science has described the PLAN as “relatively weak,” with “China’s 
maritime security at the mercy of . . . the United States Navy.”29
Future Chinese maritime expansion will depend in large part on the nation’s continu-
ing GDP growth and lack of serious threat to its very long land borders. In fact, China is 
already a global maritime power when one considers the nation’s existing navy, globally 
ranked merchant fleet, shipbuilding industry, and cargo-handling seaports.
Beijing must be reassessing continually how much to invest in the PLAN and how to 
employ its modernizing capabilities. Previous examples of developing nations emerging 
as global powers indicate that if China’s global economic impact continues to grow, so 
will its navy.
Beijing’s national security concerns are traditional, including defense of the homeland 
and against potential threats in the near seas, especially relating to Taiwan’s status. Ad-
ditionally, the PLAN already has demonstrated its ability to conduct noncombat naval 
missions, including counterpiracy operations, evacuation of Chinese citizens from 
danger zones, disaster relief, presence, and UNPKOs.
China views the United States as the primary strategic threat to its national security 
interests, especially in view of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the 1996 Taiwan Strait 
crisis, as well as updated U.S. defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, 
and Australia. The U.S. determination to strengthen relations with Vietnam, Singapore, 
and India also causes concern in China. U.S. treaties and special relationships through-
out the Indo-Pacific area paint an unfavorable strategic picture for Beijing.
China apparently is trying to beat the historical odds by transitioning from a continen-
tal to a concurrent maritime power, so as to gain the latter without losing the former.30 
History does not offer ready examples of land powers also becoming sea powers, with 
France, Germany, and Russia having failed to do so. If China succeeds in building and 
deploying an effective global navy, it will have beaten the historical odds.
The PLAN has progressed from operating obsolete Soviet ships to building near-state-
of-the-art combatants able to play their role in a formidable defensive maritime strategy. 
28 china maritime studies
It is deploying ships that are suitable for multimission task groups. However, Beijing 
remains focused on the three seas—while looking toward wider horizons.
Despite the lack of a public document with that title, China does have a maritime strat-
egy. It is unremarkable and traditional for a large, wealthy nation that is expanding its 
sea power. The PLAN surface fleet is an integral component of Beijing’s maritime strat-
egy. That strategy begins with defense of the homeland—defending the coast and littoral 
waters. For China, this encompasses a huge maritime area extending approximately 
1,600 nm from its coastline. The responsibility includes not just defense of those waters 
but defense of the extensive maritime trade on which China’s economy depends.
Second is strategic deterrence, a maritime capability the PLAN is well able to execute in 
conventional terms. The nuclear part of deterrence remains one for which China is still 
striving, but that appears to be on this side of the PLAN’s horizon.
The third element in Beijing’s maritime strategy is the ability to conduct long-range 
power projection on a situational, but if necessary recurrent, basis. The counterpiracy 
deployments to the Gulf of Aden since 2008 show that the PLAN is making progress 
toward achieving this capability.
Fourth is presence, the maritime diplomatic mission that China’s navy has demonstrated 
for the past quarter-century or more, as both warships and auxiliaries—from guided- 
missile destroyers to hospital ships—visit foreign ports and participate in exercises with 
foreign navies.
Fifth, and most important, is conducting combat operations at sea. This obviously is the 
first reason for which navies are created.
Former U.S. commander of Pacific forces Adm. Robert Willard stated that China “as-
pires to become a ‘global military (power)’ by extending its influence beyond its regional 
waters.”31 Some believe that a Chinese drive to global power will lead to conflict with 
the United States.32 That is far from certain, but the possibility must influence U.S. naval 
strategic thought.
China is building and deploying a twenty-first-century navy to be able to defend its 
interests at sea. A new force of surface combatants armed with impressive ASCMs and 
with growing AAW capabilities is emerging rapidly to serve Beijing’s maritime strategy.
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People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) forces are organized into three fleets: the North Sea Fleet (NSF), the East Sea Fleet (ESF), and the South Sea Fleet (SSF). 
Together they are charged with covering and protecting waters extending from China’s 
lengthy coastline.
The NSF is responsible for defending the Bo Hai (Gulf of Chihli) and Yellow Sea, and its 
nations of responsibility are North Korea and South Korea. Since this maritime area is 
closest to Beijing, China’s capital, naval specialists sometimes call the NSF the “Imperial 
Guard Fleet.”
The area of responsibility of the ESF is the East China Sea and the northeasternmost 
area of the South China Sea. So the ESF is believed to be tasked with preparing for a 
Taiwan crisis, operating around Japan’s southwestern island chain, and patrolling the 
Bashi Channel / Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippine Islands. The ESF’s 
hypothetical adversaries long have been both the robust naval forces of the Self-Defense 
Fleet (SDF) of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the mighty Seventh 
Fleet of the U.S. Navy, which have been close naval partners under the Japan–United 
States alliance for decades.
The SSF long has been charged with protecting China’s national interests in the South 
China Sea, where the maritime security situation has been complicated by maritime 
disputes among the coastal states in the area. In particular, China’s varied and unique 
unilateral claims in the South China Sea make the roles and mission of the SSF very 
complicated. The scope of the SSF’s operations is broad, from the most difficult anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) against submarines belonging to regional navies and the U.S. 
Navy to potentially complex amphibious warfare landings to seize remote and isolated 
islands.
Thus, to support China’s strategic objectives and protect its national interests, the PLAN 
has to maintain three separate fleets. The nature of China’s geopolitical situation makes 
integrated operations and mutual support efforts among them difficult to conduct in 
general.
Yoji Koda
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The PLAN Destroyer/Frigate Force
From 1990 to the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the PLAN tried 
to find the best solution for its fleets by building as many types of destroyers (DDs) as 
possible, but in small numbers. The PLAN has commissioned eight types of destroy-
ers since 1990. These included two 4,700-ton Luhus (052A) in 2004 and one 6,100-ton 
Luhai (051B) in 1999. China also purchased two sets of two Russian-built Sovremennys, 
Type Is in 1999/2001 and Type IIs in 2005/2006. All four were assigned to the ESF as 
“pinch hitters,” ready to fill a naval resource gap revealed during the 1996 Taiwan crisis. 
In parallel with the Russian purchase, two 7,000-ton Luyang Is (052B) were completed in 
2004, followed by two 7,200-ton Luzhou I (051C) sisters in 2006 and 2007.1
From this experience, the PLAN ultimately decided to build a single class of destroy-
ers—the Luyang II (052C) sisters—in great numbers.2 The PLAN commissioned two 
7,200-ton Luyang IIs (052C) in 2005. They greatly resembled the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh 
Burke–class guided-missile destroyer (DDG 51).3 Follow-on ships were not built during 
the next eight years, but eventually construction resumed, with a new ship (DD 150) 
commissioned in 2013.
The reason for this interruption is unknown, but it probably was necessary for the 
PLAN to conduct at-sea system qualification tests, fleet acceptance tests, and fleet 
tactical-operational evaluations in realistic, even fierce, simulated combat environments. 
These tests and evaluations always take time; in cases of complicated and sophisticated 
systems, they can take two to three years to complete. Then it can take many years to 
implement corrective measures to the malfunctions or shortcomings discovered during 
the tests and evaluations. So it is not unusual to see a period of interruption during the 
construction timeline. There are also rumors that improvements to facilities at construc-
tion dockyards were another reason for the six-to-eight-year Luyang II “construction 
holiday.”
In the renewed construction period, the PLAN has shifted to an improved and more 
modern Luyang III (052D). The first ship of this class was commissioned in early 2014. 
It looks as if the PLAN, like the U.S. Navy, finally has started to build a single class of 
destroyer in large numbers.
Frigate (FF) construction has proceeded in a very similar fashion, albeit at a faster pace. 
After the construction of fourteen Jiangwei Is and IIs (2,300 tons) in the 1990s and the 
first half of the first decade of the 2000s and two Jiangkai Is (4,000 tons) in 2005 and 
2006 as intermediate transition ships, the PLAN started quantitative production of its 
latest Jiangkai II–class frigates (4,000 tons). Since 2008, sixteen Jiangkai II frigates have 
entered fleet service. The Jiangkai II is a handsome ship, with good stealth design, and its 
combat systems look modern.
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There are about fifteen old Luda-family (modified ex-Soviet Kotlin) destroyers and 
about twenty-five obsolete Jianghu I/II–family frigates in fleet service today. However, 
given their long service lives and outdated combat systems, all these aged destroyers and 
frigates are likely to be retired by 2020.
Destroyer/Frigate Force Strength in 2020
What might the PLAN’s surface fleet look like five to ten years from now? A March 
2013 edition of the Japanese publication Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World) provides 
estimates of the likely order of battle of the PLAN fleet in 2020. It will serve as a basis for 
discussion in the sections below.4
North Sea Fleet. According to Sekai no Kansen, the NSF likely will have six destroyers 
and five frigates in 2020. Both destroyers and frigates will be of the most modern classes 
of these ships in the PLAN. Table 1 provides details.5
East Sea Fleet. The ESF, which has been the PLAN’s largest and most capable fleet, 
likely will be upgraded with six Aegis-like ships, i.e., four Luyang II and two Luyang III 
destroyers. Adding these to the four Russian-built Sovremenny sisters will improve the 
ESF’s destroyer force substantially. One noteworthy element of the Sovremenny destroyer 
is its formidable antisurface warfare (ASUW) capability, provided by SS-N-21 antiship 
missiles. The Mach 2-plus–capable SS-N-21 has been regarded as the toughest surface-
to-surface missile (SSM) threat against the surface forces of free-world navies since Cold 
War days. In this regard, the combination of the ASUW capability of the Sovremennys 
and the antiair warfare (AAW) capability of the Luyang sisters will provide well- 
balanced combat capabilities to the ESF, whose potential opponents long have been the 
SDF of the JMSDF and the Seventh Fleet of the U.S. Navy. Four old Luda destroyers 
most likely will be decommissioned.
In 2013, the ESF operated sixteen new frigates and about ten old frigates. However, 
unlike the destroyer forces, no new frigates will be added to the inventory. Instead, it is 
likely that about ten aging frigates will be taken out of service by 2020. As a result, in 
2020 the ESF will comprise ten destroyers and sixteen frigates. Table 2 provides details.
Type Class 2013 2020
DD 051C Luzhou   2   2
052A Luhu   2   2
052D Luyang III   0   2
FF 054A Jiangkai II   0   5
Table 1
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South Sea Fleet. The SSF has been in the spotlight owing to the intensification of South 
China Sea maritime sovereignty issues. For the PLAN to protect China’s national inter-
ests and fully support the country’s South China Sea policies, it must improve and main-
tain a robust and capable SSF. The estimated force strength of the fleet in 2020 will be 
only a bit smaller than that of the ESF. In 2020, the SSF likely will have eight destroyers 
and twelve frigates.
The SSF likely will possess six total Luyang II and III DDs, equal to the ESF’s. Its frigate 
force will be a little smaller than the ESF’s; however, the newest eight Jiangwei IIs will 
provide more operational flexibility in relation to the many Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) navies operating in the South China Sea.
The absence from the inventory of the SSF of the ASUW-oriented Sovremenny provides 
a striking contrast with the ESF. However, if we take into account the importance of 
ASW in SSF operations, it is natural for the PLAN to assign only Luyang-family destroy-
ers and Jiangkai II frigates to the SSF.
Like the other two fleets, the SSF likely will decommission five Ludas and twelve  
Jianghus of multiple variants by 2020. Table 3 provides details of force compositions.
Type Class 2013 2020
DD Sovremenny I/II   4   4
052C Luyang II   0   4
052D Luyang III   0   2
FF 054A Jiangkai II   4   4
054 Jiangkai I   2   2
053H3 Jiangwei II   6   6
053H2G Jiangwei I   4   4
Table 2
Type Class 2013 2020
DD 052B Luyang I   2   2
052C Luyang II   2   2
052D Luyang III   0   5
FF 054A Jiangkai II   6   8
053H3 Jiangwei II   4   4
Table 3
Note: Obsolete destroyer and frigate classes are not included.
Note: Obsolete destroyer and frigate classes are not included.
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The PLAN’s DD/FF Fleets in Comparison
How do the PLAN’s three fleets compare with the navies of major regional states—es-
pecially the JMSDF’s SDF and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Fleet (ROKF)? Table 4 
provides a detailed comparison of the three navies in 2020, as projected.
Even in 2020, each Chinese fleet still will be inferior in destroyer and frigate strengths to 
either the Japanese or Korean fleet’s. For example, the ESF will be only about 28 percent 
(10/36) the size of the SDF in numbers of destroyers, and 62 percent (26/42) in total 
destroyer and frigate numbers. Similarly, the NSF will be much smaller than the ROKF 
in 2020. Nonetheless, each PLAN fleet generally will be of good quality and capable of 
meeting mission requirements for each region.
The PLAN will continue to face several challenges, the most fundamental being the 
PLAN’s surface force allocation problem. Owing to China’s geopolitical realities, the 
PLAN needs to maintain three separate fleets on its three maritime fronts. In most of the 
possible national maritime crises of the future, it still would not be strategically feasible 
to concentrate destroyers and/or frigates from the different fleets into one force to take 
care of the problem in question. In the near future, the PLAN cannot resolve this classic 
military challenge of dispersion versus concentration of force. So the strength of each 
PLAN fleet will remain inferior to that of the SDF or the ROKF, to say nothing of the 
combined power of the SDF and the U.S. Navy (USN) Seventh Fleet.
The next challenge is resource allocation for new requirements. At some point in the fu-
ture, the PLAN will operate aircraft carriers as part of carrier battle/strike groups (CVB/
SGs). When this happens, it will need destroyers and frigates to form screening forces 
for CVB/SGs.
Another new future problem will be providing a force for Indian Ocean deployments. 
China’s dependence on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that pass through the In-
dian Ocean likely will increase substantially, so the PLAN very likely will be tasked with 
operating and safeguarding them.
However, the total force strength of the PLAN’s DD/FF force in 2020 barely will meet the 
requirements of the three regional fleets. Because of the time-consuming nature of sur-
face force buildup, a rapid and substantial increase of the DD/FF force is not likely. Even 
more worrisome for China, taking some of the already-assigned DDs/FFs from each 
Fleet PLAN SDF ROKF
NSF ESF SSF
Strength 6 DDs 10 DDs 9 DDs 36 DDs 12 DDs
5 FFs 16 FFs 12 FFs 6 FFs 6 FFs
Table 4
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mission-challenged fleet to create new CVB/SG screening forces and an Indian Ocean 
SLOC patrol force would end up creating more risk for the PLAN. In sum, establishing 
by 2020 any new add-on forces—e.g., organizing new fleets with the same force strength 
as the three current fleets—will be difficult. This could pose a serious dilemma for the 
PLAN.
The fourth challenge involves the actual capabilities of the new equipment. The PLAN’s 
modern destroyers and frigates—especially the Luyang II/III destroyers and Jiangkai II 
frigates—operate lots of new equipment and systems. However, on the basis of available 
information, such as observations of the PLAN’s at-sea training and exercises conducted 
around Japanese waters, it is doubtful that the systems’ true capabilities, especially for 
extreme performance in a realistic combat environment, have been tested effectively. 
The same goes for the tactics for fully employing the new equipment—it is unlikely they 
have been developed properly. These are many unknowns, but generally speaking the 
PLAN’s new equipment and the tactics for employing them, especially to conduct ASW, 
AAW, antiship missile defense, and electronic warfare (EW), may not be well tested or 
sufficiently developed.
The Aegis System as a Comparative Case Study
The history of the U.S. Navy’s development of today’s Aegis combat systems and their 
Burke-class platform sheds light on how difficult this process can be. Aegis represents 
the summit of USN AAW development, which began in December 1941. After the out-
break of World War II in the Pacific, USN fleet air defense had great difficulty stopping 
the naval aviation of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). In particular, after late 1944, the 
protection of surface forces, especially carrier task forces, from fierce, massive kamikaze 
air attacks provided the U.S. Navy one of its most severe challenges.
However, after suffering bitterly from casualties resulting from IJN air attacks, the U.S. 
Navy became able to protect its surface forces by developing AAW networks that con-
sisted of radar picket ships with air-surveillance radars; the carriers’ own radar; combat 
information centers; radar-directed combat air patrol fighters providing distant AAW; 
and layers of different kinds of antiaircraft guns (5-inch, 40 mm, 20 mm), with fire-
control systems providing terminal air defense.
However, the debut of jet fighters after World War II fundamentally changed the game; 
the effectiveness of using gun systems to provide terminal air defense came into ques-
tion. To resolve this challenge, the U.S. Navy started to develop surface-to-air missile 
(SAM) systems. This involved fully integrating the infant computer and rocket technolo-
gies from the mid-1940s into developmental efforts. By the mid-to-late 1950s, three sets 
of first-generation SAM systems (Talos, Terrier, and Tartar) began fleet service, with 
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Western navies widely referring to them as 3-T systems. These 3-T systems were consid-
ered the most successful SAM systems in the 1960s and ’70s.
As Soviet air threats against USN surface forces, especially carrier battle groups, became 
tougher and more complex, the U.S. Navy launched a new development attempt, nick-
named “Typhon,” that incorporated a revolutionary technological breakthrough. The 
basic idea of this AAW system was to engage multiple targets simultaneously at long 
distance. However, the attempt failed because of too many technological challenges, and 
the program was abandoned.
Around the same time, in parallel with the Typhon development, the U.S. Navy started 
improving SAM systems to meet the new threats fully by integrating the most sophisti-
cated missile technologies of the time. One measure was integrating Terrier and Tartar 
into the Standard Missile System (SMS). The attempt was successful, and the first gen-
eration of standardized SAM, SM-1, went into fleet service in the early 1970s.
However, the Soviet air threat in the 1970s and ’80s also made a jump in progress 
by introducing various longer-range, very capable SSMs, air-to-surface missiles, and 
underwater-to-surface missiles. In this extremely difficult environment, even the latest 
SM-1 system was considered insufficient to meet new Soviet air threats. Therefore, the 
U.S. Navy had no alternative to developing new shipboard AAW systems with revolu-
tionary concepts and ideas.
New technology and, more importantly, huge lessons learned from Typhon development 
supported this new attempt. The resultant shipboard AAW system, having the capabil-
ity to engage multiple targets simultaneously at long distances, was named Aegis. Major 
areas of development included command and control, phased-array radar, and the next-
generation SM-2 SMS.
During the late 1970s and early ’80s, extensive at-sea tests were conducted on board USS 
Norton Sound (AVM 1), a World War II seaplane tender converted into a missile test 
ship. Without this at-sea testing, the development of the Aegis system might have experi-
enced serious troubles or even failed.
The first operational Aegis cruiser (CG), USS Ticonderoga (CG 47), was commissioned 
in 1983. Even after the commissioning of the early production groups of Aegis CGs and 
DDGs, the Aegis combat system was improved and updated continuously by collecting 
data and deriving lessons learned from thousands of live-firing tests and exercises. With-
out these lessons learned from a long operational history and uninterrupted improve-
ments, supported by state-of-the-art technologies and a robust industrial base, today’s 
Aegis systems might have been impossible.
There are so many unknowns about the PLAN’s Aegis-like ships and systems. But the 
JMSDF has been keeping a keen, intense watch over all naval activities in Chinese waters 
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for some time, and there have been very few confirmed at-sea testing operations associ-
ated with the development of the PLAN’s systems. Thus, it may be fair to conclude that 
the PLAN’s Aegis-like systems are untested at sea.
The Remaining Challenges
The fifth challenge is the training posture, especially for ASW and AAW, of the PLAN’s 
surface force. On the basis of the JMSDF’s accumulated surveillance experience, the 
sophistication and maturity of the PLAN’s at-sea exercises and training events are far 
below Western navies’ standards. These criticisms apply to all elements of naval train-
ing basics, such as the training ranges around Chinese (Yellow Sea and East China Sea) 
and Japanese waters (northwestern Pacific), training support postures, and exercise 
scenarios.
The PLAN—especially its DD/FF force—likely has been making its best effort to correct 
these shortfalls and will continue to do so. However, it will not be easy for the PLAN, 
which is somewhat isolated owing to China’s nonaligned policy, to make rapid and 
meaningful progress in a short, limited time.
Regarding the JMSDF, which has had the world’s best allied partner-navy (the U.S. Navy) 
as an instructor and mentor since its founding, it is fair to say that it took twenty or even 
thirty years to grow into a really capable and functioning maritime partner. One striking 
difference between the JMSDF and the PLAN in this regard is that the JMSDF was built 
on human resources inherited from the IJN, which had seventy-six years of history and 
experience as a blue-water, oceangoing navy, with skills in all the conventional naval 
warfare areas. The PLAN is a growing and robust navy, but it is still a kind of branch 
service of the huge PLA, which is still largely focused on land power.
Last but not least are PLAN ASW capabilities, which must face the growing submarine 
forces of other Asian navies. Some regional navies have been undergoing ambitious sub-
marine buildup programs since the turn of the century. For example, it is public knowl-
edge that Indonesia’s navy has a plan to introduce about ten submarines, and Vietnam’s 
navy already has received three of six Russian Kilos.6 The Singaporean navy already 
operates four submarines. In addition to a training submarine in France, the Malaysian 
navy has two operational submarines in its fleet inventory.
In addition to these ASEAN navies in the South China Sea, the ROK Navy reportedly 
plans to build about twenty submarines, and in December 2010 the JMSDF announced 
plans to increase the number of its operational submarines from sixteen to twenty-two. 
In addition to these submarine forces of regional navies, it is clear that the U.S. Navy 
is prepared to deploy its nuclear-powered submarines—the finest in the world—to the 
region when necessary.
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When the fundamental nature of ASW—i.e., 24/7 warfare—is taken into account, the 
PLAN will face a serious and complex ASW challenge in its surrounding waters, espe-
cially in the South China Sea and East China Sea.
Having said all the above, we should not underestimate the PLAN’s capabilities. Simi-
larly, overestimation without concrete evidence is also a dangerous thing.
Aircraft Carriers
For China and the PLAN, having aircraft carriers (CVs) clearly has been an enduring 
dream, a symbol of having a world-class navy and being a superpower. For the PLAN, 
the carrier will be a key asset to complete missions successfully so as to support national 
objectives, especially strategic and tactical strikes, sea control, fleet air defense to support 
ASW, and noncombat missions. These represent the elements of a carrier’s added value 
that so attract today’s force planners and strategic thinkers.
However, this being said, what is the operational relationship between a carrier’s capa-
bility and China’s antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy? Is the carrier an essential 
element of China’s A2/AD strategy or not? In open-source information on China’s A2/
AD posture, antiship ballistic missiles and submarines often are discussed as the primary 
enablers of the strategy, with no mention of the carrier. What, then, is the PLAN’s ratio-
nale for having two or more CVs in the future?
Another factor that may mitigate the effectiveness of the PLAN’s carrier is weak and 
insufficient CV-protection capability. Of course, the carrier has been a magnificent mili-
tary asset for almost all naval warfare since 1941. But a carrier is also a high-value asset 
that must be protected. During World War II, the IJN and U.S. Navy contrasted strik-
ingly in this regard. After 1943, the U.S. Navy was extremely successful at protecting its 
overwhelming CV forces from both air threats and submarine attacks. The IJN, however, 
did an extremely bad job at CV protection, and ultimately lost twelve carriers to USN air 
attacks and eight to submarine attacks, out of a total force of twenty-four carriers.
If we consider the PLAN’s current and near-future AAW and ASW capabilities in light 
of the rapidly expanding submarine forces of regional navies, the PLAN surely will 
face serious problems in the area of CV protection. The PLAN has been taking steps 
to remedy these deficiencies. However, considering the JMSDF’s experience improving 
its own ASW and AAW capabilities, it may take decades for China to improve them 
significantly.
Amphibious Ship Force
The PLAN has been constructing the 19,000-ton Yuzhao-class amphibious ship (071) 
since 2008.7 Three ships are in fleet service now, with one more currently fitting out. In 
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addition to these ships, the PLAN operates a total of seventeen 5,000-ton tank landing 
ships (LSTs) of three different classes (Yuting II, Yuting I, and Yukan). Moreover, six 
medium landing ships (LSMs) (2,000 tons) and forty-four mechanized landing craft 
(LCMs) are in active service. Table 5 shows estimated amphibious ship assignments to 
the three fleets through 2020.
This table clearly projects that in 2020 the PLAN will be focusing its amphibious ships 
on the South China Sea, where many territorial disputes remain unsettled. At the same 
time, however, the SSF’s DD/FF component, which will be tasked with escorting the 
large amphibious ships, will be relatively small. This may be another problem for the 
PLAN should it attempt to conduct amphibious operations in the South China Sea. The 
growing number of submarines in Southeast Asian navies will make the PLAN’s force-
protection equation more difficult than before.
Another related element is the PLAN’s capability to conduct an opposed amphibious 
landing in a hostile threat environment. Currently, only the U.S. military is capable of 
doing so. The U.S. Navy–Marine Corps (USN-USMC) team established and polished 
this type of operation, including its tactics and equipment, through the island-hopping 
operations in the Pacific during World War II, and in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. 
But it took a long time before the USN-USMC team became an amphibious combat 
force to be reckoned with, and the capability was purchased at an extremely high cost 
during the war in the Pacific.
The PLAN’s capability to conduct this type of operation should be examined carefully. It 
would be a lot easier for the PLAN to conduct an opposed amphibious operation against 
islands in the South China Sea if the U.S. Navy were not in the area. This is one of the 
reasons China developed the PLAN’s A2/AD strategy, which tries to exclude the U.S. 
Navy from this area.
NSF ESF SSF
Kunlunshan  4
Yuting II  2  2 10
Yuting I  5  5
Yukan  7
LSM  4  6
Capacity (personnel) 500 5,000 7,000
DD/FF force 6 DDs, 5 FFs 10 DDs, 16 FFs 9 DDs, 12 FFs
Table 5
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Fast-Attack Craft
In recent years, the PLAN’s new fast-attack craft (FAC), the Houbei-class missile boat, has 
attracted the attention of regional and U.S. navies. The Houbei-class FAC incorporates 
many new features into its design, such as stealthy construction and shape, a wave-piercing 
catamaran hull with a top speed of more than thirty-five knots, and two sets of quad 
launchers for the YJ-83 antiship cruise missile (100 nm range, Mach 1.5 top speed). This 
boat is likely the most suitable terminal-defense asset against an incoming enemy surface 
force of any kind. The PLAN likely has built more than sixty Houbei FACs to date.
However, considering the research and experience of the JMSDF, there are several 
aspects to consider with respect to the real operational capability of this new equipment. 
For perspective: The JMSDF established a goal of building a robust coastal-defense force 
to counter a possible Soviet army landing on Japanese territory, especially the northern 
part. At the same time, the FAC also seemed as if it would be effective at conducting 
coastal defense and supporting straits-blockade operations. In the late 1980s the JMSDF 
selected several types of high-speed SSM boats as strong candidates to perform these 
missions.
In those days, aside from antilanding operations, one of the JMSDF’s strategic tasks was 
to control three straits: Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya. Such control would turn them into 
bottlenecks for the Soviet Union’s Pacific Fleet, homeported at Vladivostok. For years the 
JMSDF conducted in-depth and precise war-gaming and scientific research as well as 
mathematical and operational analyses. It concluded that the FACs were so vulnerable to 
air threats that their survivability in combat situations would be extremely low.
In addition to this, targeting information on enemy ships, which would be a key to 
successful operations by the surviving small number of lucky boats, constituted another 
serious problem. It became clear that in many combat scenarios the JMSDF’s fleet of one 
hundred P-3C aircraft would not be able to provide sufficient target information.
To achieve its coastal-defense posture under the alliance, the JMSDF had a plan to 
introduce three sets of six-missile-boat squadrons in three areas. However, the above-
mentioned research and examinations showed that about four boats would be destroyed 
before they could reach missile firing points. The remaining two boats would be able—
barely—to fire eight missiles against enemy combatants, but also would be destroyed, 
while returning to base. So a six-boat squadron would disappear after a single sortie. 
P-3Cs conducting the surveillance and targeting mission also would suffer substantial 
losses during their operations.
The JMSDF’s appetite for this type of small FAC faded very quickly, so it stopped its pro-
gram after building three hydrofoil boats in the early 1990s. Then, in the early part of the 
following decade, it built six high-speed SSM boats with a gliding-hull design. However, 
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the main mission of the latter FACs was not SSM attacks against enemy landing forces 
but quick reaction to North Korea’s covert seaborne infiltration attempts against Japan’s 
coastal waters.
Of course, FACs have other capabilities, especially in peacetime, such as offshore patrol. 
The PLAN seems to have launched an ambitious FAC production program; however, the 
FAC is one of the most difficult naval assets to operate, and it is doubtful the PLAN has 
undertaken the types of in-depth analyses the JMSDF conducted.
In recent years the PLAN has pursued an ambitious surface force buildup program. 
However, over the next ten years the PLAN’s surface force strength will remain insuf-
ficient even to fulfill all the PLAN’s requirements for the three regional fleets. This is the 
time-consuming reality of naval surface force buildup, which is true for all navies in the 
world, including today’s U.S. Navy. Because the PLAN has to maintain three separate 
fleets, it may take two decades or more to build up a surface force sufficient to provide 
for them, provide an escort force for carriers, and support Indian Ocean deployments. 
However, we should be careful neither to underestimate nor to overestimate the future 
capability of the PLAN.
Notes
1. In spite of their recent construction, the two 
Luzhou I sisters are obsolete steam-propelled 
DDs, the only ones the PLAN built during this 
period.
2. It follows standard practice to count some 
improved ships of the same variant as members 
of the Luyang II class. Even in the U.S. Navy, for 
instance, there are at least four different groups 
of Aegis DDGs: Basic, Flight I, Flight II, Flight 
IIA, and the upcoming Flight III.
3. There has been some speculation about the 
origins of the Chinese DDs’ Aegis-like weapons 
system on the Luyang IIs. While the real capabil-
ities of its onboard combat systems are unknown 
to outsiders, the Luyang II markedly resembles 
the U.S. Navy’s Aegis DDGs. Some even have 
said that the class is a clone of the USN DDG 51 
class. However, there is no evidence of copying 
by the PLAN, and it is also clear that the PLAN 
has developed, on its own, some programs to 
build the ship and its combat systems. Waiting 
to observe the Luyang II’s actual performance 
while gathering more information from various 
sources is preferable to engaging in unfounded 
speculation or prejudice on the subject.
4. Sekai no Kansen [Ships of the World] 774 (March 
2013), special edition for the PLA Navy.
5. Four old Luda DDs and four Jianghu I FFs are 
obsolete and are not represented in the table. 
Two of the latest 052Ds, improved with the 
Chinese, purportedly “cloned[,] combat system,” 
à la USN Aegis ships, and five Jiangkai II FFs 
will replace these obsolete ships.
6. Sam Lagrone, “Report: Vietnam Receives Third 
Kilo Attack Boat,” USNI News, February 3, 2015, 
news.usni.org/2015/02/03/reports-vietnam 
-receives-third-kilo-attack-boat.
7. Its characteristics: speed of twenty knots; 
capacity of five to eight hundred soldiers, four 
transport helicopters, and four air-cushion land-
ing craft (LCACs).
For several decades the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) was consid-ered to be a small coastal-defense navy comprising a large number of conventional 
submarines and fast-attack craft (FACs) with limited operational radius. The naval 
modernization that began in the late 1990s seems to have continued the emphasis on 
submarines and FACs. For instance, China has acquired a total of twelve Kilo-class 
diesel-electric submarines from Russia. It also has built and commissioned thirteen Type 
039G diesel-electric submarines and added three Type 093 nuclear attack submarines 
and three Type 094 nuclear ballistic missile submarines. Since 2005, thirteen Type 041 
diesel-electric submarines that are probably more capable than the Kilos have been 
launched or commissioned, and more are planned.1
Between 2004 and 2008, the PLAN also commissioned more than sixty Type 022 FACs. 
Featuring a wave-piercing catamaran hull, the Type 022 reportedly travels at a maximum 
speed of thirty-six knots and has an operational range of three hundred nautical miles. 
It also incorporates stealth features that reduce radar, visual, acoustic, infrared, and elec-
tronic emission signatures. Moreover, it is armed with eight 100 nautical mile–range YJ-83 
antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and a datalink antenna that can receive off-board 
sensors for over-the-horizon targeting information.2 Their high speed, small profile, and 
stealth features enable these craft to approach a target quickly and quietly from multiple 
directions. The operational range combined with the missile range, together with the 
datalink antenna, enables the Type 022 to cover most of the sea area near China’s shores. 
These features increase the craft’s probability of succeeding in engaging a superior oppo-
nent, thereby raising the cost to the opponent of operating in the near seas.
During the period in which the PLAN emphasized submarines and FACs in the order 
of battle, it conspicuously neglected procurement of major surface combatants—aircraft 
carriers and guided-missile destroyers and frigates. As recently as the middle of the last 
decade, Chinese holdings of these ship types consisted of four Sovremenny-class destroy-
ers acquired from Russia, two Type 051C destroyers, two Type 052B destroyers, two 
Type 052C destroyers, and two Type 054 frigates. This acquisition of a small number of 
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various types of ships led analysts to believe that the PLAN approach to its surface fleet 
was largely experimental, on the principle of “more research, more technological accu-
mulation, but less armament” (多研制, 多技术储备, 少装备). That is, a small number 
of hulls are built for test and trial, followed by construction of another small number that 
incorporate remedies to the defects identified during the test and trial. Beyond that, after 
launching the first two 052Cs in 2003, the PLAN constructed no new 052Cs for about 
seven years, leading some analysts to conclude that the PLAN would no longer acquire 
major combatant ships for its surface fleet.
Since late in the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, construction of major 
surface combatants has gained momentum. The PLAN’s first Type 001 aircraft carrier, 
purchased from Ukraine and refurbished with modern systems, was commissioned on 
September 25, 2012, and more reportedly are planned. Moreover, construction of Type 
052C destroyers resumed in late 2010, resulting in four new hulls. Furthermore, since 
2012, six Type 052D destroyers—an upgraded variant of the Type 052C—have been 
launched or commissioned or have begun construction. The Type 052D has a larger ac-
tive phased-array radar system than the Type 052C. Rather than the forty-eight surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs) embedded in eight revolver-type six-cell vertical launching 
systems (VLSs) on the 052C, the Type 052D has two canister-type thirty-two-cell missile 
VLSs. A total of sixty-two missiles reportedly includes a mixture of SAMs, ASCMs, anti-
submarine missiles, and land-attack cruise missiles. If this is true, the Type 052D may be 
China’s first dedicated multirole destroyer. Construction of more hulls is expected.
Finally, a large number of new frigates are being added to the PLAN’s surface fleet. Since 
2006, twenty 4,000-ton Type 054A frigates have been launched or commissioned, and 
more reportedly are planned. Furthermore, twenty-three Type 056 light frigates were 
launched or commissioned during the 2011–14 period. This 1,400-ton ship features a 
deep-V hull, sloped surface, and reduced superstructure clutter; a 150 kilometer (km)–
range air- and sea-search radar; and a helipad at the stern. It is armed with a 76 mm gun, 
two two-cell YJ-83 ASCM launchers, one eight-cell FL-3000N short-range SAM system, 
and two three-cell antisubmarine torpedo tubes.3 These features clearly are intended to 
enhance the speed, stealth, and versatility of the ship. The relatively simple and conven-
tional nature of the weapons systems and sensors reduces the production cost so a large 
number of ships can be acquired. Even though the Type 056 is not a major ship class, it 
can fulfill many surface warfare missions in the near seas.
The above account shows that the PLAN’s surface fleet is gaining importance. What can 
account for this new emphasis within China’s naval modernization? Conventional expla-
nations include the availability of funding and shipbuilding infrastructure and technolo-
gies and the need to replace a large number of obsolete surface ships. But because major 
surface ships such as aircraft carriers are perceived as vulnerable targets when facing a 
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superior opponent, the PLAN could have chosen to shift scarce funding and available 
technologies to constructing more and better submarines and FACs, which have the sort 
of stealth capabilities that give the PLAN asymmetrical advantages. In short, surface 
ships need not be replaced when they become obsolete; resources could be shifted to 
constructing more submarines and FACs.
This essay shows that two conceptual developments by PLA analysts account best for 
this new emphasis on the surface fleet. The first is the notion of “balanced development,” 
a lesson PLA analysts learned from modern Western naval history and from Soviet 
naval development during the Cold War. The second is the need to develop the PLAN’s 
“system of systems,” a major requirement for conducting “information systems–based 
system-of-systems operations” (基于信息系统的体系作战), a new concept that Hu 
Jintao endorsed in 2005 to guide PLA development in general and PLAN development 
in particular.
“Balanced Development”
The notion of “balanced development” is a lesson PLA analysts learned from two sources: 
modern Western naval history and Soviet naval development during the Cold War. PLA 
analysts also have suggested a few additional specific lessons related to balanced devel-
opment for China’s naval development.
Learning from Western Naval History
By examining the modern history of Western naval powers, PLA analysts have discerned 
two distinct models of fleet development. The first is the large surface fleet centered on 
battleships in the early days and aircraft carriers in modern days. Contributing to and 
shaped by the classical theory of sea power developed by Alfred Mahan, such a fleet is 
associated mostly with traditionally dominant sea powers such as Great Britain and the 
United States, and distinctively manifested in the British and U.S. navies. According to 
this analysis, the primary mission of such a fleet is to mass, maneuver to seek the enemy, 
then fight the opponent frontally and directly in a “decisive fleet engagement” (舰队决
战) or impose a “forceful blockade” (强势封锁). Victory in a decisive fleet engagement 
accomplishes the ultimate objective of a sea power: command of the sea. For this fleet, 
missions such as sea-lane operations, maritime commerce raiding, and amphibious 
operations are mostly secondary, and can be accomplished best after seizing command 
of the sea. Similarly, in such a fleet other, smaller-sized vessels such as submarines have 
only secondary importance, generally playing a supportive role to battleships and/or 
aircraft carriers.4
The second model is the smaller or asymmetrical fleet, composed mainly of subma-
rines and FACs. Such a fleet largely is associated with continental powers with maritime 
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aspirations that seek to challenge the status quo sea powers. Because of its inferiority, 
such a fleet would avoid a direct, frontal fight with the large fleet of a dominant sea 
power, eschewing the decisive fleet engagement that would surely doom it. Instead, it 
would pursue asymmetrical strategies. Even though such a fleet also might acquire some 
major surface ships, their purpose is not to participate in a decisive fleet engagement; 
instead, such ships mostly would coordinate and support submarine and other asym-
metrical operations.5
French naval strategists of the late nineteenth century argued for a small or asymmetri-
cal fleet that would exploit new technologies such as submarines, automated torpedoes, 
and torpedo boats and other light, fast ships. Rather than accepting a frontal fleet en-
gagement that favored the comparative advantages of an opponent such as Great Britain, 
this small fleet would target the chief vulnerability of the opponent as a maritime trading 
and colonial power: its merchant fleet. By raiding the opponent’s maritime commerce, 
the French hoped to create chaos in Great Britain and eventually force it to negotiate on 
terms favorable to France. This French Jeune École (Young School) of thought influ-
enced not only French naval development but the naval thinking of other continental 
powers, such as Germany, which prioritized submarines among its naval acquisitions 
during the later phase of World War I.
While the Jeune École emphasized the offensive use of the small fleet, the “small war 
strategy” school of the Soviet navy in the 1930s emphasized the defensive value of a 
small or asymmetrical fleet. The central premise of this school was that submarines and 
shore-based aircraft make close blockade difficult for traditional sea powers. Command 
of the sea was not the objective of the Soviet navy; therefore it would employ its small, 
submarine-based fleet to counter amphibious landings of the opponent, forcing the lat-
ter to retreat.6
According to this analysis, as a result of the advancement of ship-protection technolo-
gies against torpedoes and improvements in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies, 
particularly after the failure of German submarine warfare in World War I, the role of 
surface ships in coordinating with submarines and the need for a balanced fleet capable 
of raiding the opponent’s maritime commerce drew more attention. The interwar Ger-
man navy, for instance, built high-speed “pocket battleships” or “heavy cruisers,” whose 
primary purpose was to conduct sea-lane operations. They were designed to be fast 
enough to outrun the opponent’s more-powerful battleships so as to avoid a frontal fleet 
engagement, but their stronger armor and firepower would enable them to defeat the 
opponent’s cruisers and destroyers escorting convoys of merchant ships as protection 
against German submarines.
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Despite some successes, this strategy did not achieve the desired results during the 
early stages of World War II owing to a lack of coordination between surface combat-
ants and submarines. The German navy then adopted a “wolf pack” strategy, employ-
ing its submarines en masse in attacking the opponent’s merchant shipping in convoy. 
The Germany strategy failed partly because of a lack of sufficient submarines. But a 
more important reason, according to this analysis, was the German inability to coordi-
nate surface combatants and submarines effectively, that is, to employ surface ships to 
protect submarines and use submarines to support surface ships. The German experi-
ence apparently had an impact on later Soviet naval development, because Soviet navy 
commander Sergey Gorshkov allegedly believed that the Germans’ mistake was their 
“unbalanced fleet structure” (失衡的舰队结构).7
Learning from Soviet Naval Development
PLA analysts believe that Soviet naval development in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
was highly “unbalanced” or “deformed” (畸形), with a narrow focus on acquiring 
submarines, particularly strategic nuclear submarines. This largely was owing to Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev’s view that in the nuclear age “cruisers are good only for state 
visits,” “aircraft carriers are moving targets for nuclear rockets,” and the only effective 
naval weapons were nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles. The lack of major 
surface combatants and naval aviation, however, seriously hampered the comprehensive 
operational capabilities (综合作战能力) of the Soviet navy. This weakness was made 
starkly evident during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, during which the Soviet navy had 
no major surface combatants to deploy against the U.S. naval blockade, and deployed 
submarines were mostly locked on (锁定) by the U.S. Navy’s ASW forces. As a result, the 
U.S. Navy stopped, boarded, and inspected Soviet cargo ships carrying missiles to Cuba.8
According to PLA analysts, after Leonid Brezhnev succeeded Khrushchev as the Soviet 
leader in 1964, he highlighted the role of conventional war and military intervention 
in Soviet foreign policy, which elevated somewhat the role of the Soviet navy. But more 
importantly, guided by the notion of balanced development that Admiral Gorshkov 
endorsed and sustained by Soviet economic and technological strength, the Soviet navy 
was able to expand from its narrow focus on nuclear submarines to developing a sub-
stantial surface fleet capable of naval aviation. This expansion helped to achieve a bal-
anced fleet of both surface and submarine forces capable of challenging Western naval 
power. By 1981, the number of Soviet submarines reached 342, including strategic nu-
clear submarines, nuclear attack submarines, and conventional attack submarines. The 
Soviet surface fleet also boasted fifty guided-missile cruisers and five heavy air cruisers, 
or Soviet-style aircraft carriers. However, according to PLA analysts, this balanced fleet 
continued to regard submarines as providing its core capabilities. Because the surface 
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fleet worked primarily to protect submarines, particularly strategic nuclear submarines, 
its offensive power for fleet engagement clearly was constrained and limited.9
Lessons for the PLAN
PLA analysts acknowledge that, like the navies of other continental powers, the PLAN 
began as a small or asymmetrical fleet centered on submarines, FACs, and shore-based 
aircraft (潜, 快, 飞). While the PLAN deployed some major surface combatants, they 
were not designed to coordinate with submarines on matters of command and control, 
mutual protection, or offshore supply. On the other hand, this force structure was largely 
consistent with the earlier strategy of “maritime sabotage and raid guerrilla warfare”  
(海上破袭游击战), which highlighted the use of separate, well-concealed, and flexible 
small-force groups (小兵力群) capable of quick concentration to conduct surprise raids 
against an opponent’s vulnerabilities, followed by quick dispersion. The goal of such a 
strategy, according to PLA analysts, was to weaken the opponent through protracted, 
small-scale operations rather than a direct frontal fleet engagement. This strategy also 
entailed coordination with land operations, and required the PLAN to play a supportive 
role in an overall land war.10
The near-seas defense strategy that has evolved since the mid-1980s, however, has 
aimed to expand the PLAN’s maritime operational space and shift the service away from 
merely supporting land operations. To deal with the long-range strike capabilities of the 
opponent, for instance, this strategy requires the PLAN to expand its defensive depth in 
the near seas and develop naval combined-arms capabilities extending from subsurface 
to surface, air, and outer space. Similarly, the naval modernization that began in the late 
1990s has enhanced the surface fleet’s air and missile defense. The current PLAN acqui-
sition of major surface combatants, including an aircraft carrier, shows that the PLAN 
is “following the historical path that the German and Soviet Navies traveled”: increasing 
the proportion of surface combatants in the fleet and adding big-deck naval aviation. 
Consequently, the “PLAN is standing at a crossroads, and needs a fundamental reevalu-
ation of both its strategic thought and fleet structure” to determine whether it wants a 
carrier-centered fleet or a Soviet-style, submarine-based fleet in which carriers serve 
more to support submarine operations than to fight a fleet engagement.11
To guide the PLAN’s future development, PLA analysts have proposed a few specific 
lessons learned, particularly from earlier continental powers with maritime aspirations. 
First, as both German and Soviet naval histories show, balanced development is both 
desirable and necessary. This is because different types of naval combatants deployed 
to different spatial spectra (e.g., subsurface, surface, and air) can support and protect 
one another to reduce each other’s vulnerabilities. These “balanced capabilities” are also 
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useful for coping with “many types of security threats” and for fulfilling “diversified mili-
tary missions,” a task that China’s top civilian leadership assigned to the PLA.12
Furthermore, for this balanced development to succeed, it is necessary to have top-level 
design (顶层设计), long-term planning (长远规划), and institutionalized implementa-
tion. Top-level design and long-term planning are needed mainly because naval develop-
ment is capital and technology intensive, and therefore requires consistent, long-term, 
and heavy investment through long shipbuilding and personnel-training cycles. Insti-
tutionalized implementation, on the other hand, can help to avoid major disruptions 
resulting from any change in top leadership. From the Soviet case, PLA analysts conclud-
ed that the ascendance of erratic leaders such as Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev 
caused “big losses” associated with either “unbalanced development” or naval decline.13
Finally, Gorshkov’s notion of balanced development not only broadened the Soviet navy 
from its narrow focus on nuclear submarines to include major surface combatants but 
expanded its role in Soviet foreign policy through activities such as ocean naval maneu-
vers, port visits, export of submarines and other warships, and transport operations to 
support client states that included Cuba, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Vietnam. Also associ-
ated with naval expansion was the expansion of the Soviet shipbuilding industry, fishing 
fleet, and other maritime capabilities. According to PLA analysts, however, the critical 
driving factors behind the Soviet naval expansion were largely political and ideologi-
cal, “not economic in the traditional sense of the term” (that is, related to maritime 
commerce). As a result, Soviet naval development went “beyond the defensive needs” 
and embarked on a path to “seek hegemony” beyond the country’s means, contribut-
ing to a weakening of the Soviet economy that ultimately caused the regime’s decline. 
PLA analysts believe that this is where China’s naval development has been and should 
continue to be different from the Soviet experience. That is, it always should be closely 
associated with trade-based maritime activities, reflecting the integration of the Chinese 
economy with the global economy. While this driver is similar for both China and the 
United States, PLA analysts differentiate China from both the United States and the 
Soviet Union in that the focus of China’s naval development should “not be competition 
and contest against a certain opposing force” (不是与某一对立力量的竞争和较量) 
but rather the cultivation of a maritime environment and order that can benefit China’s 
development.14
Constructing the PLAN’s “System of Systems”
The need to develop the PLAN’s system of systems, a major requirement for conducting 
“information systems–based system-of-systems operations,” also helps to explain the 
PLAN’s new emphasis on its surface fleet.
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Defining “Information Systems–Based System-of-Systems Operations”
The notion of information systems–based system-of-systems operations (ISSSO) first 
was endorsed by Hu Jintao at an “important army conference” in December 2005, but 
PLA analysts did not articulate it fully and operationalize it until after early 2010. By 
then, the policy to “informatize” the PLA, which Jiang Zemin had endorsed earlier, had 
produced a few unintended but serious consequences.15
According to PLA analysts, one consequence involved interservice integration. Because 
“informatization” was “service-centered” rather than “system of systems–based,” each 
service (军种) became more informatized, leading to more powerful stovepipes, or “iso-
lated information islands” (信息孤岛), due to lack of collateral information networking 
across the services. Also, each service tends to be “self-serving” (自我完备). That is, 
under the pretext of enhancing joint operations, each concentrates on becoming an “all-
around service” (全能军种): ground forces expand air, shore-defense, and ship capabili-
ties; the navy expands air and land capabilities; and the air force expands land capabili-
ties. This causes not only unnecessary redundancy and waste of resources but erosion 
of each service’s comparative advantage. Moreover, service-centered “informatization” 
leads to a lack of common information standards and results in a monopolization of 
information by each service, which not only may contribute to interservice tension but 
may cause a loss of initiative in wartime.16
PLA analysts believe that correct implementation of ISSSO may help to resolve this in-
terservice issue. This is because ISSSO requires fostering a consciousness that war can be 
fought and won by a PLA system of systems, but not by individual services. Therefore, 
the emphasis of military modernization should shift from “forging all-around services 
to constructing an all-around system of systems” (从打造全能型军种转向建设全能型
体系). This means that services should transfer ownership (所有权) and command and 
control of their operational elements and resources to the PLA system, while retaining 
the usage right of these resources. Services also should become open and transparent to 
one another and “share the usage right” (军种共享使用权) of each other’s and the PLA 
system’s resources, because services constitute and are the builders of the PLA system 
of systems. “Transferring communications bandwidth and satellites to the system, for 
instance, can give full play to the utility of these elements.” In return, services benefit 
from system construction by retaining the usage right to all the resources the system 
offers.17
Generally speaking, future “integrated operations” (集成作战) would “reinforce ser-
vices’ functions for force construction and management, but weaken their role to com-
mand such operations.” “Services will supply functional units and essential elements to 
integrated operations command according to operational needs.” To optimize the use of 
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these units and elements, the integrated operations command would rely on information 
systems such as the all-army, unified (全军统一) command-and-control network, early-
warning and reconnaissance network, communications grid network, weapons-control 
network, and comprehensive support (综合保障) network.18
According to PLA analysts, ISSSO also requires “construction of collateral, integrated 
system-of-systems operations capabilities centered on integrated networks” (以集成网
络为中心, 建设横向一体的体系作战能力) across services. This “net-centered” ap-
proach leverages information technologies and networks to permeate (渗透), fuse  
(融合), and connect (连通) all forces (力量), units (单元), and essential elements (要
素) deployed at different distances and in different spatial spectra, to achieve intercon-
nectedness (互联), intercommunications (互通), interoperability (互操作), and mutual 
complementarity (互补), particularly in terms of early warning and reconnaissance, 
command and control, communications, weapons control, and combat support. This 
interconnectivity should enable synchronized joint action (同步联动), thus enhancing 
precision, coordination, efficiency, and orderliness of actions and strikes.19
How does the concept of ISSSO enhance military operations? First, such system of 
systems–based synergy not only surpasses what an individual service, unit, or weapons 
platform is capable of achieving; it also helps to reduce the vulnerability of any indi-
vidual platform. For instance, “employing information systems to permeate, fuse, and 
connect weapons systems can accomplish operational effectiveness that far exceeds what 
a single weapons platform such as an aircraft carrier can accomplish. At the same time, 
this integration can reduce the risks to an aircraft carrier.”20
Moreover, information systems–based integration leads to real-time and common battle-
field transparency, reduces reaction time, and enables more-precise strikes, thus creating 
conditions for dispersed (分散) and pointed (点状化) force deployment but concentrat-
ed firepower. This deployment can expand from traditional spatial spectra such as land, 
sea, and air to new spectra such as outer space, electromagnetic space, and cyberspace, 
exhibiting a trend toward “comprehensive spatial spectra” (全域性). These deployment 
patterns of different distances, altitudes, and visibilities should enhance not only force 
survivability but multispatial, spectra-based battlefield versatility and flexibility.21
Finally, PLA analysts believe that information systems integration enables real-time, 
synchronized target acquisition, decision making, mobility, strikes, and control. These in 
turn shorten decision cycles and increase operational tempo, making it possible to con-
duct parallel operations, achieving “all-dimensional superiority” (全维优势) over the 
opponent by “maximizing the comprehensive effects of system-of-systems operations.”22
52 china maritime studies
ISSSO and the Surface Fleet
ISSSO requires the PLAN to contribute to the construction of the PLA’s system of 
systems. A small or asymmetrical fleet centered on conventional submarines and FACs 
may constitute the most appropriate contribution, because such a fleet primarily focuses 
on coastal and near-seas defense and the support of land operations, and therefore can 
integrate better with other services that are mostly land based. Since the middle of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, however, China’s naval strategy has integrated the 
new concept of “far-seas operations.”23 China’s most recent defense white paper reiter-
ates the need to “enhance capabilities for far-seas mobile operations, and for far-seas 
cooperation and coping with nontraditional security threats” (提高远海机动作战能力, 
远海合作与应对非传统安全威胁能力). It also has added, for the first time, sections on 
“safeguarding China’s overseas interests” and “enhancing the security of international sea 
lanes”—new missions for the PLAN to fulfill in the far seas.24 To the extent that “far-seas 
operations” are conducted in waters remote from China’s shores, the PLAN may have to 
develop its own system of systems. This is because it no longer would be able to count on 
support from the PLA’s land-based system of systems.
A small or asymmetrical fleet is clearly not appropriate for far-seas operations, because of 
its limited operational radius and sustainability. This fleet also constitutes an incomplete 
system of systems, because it cannot reach all spatial spectra, particularly the air spec-
trum, in the far seas. It may possess major surface ships such as destroyers and frigates 
that can be deployed to the far seas, but these ships would be left exposed, vulnerable 
to air, missile, and submarine attacks. Aircraft carrier capabilities, however, can reduce 
these vulnerabilities. Carriers can provide air resources that can compete for air supe-
riority and provide air cover for surface operations in the far seas. These air capabilities 
also can be deployed against the opponent’s air-based ASW capabilities, thus protecting 
one’s own submarines operating in the far seas. Carriers’ air-based ASW capabilities 
also can be deployed against the opponent’s submarines, thus providing protection for 
China’s own surface ships and submarines operating in the far seas. Finally, with the 
PLAN’s lack of overseas naval bases, carriers can serve as sea bases to sustain the PLAN’s 
system-of-systems operations in the far seas.
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, an information systems–based system of systems can 
become a force multiplier, not only because it can accomplish what an individual weap-
ons platform such as an aircraft carrier cannot accomplish otherwise, but also because 
it helps to reduce the vulnerability of that individual weapons platform. PLA analysts 
believe that a carrier battle group (CVBG) is an ideal “maritime operations system 
of systems” (海上作战体系). With escorts such as destroyers, frigates, nuclear attack 
submarines, and oceangoing replenishment ships, this system of systems is capable of air 
operations, strikes, submarine warfare and ASW, air and missile defense, and electronic 
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warfare, thus possessing the “five integrated operational capabilities” (五为一体作战能
力). If well integrated by the information systems, a CVBG represents a “fully functional 
and optimally combined” (功能完备, 优化组合) system of systems, in which all individ-
ual weapons platforms not only work together to create operational synergy against the 
opponent but offer mutual support and protection by reducing each other’s vulnerabili-
ties. On the other hand, analysts also recognize that a CVBG is too massive to conceal, 
making it easy, under certain conditions, for an opponent to detect and attack it.25
Finally, the versatility of a system of systems is reflected in the system’s deployability 
not only to different distances and spatial spectra but at different times and for different 
purposes. In spite of their different roles and functions, all naval weapons systems are 
designed to fight wars. But some systems may be more appropriate for peacetime mis-
sions than others. To the extent that a navy can play an important role in serving a state’s 
foreign policy in peacetime, performing this role may require either substantial surface 
capabilities or a visible naval presence in the far seas, and a major surface fleet may be 
more appropriate to accomplish this. Peacetime missions that require substantial surface 
capabilities may include provision of sea-launched humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief to a foreign country, evacuation of nationals from a foreign country by sea in times 
of crisis, and naval deployment to secure international sea-lanes against pirates and ter-
rorists. Peacetime missions requiring visible naval presence also may include port visits 
and naval maneuvers, many of which serve the purpose of reassuring allies and deter-
ring opponents from engaging in risky behavior. By contrast, because of their less-visible 
features and lower profile, submarines and FACs are probably less appropriate for such 
peacetime missions.
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Just a few years ago few people cared very much about any People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) destroyer, much less with what it was armed. That was because 
the central problem the PLAN posed for the United States in East Asia had nothing to 
do with destroyers. Instead, the focus of attention was China’s “antiaccess” strategy, the 
military objective of which is to keep U.S. naval and air forces as far away from China as 
possible.1
The PLAN’s surface force (its destroyers, frigates, and amphibious ships) plays a small, 
even marginal, role in the PLAN’s wartime counterintervention operations. To execute 
this objective, the PLAN’s most important arm is its submarine force, along with its 
land-based air arm operating in conjunction with the PLA Air Force. In fact, the coun-
terintervention arsenal capability that justifiably has received the most attention in the 
Western press—the DF-21 antiship ballistic missile—does not belong to the PLAN at all; 
it is a PLA Second Artillery weapons system.
In a conflict with the United States over Taiwan, for example, the surface forces of the 
PLAN would have two missions, neither directly related to keeping U.S. forces from 
interfering with Chinese operations. The surface force would be responsible for getting 
the army safely across the Taiwan Strait and conducting sea-control missions in the East 
China Sea. Its ships also might make contributions as seaward extensions of China’s air 
defenses, while remaining close to China. The surface force would be very unlikely to 
venture out from under land-based air cover (i.e., beyond the first island chain). If it did, 
it would be very vulnerable to U.S. submarines and air attack. In short, during a major 
conflict over Taiwan, the PLAN surface fleet would stay close to home, while U.S. surface 
forces would operate in the Philippine Sea.
On the other hand, when China is not at war, which is to say virtually all the time, the 
surface fleet becomes the most significant element of China’s navy. During the last half-
dozen years, the PLAN has performed missions that are not directly related to the terri-
torial defense of China and its claimed island possessions.2 The best way to characterize 
these new (for China) “far-seas” missions is as peacetime operations. In 2009, the PLA 
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defense white paper applied a U.S. Department of Defense term to these new missions: 
“military operations other than war” (MOOTW).3
With its expanding global economic interests, China has developed global political 
interests as well. This has created a “demand signal” for a PLAN that can support UN-
sanctioned missions, protect People’s Republic of China (PRC) interests abroad with a 
show of force, respond to situations in which PRC citizens are in jeopardy or require 
evacuation, protect sea lines of communication, respond to natural disasters, and, if 
necessary, demonstrate PRC resolve in support of embattled friends in Africa and along 
the South Asia littoral—in other words, the typical mission set that traditional naval 
powers have practiced for centuries.
These new missions require a mix of naval capabilities different from those needed to 
conduct wartime offshore active defense. A navy that is expected to operate in “far seas” 
requires more logistics-support ships; amphibious ships with helicopter facilities; and 
large destroyers with good sea-keeping characteristics, better endurance, helicopter 
hangars and facilities, and longer-range air defenses. Far-seas operations also rational-
ize a requirement for a modest aircraft carrier force.4 Carrier-based aircraft will provide 
the PLAN with sea-based air cover for its distant operations; eventually yield a credible 
power-projection, limited-war capability; and, most importantly for the topic of this 
article, generate a requirement for a number of multimission destroyers to escort the 
carrier and provide air and submarine defense.
Any study of the PLAN destroyer force has two basic problems: the lack of really cred-
ible open-source information on the specific capabilities and performance of combat 
systems, and the fact that until very recently China approached its surface combatant 
force as a two-decade-long research-and-development project. In effect, the PLAN has 
been executing a long-running experiment to marry a suitable hull and propulsion plant 
to effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antiair warfare systems.
This has made it difficult to keep track of the differences among the various iterations 
of destroyer classes. The basic challenge that Chinese designers faced with the “build 
a little, test a little” approach to developing surface combatants was to try to find a hull 
form and propulsion plant suitable for distant operations. The PLAN desired a ship 
large enough to accommodate a helicopter detachment and with the volume to house 
magazines that could store a significant number of missiles along with the necessary 
radar and electronics. The other challenge was to ensure that over time it could develop 
modern combat systems indigenously, or reverse engineer modern combat systems from 
France, Russia, Italy, and the United Kingdom, then integrate them with unique Chinese 
systems. China overcame these two challenges relatively quickly.
china’s evolving surface fleet 57
The First Modern Destroyers
The now-obsolete Luda (Type 051) class (3,700 tons full-load displacement) comprised 
the early test platform used to mix and match combat systems. Its design was derived 
from an early Cold War–era Soviet ship. The sixteen ships of this class entered PLAN 
service over a twenty-year period (1971–91). The experience seems to have confirmed 
for the PLAN that steam plants and the associated rotating machinery simply created 
too much self-noise for the sonar systems to be effective.5 The PLAN, like the U.S. Navy 
and other global navies, learned that changing from steam propulsion to either gas tur-
bine or combined diese–gas turbine propulsion had advantages not only in self-quieting 
but in reliability, ease of maintenance, and performance as well. Moreover, the PLAN 
learned that, at just 3,700 tons, the Luda class was relatively small, so sea keeping in 
rough blue water was a challenge. During a 1997 transit to Honolulu, a three-ship PLAN 
task force ran into ten consecutive days of heavy weather, during which it encountered 
a great deal of difficulty refueling the small Luda. Because the class has limited fuel-
storage capacity, the PLAN found the Luda needed to be underway replenished every 
three days, and high seas made that very difficult.6 In sum, just short of two decades ago 
the PLAN destroyer force consisted of eighteen ships—sixteen of which had capabilities 
closer to the World War II–vintage “tin can” in which I served during the 1960s than to 
the state-of-the-art destroyers China’s northeast Asian neighbors and the United States 
were operating in the western Pacific.
That began to change with the introduction of the Type 052 series of destroyers, which, 
according to the NATO classification system, comprise the Luhu (Type 052—two ships), 
Luhai (Type 052A—one ship), Luyang I (Type 052B—two ships), Luyang II (Type 
052C—eight ships), and Luyang III (Type 052D—one commissioned and up to twelve 
planned) classes. Commissioned in 1994, the Luhu marked the transition of Chinese 
destroyers from steam to gas turbine propulsion—in fact, both ships of the class were 
equipped with General Electric LM2500 gas turbine engines, the same engines that have 
powered all U.S. destroyers since the late 1970s. But it was the Type 052B that marked 
the advent of the PLAN’s first truly modern destroyer.7
Combat Systems
Starting with the Type 052B Guangzhou (hull number 168), commissioned in 2004, 
all Chinese destroyers have used roughly the same hull design: a 508-foot-long, 
6,500–7,300-ton-full-load-displacement ship, with a combination diesel–gas turbine 
propulsion system.
Guangzhou and all the subsequent Type 052 series are handsome warships that incor-
porate a hull form and superstructure designed to reduce the radar cross section of the 
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ship. But, as attractive as Guangzhou is, its war-fighting capabilities were outdated the 
day it was commissioned.
Antiair Warfare
Although the ship’s primary mission was air defense, it carried the short-range (twenty 
nautical miles [nm]) Russian SA-N-12 surface-to-air missile (SAM). At best, the ship 
could defend only itself, and even then not very well, because of the short range of its 
missiles. Aircraft easily could remain outside its SAM envelope and launch a variety of 
weapons with impunity, overwhelming its defenses because it depends on four individ-
ual fire-control radars to control the semiactive SAMs. It uses rotating 3-D radar as its 
primary air-search radar, which is inferior to the phased-array systems that are state of 
the art. For comparison, phased-array systems such as the SPY-I Aegis radar have been 
in use in the U.S. Navy since 1983. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force had phased-
array systems in service for over a decade by the time Guangzhou was commissioned. 
Norway commissioned its first Aegis-equipped ship in 2004, the same year Guangzhou 
entered the PLAN.
This is a noteworthy reference point, because it took China only ten years to close the 
radar gap by introducing its own phased-array radar system. Phased-array systems 
search and track simultaneously, an important capability in the antiship cruise missile 
(ASCM) era. One needs quick reaction time, firepower, and good reliability to survive 
in today’s precision-weapon environment—and Guangzhou has none of that. Reaction 
time and firepower come with a phased-array system mated to a vertical-launch system 
(VLS) firing long-range SAMs. So, while this ship was the beginning of a truly modern 
air-warfare destroyer for the PLAN, it had a long way to go to match the capabilities of 
the ships of other modern navies.
Anti–Surface Ship Warfare
In terms of anti–surface ship warfare (ASUW), Guangzhou packs a punch, with sixteen 
YJ-83 cruise missiles in four quad box launchers located aft of the engine room exhausts. 
This missile has a 120 nm range with a 420-pound warhead. Like the U.S. Harpoon, it 
is a subsonic fire-and-forget missile.8 With the YJ-83, Guangzhou could outrange many 
U.S. surface combatants.9 The PLA has been good at fielding an impressive array of  
ASCMs that can be launched from aircraft, submarines, or surface combatants. Al-
though there is scant open-source information on how effective this missile has been 
in testing, one must assume the PLAN has confidence in its capabilities. We do know 
that a Chinese export C-802 ASCM, which Iran purchased in numbers in the 1990s, 
does work: in July 2004, during Israel’s war with Hezbollah, the Israeli corvette Hanit 
was hit by a truck-mounted C-802. A two-missile salvo had been fired; one hit Hanit’s 
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stern crane, while the other overflew the target and hit a Cambodian-flagged Egyptian 
freighter some sixty kilometers downrange.10
Antisubmarine Warfare
Since the Type 052s are intended primarily to be missile-defense ships, they are 
equipped with a short-range (15,000 yards), medium-frequency, chin-mounted sonar 
(SJD-8/9), which is based on a French Thales DUBY-23-series sonar. The PLAN appar-
ently has adopted the Russian navy’s approach to destroyer ASW, in which the intent 
is ASW self-defense.11 This is unlike the U.S. approach, which for decades has tried to 
achieve much-longer-range detection because it assumes U.S. Navy (USN) destroyers 
will operate as screening forces for aircraft carriers and contribute to the submarine 
defense of the carrier.
Like USN destroyers, Guangzhou has two triple-tube ASW torpedo launchers. Unlike 
USN ships, it is also equipped with short-range (1,000 yards) ASW rockets that, if noth-
ing else, will put a “bang in the water” that can be very distracting to a submarine. All 
Type 052 classes have a helicopter-capable flight deck and a hangar for Ka-27 helicop-
ters. These aircraft are equipped with dipping sonar derived from Russian systems.
Getting a Lot Better in a Hurry: The Type 052C (Luyang II)
While the Type 052B represented impressive improvement toward a state-of the-art de-
stroyer, the ships the PLAN really wanted were the two successor classes, the 052C and 
052D. That they are both in series production is the best evidence of PLAN satisfaction. 
And the PLAN has reason to be satisfied, because not only are they handsome ships, but 
on paper their combat capability is impressive.
The first two Type 052Cs were commissioned in 2004 and 2005, in parallel with the two 
Type 052Bs.12 This was followed by a long—eight-year—hiatus, apparently caused by the 
relocation of the building yard to the Shanghai area. Unlike the earlier Type 052s, which 
combined Russian and Chinese systems, the Type 052C uses primarily Chinese systems 
derived from earlier foreign technology.13
Antiair Warfare
The Type 052C marks a big jump for the PLAN into phased-array air-search radars. The 
eight ships of this class have electronically scanned array radar (AESA), which, when 
combined with vertically launched missiles, greatly improves firepower. These eight 
ships permit the PLAN to narrow dramatically the capability gap with the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea, all of which operate Aegis-equipped destroyers in the western 
Pacific.
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The Luyang II is generally similar to the 052B, with the notable addition of four fixed 
phased-array antennae in the forward superstructure. Two antennae cover the forward 
hemisphere, while the other pair covers the rear hemisphere—the same arrangement 
adopted on the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke class. Reports indicate that this radar may be 
the outcome of a codevelopment program with a Ukrainian company.14
These ships mark the PLAN’s first venture into VLSs, which, along with the AESA radar, 
improve the Type 052C’s antiair firepower by allowing it to track and shoot more rapidly. 
The VLS is made up of eight six-cell components. All are assumed to be filled with long-
range HHQ-9 SAMs. The HHQ-9 has a maximum slant range of approximately 110 
nm. Although this constitutes a dramatic improvement, any aircraft carrying long-range 
variants of the air-launched Harpoon ASCM still can remain outside a 052C’s missile 
envelope and engage the ship. Thus, the U.S. Navy, which relies on sea-based airpower to 
contribute to gaining sea control, retains an important tactical asymmetry.
During the Cold War the U.S. Navy concluded that the best way to defend against 
massive Soviet air raids that would involve the launching of ASCMs was to destroy the 
launching platform before it reached its launch range—colloquially known as “shoot-
ing at the archer, not at the arrow.” Until the PLAN can field a SAM system that can 
outrange most air-launched antiship weapons, it will remain condemned to “shooting 
at arrows.” Of course, this is why the Aegis system was developed in the first place—to 
ensure the air defenses around an aircraft carrier could shoot down arrows.15
The Luyang II’s terminal air defense is provided by two Type 730 close-in weapon 
systems (CIWSs). This CIWS can fire at a rate of 4,600–5,800 rounds per minute up to a 
range of 2,700 yards.16
Antisurface Warfare
Like the earlier Type 052s, the Type 052C carries ASCMs in separate launch canisters 
(two four-cell launchers). That these cruise missiles are in canisters rather than boxes 
suggests they are the indigenously produced YJ-62 (C-602) ASCMs. This is a subsonic 
missile that flies at an altitude of one hundred feet during the cruise phase of an engage-
ment. It has an impressive range of about 250 nm. On paper, this is a formidable system; 
but trying to target individual ships at very long, over-the-horizon ranges is difficult. It 
almost certainly requires third-party assistance, often from the embarked helicopter, to 
make certain of the target and to ensure that other ships are not in the vicinity, lest they 
become unintended targets. In the terminal phase, the missile descends to twenty to 
thirty feet. The active radar seeker has an acquisition range of up to 22 nm.17
The 052C also carries one main gun, a single-barrel, 100 mm gun “derived” from a 
French Creusot-Loire weapon. The fully automatic gun can engage surface and aerial 
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targets such as aircraft and low-speed missiles. It has a maximum rate of fire of ninety 
rounds per minute.
Antisubmarine Warfare
Like those of the Type 052B class, the eight ships of the Luyang II class apparently are 
equipped with derivative French sonar suites, manufactured in China under license, and 
identified as SJD-8/9. For twenty years, from 1972 to 1993, France provided modern so-
nar technology to China; the post–Tiananmen Square arms embargo that the European 
Union still maintains apparently has brought that to a halt. This medium-frequency 
sonar has a surface duct range of ten thousand to eighteen thousand yards, again sug-
gesting that the primary purpose of the ASW suite on these ships is self-defense rather 
than “main body defense.”18 The relatively short range of the hull-mounted sonars on 
these air-defense destroyers has interesting implications for how many escort ships will 
be required to provide adequate ASW protection for China’s aircraft carrier(s).
The Luyang IIs are not fitted with a hull-mounted, variable-depth sonar or a towed array, 
and experts speculate that so equipping them would entail both a major hull redesign 
and a dramatic increase in processing power in the ships’ integrated command-and-
control system.19
In terms of ASW weapons, the 052Cs are outfitted with the standard six ASW torpedo 
tubes. ASW rockets, however, are apparently not part of the suite.
An embarked helicopter, either the export version of the Russian Kamov Ka-28 or the 
Chinese version of the Eurocopter Dauphin (AS-365N), known as the Z-9, constitutes a 
significant element of the ASW capability of this ship. Both aircraft have a dipping sonar 
capability, but the Z-9 is probably the more desirable since it has an onboard processor, 
whereas the Ka-28 has to datalink its acoustic information to the ship for processing. In 
either case, the helicopters perform a vital function in providing self-defense ASW for 
the ship.20
“Red Aegis”—the Type 052D (Luyang III)
A September 5, 2012, Global Times article created quite a stir among PLAN watchers 
when it revealed that a new destroyer was under construction at the Changxingdao- 
Jiangnan shipyard, near Shanghai, identifying it as “the Type 052D, the 052C’s successor.”21
The article went on, “As the most sophisticated combat ships, Aegis destroyers are com-
monly referred to as air-defense destroyers equipped with phased-array radars and mod-
ern ship-to-air missiles, which enable the ships to provide regional air-defense shields 
for the entire fleet.”22
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Photos of the ship turned up shortly thereafter in the blogosphere. They reveal that the 
Type 052D appears to be a more handsome Chinese cousin of the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh 
Burke–class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs). Designers have adopted the flat-panel 
phased-array radar, similar to U.S. and allied Aegis systems. The ship apparently is fitted 
with two thirty-two-cell VLSs as well, one forward and one aft. Exactly what SAM they 
will carry is open to question, as is the nature of the rest of the combat systems suite, 
except for the gun—the 100 mm gun of the 052C class has been replaced with a larger-
caliber 130 mm weapon.
In recent years, China has demonstrated an impressive ability to construct complex 
warships in large numbers. For example, it has launched four Type 052Cs since 2010. 
The new Changxingdao-Jiangnan yard where the 052Ds are building has the capacity to 
build several warships simultaneously.23 According to some accounts, at one point this 
yard had eight ships of the Type 052C/D classes in various stages of construction.24 I 
suspect that the 052D will go into series production to provide the most capable escort 
force available for the PLAN’s first aircraft carrier strike group. In other words, the world 
will begin to see this ship in numbers in two years or so when the PLAN carrier Liaoning 
transitions from testing and training and begins to conduct more routine operations at sea.
The Sovremenny Class
No discussion regarding China’s modern destroyer force would be complete without ad-
dressing the four Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers that entered the PLAN force 
structure in the early years of the twenty-first century. While for a brief moment they 
were the most capable surface combatants in the PLAN, these were “old” ships: old in 
design; old in hull, mechanical, and electrical structures; and old in combat systems.
In 1996, the PLAN decided to purchase two unfinished ex–Russian navy Project 956 
destroyers, one two-thirds complete, the other one-third complete. Both ships were laid 
down in the late 1980s by the North Shipyard in Saint Petersburg, but their construction 
was suspended in 1995 owing to a lack of funds. The first hull, renamed Hangzhou (136), 
was delivered in December 1999, followed by the second hull, renamed Fuzhou (137), in 
December 2000.
In 2002, the PRC signed a contract with Russia to purchase an additional two ships of 
this class. The first to be delivered was Taizhou (138), in 2005; the second, Ningbo (139), 
was delivered in September 2006. These dates are significant: Taizhou and Ningbo were 
delivered after the first two Type 052Cs. Why China thought it needed two more of this 
class is a bit of a mystery. The blog SinoDefence.com asserts, “The Sovremenny-class de-
stroyers provided a balanced platform that vastly exceeds [sic] the capabilities of Chinese 
domestic designs at the time of delivery.”25 That may have been what the senior officials 
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in Beijing concluded, but it was not an accurate judgment—perhaps reflecting their lack 
of confidence in China’s own design abilities.
In any case, the contemporaneous Type 052B/C models had SAM systems of range equal 
to the Sovremennys’, and their French-based ASW capabilities were slightly superior. 
The one unique capability the Russian ships did bring to the table was a long-range 
(195–210 nm), high-speed (Mach 3) ASCM, the Moskit, or SS-N-22. This is an impres-
sive weapon, and when mated to a large (8,000 tons full load) hull, the class provides the 
PLAN with a good sea-keeping ship that it could employ against U.S. carrier forces.
On the other hand, short-range SAMs and mediocre ASW capabilities make ships of this 
class extremely vulnerable when operating beyond the PLA’s land-based air cover, which 
they would have to do to get within range of U.S. carrier forces in a Taiwan scenario. 
Beyond these shortcomings in self-defense capabilities, they are steam-powered ships 
that use unreliable pressure-fired boilers.26 This was a design the United States tried, 
unsuccessfully, in two classes of frigates (FF 1040 and FFG 1), both of which had trouble 
staying at sea because of the fickle engineering plants.
Given how far the PLAN design and production capabilities have come in less than a 
decade, to some analysts the Sovremennys appear to be the PLAN’s “white elephants.” 
That they are not interoperable with the PLAN’s own datalink standard, combat control 
systems, and communications systems makes their deployment especially anomalous.27
Large, reliable, long-endurance, multimission destroyers are essential for any navy that 
aspires to conduct sustained operations an ocean away from its home waters. Modern 
destroyers are expected to provide air defense for themselves and other ships in com-
pany, defend against submarines, and use embarked helicopters to find and attack hostile 
submarines before they can close to firing range. Destroyers also are expected to prevail 
in encounters with other ships, using ASCMs and helicopters with antiship missiles. 
Finally, modern destroyers are expected to be able to project power ashore, employing 
land-attack cruise missiles, and if necessary using their gun batteries to provide fire sup-
port for forces ashore.28
Over the last ten years, China has demonstrated, at least to outward appearances, that 
it has the ability to produce a state-of-the-art, multimission destroyer. The PLAN has at 
least eleven in commission or at various stages of construction, with an unknown total 
inventory objective. It joins Japan’s (six Aegis destroyers) and South Korea’s (three Aegis 
destroyers) as the only Asian navies with an Aegis, or Aegis-like, capability actually at 
sea, and by 2020 seems likely to have around twenty ships with this type of system. At 
that point, the PLAN’s destroyer force will be far and away the second most capable (on 
paper) in the world. However, perspective is important: American destroyer capabilities 
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still will be unmatched. With the Arleigh Burke, or DDG 51, class, the U.S. Navy cur-
rently has sixty-three state-of-the-art destroyers in commission, with a total of at least 
seventy-five planned.
Finally, it is of course unclear how effective the combat systems of China’s ships are, and 
how competent the crews will become. China is still dependent on Russian or Western 
“assistance” in the development of its most advanced weapons and combat systems; but 
so too are the Japanese and South Koreans. The reality is that China has joined the ranks 
of a handful of countries that have the money, infrastructure, design talent, and national 
strategic demand signal to build credible modern destroyers. Watching this incipient 
transregional Chinese navy develop will continue to be a fascinating occupation.
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Sureesh Mehta
China’s naval modernization program is driven by three primary factors: potential conflict within the Taiwan Strait; the increased challenge posed by the significant 
U.S. naval presence in the Pacific Ocean; and the desire to develop a blue-water fleet to 
secure China’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that pass through the Indian Ocean 
and the South China Sea.1 This modernization involves naval hardware accretion, ad-
ditional infrastructure to support the growth of naval forces, and a matching manpower 
profile. The latter two aspects are contingent on the modernization of naval hardware.
The major naval hardware elements being modernized consist of the surface combatant 
forces—destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, patrol craft, and, above all, China’s air-
craft carrier—as well as submarines, antiship ballistic missiles, and antiship cruise mis-
siles (ASCMs). While submarines and long-range missiles unquestionably complement a 
country’s surface fleet and synergistically increase overall naval capacity, it is the surface 
fleet that provides the primary and most visible indicator of national naval capabilities.
Developments in the PLA Navy’s Surface Fleet
Since the start of the new millennium, modernization of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) Navy (PLAN) has received a huge impetus. Within that larger effort, the pace of 
surface fleet modernization can be gauged by the increase in the portion of surface com-
batants qualifying as modern from less than 10 percent in 2004 to more than 30 percent 
in 2011.2 While certain advanced platforms were acquired from Russia, surface fleet 
modernization has relied largely on indigenous production of a wide variety of ships.
The Liaoning Aircraft Carrier
Any discourse on PLAN modernization has to begin with the Chinese aircraft carrier 
program. Chen Bingde, the PLA chief of general staff, acknowledged for the first time in 
June 2011 that the former Varyag, after undergoing a ten-year refit, was being readied in 
the Dalian shipyard.3 After extensive machinery and navigational equipment checks and 
deck landing trials by PLAN helicopters, the carrier was commissioned into the PLAN 
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on September 25, 2012. The first deck landing and takeoff of J-15 fighter aircraft from 
Liaoning were accomplished at the end of November 2012. Since then, the carrier has 
been based at the North Sea Fleet base of Qingdao for operational workup and exploitation.
Chinese media releases suggest that the planned “way forward” for consolidation of a 
Chinese carrier task force will be carried out in phases. A Xinhua report, for instance, 
speculates that, “restricted by the number of main PLA naval ships, China’s aircraft car-
rier formation will be kept in an appropriate scale, and mainly be composed of Liao ning, 
four to six guided missile destroyers and guided missile frigates, one to two nuclear 
attack submarines or new-type conventional submarines, and one comprehensive supply 
ship.”4
As for its air wing, China intends to operate two types of fixed-wing aircraft from the 
carrier. Beyond the already-tested J-15 fighter aircraft, it projects the J-31 as the next-
generation carrier-borne fighter. The Chinese consider the fifth-generation J-31 to have 
three traits that will make it suitable for service on the aircraft carrier: medium size, 
reliability, and multirole functionality. The PLAN hopes that these two aircraft operating 
together will provide “comprehensive time-domain and airspace coverage, and greater 
combat radius” around the carrier.
Unsubstantiated media discourse assesses that the PLAN may construct up to two more 
carriers by 2020. One might be of Liaoning’s follow-on class. The other could have an 
improved design, with heavier displacement (seventy thousand tons), steam catapults 
and conventional steam power, and the capability to carry domestically manufactured 
advanced fighter and fixed-wing airborne warning and control system (i.e., AWACS) 
aircraft.5
Destroyers and Frigates
China has acquired four Sovremenny-class destroyers and advanced Kamov-28 antisub-
marine warfare (ASW) helicopters from Russia. Indigenous production includes the 
building and commissioning of the Luyang I and II–class destroyers and Jiangkai I and 
II–class frigates. The Chinese regard Luyang II (052C)–class destroyers as Chinese 
“Aegis” destroyers. To augment further its surface vessels to meet escort requirements 
for an aircraft carrier task force, the PLAN commissioned the first of its Type 052D air-
defense destroyers, named Changchun (150), on January 31, 2013.6 Displacing about six 
thousand tons, it has greater long-range air-warning and regional air-defense capabilities 
than earlier destroyer classes.
Building of Jiangkai-class frigates has proceeded at a rate of one per year, and several 
more of the same class likely will be built. The commissioning of the new-class destroyer 
was followed in quick succession by the introduction of the first Type 056 advanced 
ASW frigate on February 25, 2013, again primarily for carrier escort tasks. Bengbu (582) 
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was commissioned on March 12, 2013. It reportedly integrates different types of weap-
onry and equipment of advanced technologies and features good stealth performance 
and high electromagnetic compatibility.7
Missile Boats
Through 2013, China had built roughly seventy Houbei-class attack craft. It may have 
plans to build as many as one hundred of these stealthy boats. They have a wave-piercing 
catamaran hull design. Each is armed with eight YJ-83 ASCMs.
Amphibious Ships
Amphibious warfare capabilities also are being augmented through significant equip-
ment upgrades, including introduction of new Yuzhao (071)–class amphibious ships 
(LPDs) and their integral air-cushion landing craft. China has built three Type 071 
LPDs, with at least one more to be commissioned. More multimission amphibious plat-
forms are likely to be built to enable the PLAN to fulfill both traditional missions and 
requirements for military operations other than war.
Assessed Roles and Missions in the Indian Ocean Region
Chen Mingyi, a member the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Con-
sultative Conference, laid out the role of the PLAN quite aptly when in March 2009 he 
exhorted it to “move to oceans and shoulder the tasks of safeguarding territory, develop-
ment of national economy and overseas interests.”8 This suggests that China looks at the 
Indian Ocean region (IOR) in light of two imperatives. The first concerns the security of 
China’s SLOCs, on which its growing economy is so dependent. The second is the need 
to expand its operating space, striving for presence in all global hot spots, so as to be able 
to influence events in favor of its national interest.9
Answering these imperatives—involving distant-area operations, far and wide—may 
have led China to strengthen the capacity of its surface fleet. In this context, the PLAN’s 
evolving surface fleet’s roles and missions in the IOR may be viewed from three distinct 
perspectives: traditional, nontraditional, and support of extended Chinese maritime 
interests and endeavors.
Traditional Military Role
The Chinese vision of expanding the country’s maritime frontiers in accordance with the 
“three island chain” construct entails establishing a blue-water presence within the “first 
island chain” of the Pacific Ocean by 2010; gaining the capability to exercise presence out 
to the “second island chain” by 2025; and possessing a true blue-water fleet with credible 
presence in the Pacific to the “third island chain,” extending from the Aleutian Islands 
to Antarctica, by 2050.10 Considering the PLAN’s current growth and modernization 
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trajectory, once the PLAN’s reach has passed the “second island chain” credibly, project-
ing itself toward the IOR would be well within its capabilities.
One hopes that opportunities for the PLAN surface fleet to engage in its conventional 
role of war fighting will not present themselves readily. Nevertheless, the mere presence 
of “men-of-war” implies an offensive and coercive capability, whether used or not. At 
present levels of surface fleet evolution, the PLAN would find it difficult to carry out 
the traditional naval role at the high end of the spectrum of warfare in the IOR, mainly 
because of its lack of integral air-defense capability. However, the situation will change 
substantially within a decade or so, by which time the gap between the Chinese intent 
of “conducting operations in distant waters” and its aircraft carrier task force–based 
“power-projection” capabilities will have narrowed substantially.11
The intervening time also will enable Beijing to gain relevant technical expertise in 
carrier construction and aircraft manufacture, learn the highly specialized art of carrier 
air operations, and acquire enough influence over its regions of interest to transform 
one or two “influence-heavy places” into bases for supporting such a force at extended 
ranges. The most probable locations for the latter are Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota 
in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. But the Chinese 
maritime options may not be limited to these “pearls” alone. The PLAN’s current tasking 
and China’s future naval vision may warrant the exploration of other suitable sites deep 
into the Indian Ocean, such as Mauritius, Seychelles, one of the East African littorals, or 
ports in the Gulf of Aden.
In fact, Liaoning’s political commissar forecast the shape of things to come when he 
reportedly stated that “as the first generation of Chinese aircraft carrier crew, we must 
. . . ensure early establishment of our high-sea combat capability, making due contribu-
tions to safeguarding our national maritime rights and interests, and building up China 
into a marine power.”12 While the PLAN assiduously works toward that vision, the ongo-
ing capability accretion of the PLA naval surface fleet could be used appropriately for 
nontraditional activities that project a benign face for the state while keeping the force 
well trained and equipped and operationally active.
Nontraditional Roles
Military operations other than war (MOOTW) now form an important component of 
the application of military forces. Chinese doctrine governing this area directs the PLAN 
to “defend the country’s maritime rights, interests, and security, safeguard its economic 
development, and serve its peaceful diplomacy” by engaging in maritime operations in 
offshore areas.13 The IOR has provided numerous opportunities for the PLAN to engage 
in these activities. The most important has been the PLAN’s antipiracy escort mission, 
which (as of early 2014) the service has been conducting for more than six years. The 
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PLAN has sent nineteen naval task forces to the Gulf of Aden and has performed more 
than eight hundred escort missions.14
But the real and invaluable gains for China from these missions have extended far 
beyond the safety of the merchant ships escorted. China has undertaken many maritime 
and diplomatic activities either associated with or complementing the presence of its 
ships in the Gulf of Aden. While on deployment, PLAN ships have increased their in-
teroperability by jointly operating with other countries’ ships, conducting joint exercises, 
and exchanging visits of task force commanders and other personnel from NATO, the 
European Union, and Combined Task Force 151.
Warships of different task forces also have been “showing the flag” in various IOR lit-
torals, including those of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Malaysia, while 
proceeding to or returning from antipiracy mission deployments. The PLAN’s postde-
ployment arena has expanded progressively as its escort mission has endured. Ships of 
the eleventh task force transited the Suez into the Mediterranean and ventured into the 
Black Sea for the first time, making maiden visits to Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Roma-
nian ports. These ships subsequently docked at Istanbul and the Israeli port of Haifa, 
thus remaining in a potentially volatile area—considering the ongoing Syrian turmoil 
and the Israel-Lebanon standoff—for close to a month in July–August 2012. The war-
ships of the twelfth task force reached out even farther by routing themselves home via 
Australia. The thirteenth task force ships sailed into the Atlantic in the first half of April 
2013 and visited Moroccan, Portuguese, and French ports in that ocean. They called at 
Mediterranean Sea ports in Malta and Algeria en route. The emergent pattern resembles 
a wheel, with the hub at the Gulf of Aden and the spokes fanning out across the globe in 
all directions.
Other nontraditional PLAN activities in the IOR merit mention: 
 • The PLAN hospital ship Peace Ark sailed across the Indian Ocean on Mission 
Harmony from September to November 2010, visiting Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Seychelles, and Bangladesh. It also operated in the Gulf of Aden for a few days with 
the sixth escort task force.
 • The PLAN training ship Zheng He, while transiting through the Gulf of Aden as part 
of its around-the-world training mission, also effected a rendezvous with the Yantai 
frigate of the eleventh task force on May 17, 2012, with the ships operating together 
for a day.
 • Diversion of the frigate Xuzhou from the antipiracy task force to the Libyan coast 
in February 2011 to assist in the withdrawal of Chinese citizens from crisis-struck 
Libya—the first role of this kind for the PLAN—is well documented.
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 • Three PLAN warships participated in the Pakistan-initiated multilateral maritime 
Exercise Aman in March 2013 prior to service as the fourteenth task force in the Gulf 
of Aden. This represented the second time the PLAN followed this sequence, the 
first being when the frigate Ma’anshan joined Exercise Aman in March 2011, then 
proceeded to join in escort operations in the Gulf of Aden.
All these nontraditional activities have accorded the PLAN an unprecedented oppor-
tunity to perform operational tests, showcase the frontline units of all three of its fleets, 
and provide the bulk of its manpower with hands-on workup in distant-area operations, 
in a theater it did not have to create. While these are the visible dividends, the biggest 
gains have accrued in the PLAN’s institutionalization of back-end logistical, administra-
tive, and infrastructural setups, which have evolved into well-coordinated mechanisms 
for supporting the pre-, post-, and actual deployment activities of the successive task 
forces.
Supporting Extended Maritime Interests and Endeavors
On November 8, 2012, during his final keynote address at the National Party Congress 
in Beijing, then–Chinese president Hu Jintao called for “enhancing the Chinese capac-
ity for exploiting marine resources, resolutely safeguarding China’s maritime rights and 
interests, and building China into a maritime power.”15 These comments represented 
the first time the country’s topmost leader had enunciated clearly in a party congress a 
decisive road map for maritime development.
As part of its marine resources exploration policy, China has been extending its deep-
sea exploration activities in the Indian Ocean since 2005. In July 2011, the International 
Seabed Authority granted the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Develop-
ment Association exclusive rights to explore an area measuring ten thousand square 
kilometers (3,800 square miles) of the sub-ocean Southwest Indian Ridge.16 China also 
has dispatched its oceanographic-survey and intelligence-collection vessels to the IOR 
on a regular basis. The large-scale, China-bound, seaborne trade and energy flow needs 
no further elaboration. In addition, a large Chinese diaspora inhabits the IOR littorals, 
engaged in varied economic activities. For instance, Chinese people—including techni-
cal reserve PLA troopers—are carrying out uranium, mineral, metal, and oil exploration, 
infrastructure development, and humanitarian-assistance activities in about twenty-
eight African countries.
In keeping with the oft-repeated dictum that “the flag follows economic interests,” it 
appears quite logical that the PLAN surface fleet would feel, sooner rather than later, 
the need to secure the above-mentioned maritime endeavors and interests of the Chi-
nese state. The presence of PLAN ships in proximity to the Gulf of Aden—albeit for a 
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different task, antipiracy escort—does imply an unstated and notional sense of security 
assurance for Chinese economic and personnel interests.
Impact on Stability and Security in the IOR
To the other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the 
important oceanic areas; to India, it is a vital sea. Her lifelines 
are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the 
freedom of that coastal surface. No industrial development, no 
commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her 
unless her shores are protected.
    K. M. PANIKKAR, INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN 
Although the noted Indian maritime historian Sardar Panikkar expressed the prophetic 
words of the epigraph above in 1945, they remain relevant. In the contemporary era of 
globalized economic interdependence, predicated on uninterrupted traffic along mari-
time sea-lanes, the existing myriad security challenges in the IOR could have a decided 
impact on the security and stability of the entire region.
Impact in the Indian Maritime Domain
While the extent and intensity of future instability in the region are debatable at present, 
there is no denying that any such instability would affect Indian maritime interests and 
activities immediately, and to a considerable degree. India has a coastline of 7,516.6 km 
and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 2.013 million sq. km. The outlying Indian is-
lands; offshore assets, fisheries, and deep-sea interests within the EEZ; major and minor 
harbors; and the overall seaward security of the vast coastline are other vital aspects of 
the Indian maritime dimension and responsibilities. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 
which serve as strategic outposts for India, have to be defended against various threats 
from state and nonstate actors. The main missile and rocket test launch centers connect-
ed to the Indian space and strategic-missile programs are located on India’s east coast. 
The Bay of Bengal, particularly the area around the Andaman Sea, is used extensively 
for experimental missile tests and operational rocket launches for placing various kinds 
of satellites into space. These activities entail deployment of maritime assets, including 
those of the navy, over a large area, necessitating wide-area communications, data trans-
fer, and relaying, both terrestrially and through satellites.
In recent years, there have been reports of PLAN intelligence-gathering ships being 
deployed in the Bay of Bengal.17 Such ships easily would be able to monitor the entire 
gamut of India’s scientific activities related to its space and missile program by intercept-
ing the ongoing communications and transmitting them to China for intensive analy-
sis. Further, the presence of Chinese listening posts in the Myanmar-controlled Coco 
Islands (which has been reported in the global media, accompanied by a fair amount of 
74 china maritime studies
speculation) would present Beijing with permanent infrastructure to conduct communi-
cations and signals intelligence.
Additionally, when PLAN ships regularly start visiting ports such as Chittagong, 
Kyaukpyu, and Yangon in the Bay of Bengal, and Hambantota, Karachi, and Gwadar in 
the Arabian Sea, they would be right in the midst of a maritime area critical to Indian 
maritime interests. While transiting the region, these warships, along with research and 
intelligence-collection vessels, surely would indulge in activities such as seawater and 
atmospheric profiling, weather pattern observation, and routing and navigational famil-
iarization. The increased data collection resulting from this ongoing presence combined 
with diligent management of such data would enable the PLAN to identify emerging 
patterns, which it could exploit in future maritime confrontations.
The institutionalization of the Aman series of multilateral exercises also has enabled the 
PLAN to plant its footprint regularly in the close vicinity of the Indian seaboard. The 
scope of the exercises themselves and the extent of PLAN participation therein have 
been expanding over time. From the presence of one warship and the conduct of basic 
naval drills in 2007, the activities have increased to three PLAN ships participating in 
tactical surface interception exercises, formation helicopter flying, and coordinated 
weapon firings. Asked by the media to comment on the enhanced participation of PLAN 
ships, Rear Adm. Khan Hasham Bin Saddique, commander of Pakistan’s fleet, said: 
“Given the kind of relationship between Pakistan and China as well as between the Paki-
stan Navy and PLA Navy, we expect this level of participation from our Chinese friends. 
It could give us the opportunity to further refine our procedures and enhance coopera-
tion between the two navies.”18
Implications for the Indian Navy
To be sure, China definitely will not be able to “project power” in as comprehensive a 
manner as the United States defines it—as the ability “to rapidly and effectively deploy 
and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises and con-
tribute to deterrence”—even should it gain the three medium-sized aircraft carriers and 
supporting hardware expected in the 2020 time frame.19 However, the PLAN is making 
steady progress in its aircraft carrier program, with the stated aim of “developing its 
naval capabilities of conducting operations in distant waters.” Assuming that eventually 
this will lead to a Chinese carrier formation deploying in the Indian Ocean, the Indian 
navy has reason to be concerned.
As an integral part of such a future Chinese carrier formation, nuclear attack submarines 
(SSNs) will bring about a quantum change in the undersea security paradigm for the 
Indian navy. Since the submarine-detection problem in the IOR is rather complex—the 
tropical seawater conditions complicate the sound-propagation profile—submarines 
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occupy an inherently advantageous position. In such an environment, Chinese SSNs 
armed with ASCMs and modern torpedoes effectively would be able to achieve sea 
denial while posing a credible threat to IOR SLOCs.20 A disproportionate ASW effort 
would be required for the Indian navy to detect and prosecute such SSNs. The recent 
hype created around media reports of Chinese submarines being detected in the 
Indian Ocean demonstrates the challenges such submarines would pose in the region. 
The media also have highlighted Indian concerns—for instance, citing an Indian Min-
istry of Defence document to the effect that “the implicit focus of the Chinese navy 
appears to be undermining the Indian navy’s edge to control highly sensitive sea lines 
of communication.”21
In addition to Chinese SSNs, the Chinese surface fleet (whether operating indepen-
dently; or in the traditional role as part of a carrier group, likely a decade from now; or 
continuing the current engagement in nontraditional MOOTW activities) definitely will 
impact the operational pattern of the Indian navy. With PLAN ships crisscrossing the 
northern Arabian Sea for purposes of transit, passage, joint exercises, antipiracy patrols, 
and postdeployment activities, the availability of maritime space for the Indian navy 
to conduct operations, exercises, and training could be constrained somewhat, with its 
intentions and movements open to monitoring and possible interdiction. In such a con-
stricting environment, the policies, plans, and procedures of the Indian navy will have to 
be transformed accordingly.
Pakistan’s acquisition of Chinese frigates and patrol craft, and possibly Chinese sub-
marines, in addition to the two countries’ extensive maritime cooperation, may lead 
progressively to the positioning of Chinese maritime assets and expertise in Pakistan. 
Moreover, the handing over of Gwadar port operations to a Chinese company makes it 
easy for the PLAN to gain a foothold there eventually. Such a presence may merely facili-
tate training and “enhance[d] cooperation between the two navies,” as the Pakistani fleet 
commander has articulated, but the Indian naval establishment will have to be cognizant 
of this potential when planning its maritime mission profiles, operational doctrines, and 
tactical plans.22 In any period of heightened tensions, the possibility of active or tacit 
cooperation between the two forces will have to be factored in.
Impact on Regional Security
The naval forces of most maritime nations, including many extraregional powers, are 
undertaking antipiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. In “A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower” (October 2007), the U.S. Navy articulated its intent to maintain 
a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, officially reiterating that “[c]redible com-
bat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf / 
Indian Ocean to protect [America’s] vital interests . . . and deter . . . potential adversaries 
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and peer competitors.”23 The 2010 American Naval Operations Concept further elabo-
rated that for the foreseeable future, the U.S. Navy will maintain continuous presence 
of one carrier strike group and one amphibious readiness group in the Arabian Gulf / 
Indian Ocean.24
Chinese strategic discourse indicates that Beijing’s strategic elite is debating seriously the 
possibility of China’s future energy security in the Indian Ocean being affected by India’s 
maritime strategy.25 As part of the larger energy security effort in the IOR, during one 
meeting of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction organization on streamlining antipi-
racy patrols and escort duties in the Gulf of Aden, China suggested that the sea-lanes 
currently being patrolled be divided into separate national sectors.26 Similar propos-
als—to the effect that various countries’ naval forces should define individual areas of 
responsibility to improve the efficiency of escort operations—also were floated by the 
Chinese representative at the UN Security Council.27 Had the participating nations ap-
proved such a proposal for implementation, the PLAN would be sitting pretty by now in 
a legitimately allotted “maritime slice” of the Arabian Sea.
The PLAN’s sustained naval presence in the IOR also allows Beijing’s foreign ministry to 
delve into regional diplomacy and test out foreign policy overtures. A case in point was 
the reported Chinese offer to mediate in the long-running sovereignty dispute between 
the United Arab Emirates and Iran over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa 
Island in the Persian Gulf.28 This mediation offer, if accepted by one or the other party, 
could go a long way toward establishing China’s credentials as a preeminent player in 
the Gulf region. Yet another facet of the Chinese naval presence in the region came into 
focus when certain countries sought to leverage that presence to create an impression of 
overt Chinese support in their favor. When the ships of the eleventh Chinese task force, 
after completing their tenure in the Gulf of Aden, were transiting through the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea on their way to the Black Sea, local-language articles in Syrian and 
Iranian media averred that the Chinese and Russian navies would conduct joint exer-
cises with Syria and Iran. Although both China and Russia rejected such a possibility out 
of hand, the PLAN ships’ mere presence in the vicinity raised undue concerns at a time 
of great and ongoing regional turbulence.29
The above instances indicate that even the PLAN’s currently limited presence in the 
IOR is being leveraged by either China or others in various nuanced ways. Hence, 
even if the problem of piracy in the Arabian Sea hypothetically were to be resolved, the 
PLAN might not return to China, especially after investing so much in the way of effort, 
resources, and international relations capital, and having gained strong sea legs, vital les-
sons in interoperability, and, above all, a say in global maritime matters.
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An Indian scholar argues that “the continued presence of these two extraregional navies 
[i.e., the U.S. Navy and the PLAN] in the Indian Ocean with the similar stated motives 
of ‘SLOC security’ and ‘freedom of the seas’ but diametrically opposite ways of think-
ing, does have portents for instability. Rising capabilities of the Indian navy also adds 
the third dimension into the regional power matrix.”30 The Indian navy’s assigned role of 
“safeguarding India’s national interests encompassing sovereignty, territorial integrity, se-
cure maritime environment conducive to safety, security, and development of the nation 
and its citizens” is quite similar to what members of the Chinese political elite want their 
navy to do.31 Thus, when the PLAN’s assigned task of “safeguarding . . . development of 
national economy and overseas interests” overlaps with the charter of the Indian navy, 
there are bound to be conflicts of interest. The resultant maneuvers aimed at convinc-
ing each other—and the larger IOR littoral—of the seriousness of their imperatives 
could cause internecine fault lines, which, if not adroitly managed, could widen with 
time. Robert Kaplan in fact identifies the “Indian Ocean [as the place] where the global 
struggles will play out in the 21st century.”32 One Chinese author also suggests that since 
India perceives the Indian Ocean as a guarded sphere of influence, it offers an important 
arena for Beijing and New Delhi to “display their strategic muscle.”33
One of the scenarios that two Indian strategists have painted predicts that China will 
manage to find a military base on the East African coast and will station an air expedi-
tionary wing there to provide air cover for PLAN ships deployed in the region. In that 
scenario, India would find itself isolated with regard to its strategic interests in the IOR.34 
India would have to generate alternatives to reverse this “isolation” predicament, and 
many other Asian countries would have to seek options for a power balance vis-à-vis the 
proactive Chinese presence in the region. These dynamics and any counterresponses 
obviously would impact regional stability.
Since the end of the Cold War, China has manifested a gradual doctrinal shift from its 
previous continental focus to a maritime one and the notion of outward expansion, 
leading to a stress on naval modernization. As a result, the contours of the PLAN have 
undergone considerable change, transforming both its force composition and its mari-
time strategy. While the numbers of surface combatants likely will remain more or less 
constant, as new ships are commissioned and older ones get phased out more modern 
weapons systems and sensors will find their way into the inventory, so the force capabil-
ity will keep on rising.
The relevance of the PLAN’s conducting far-seas operations and its increasing necessity 
may be explained in terms of the increasing vulnerability of the Chinese energy flow 
through the Indian Ocean and the need to secure China’s maritime areas of interest. 
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The theaters associated with such a far-seas operations strategy appear to be the western 
Pacific Ocean, followed by the eastern IOR.
The PLAN’s enhanced capabilities, combined with the desire to “operate in distant wa-
ters,” suggest an eventual permanent Chinese presence and power projection in the IOR. 
The PLAN’s current capabilities may not match its intent yet, but its rapid progress in ac-
quiring these capabilities and the current Chinese maritime orientation do raise security 
concerns for India, and may pose questions regarding the future stability quotient in the 
IOR.
Therefore, maintaining a clear perspective on the PLAN’s evolving surface fleet and its 
accompanying shift in strategic focus will serve the interests of the larger global com-
munity well.
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The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) aircraft carrier Liaoning is now afloat and conducting initial operations to develop its deck-aviation capability. The 
PLAN has demonstrated on several occasions an ability to outstrip the projections of 
Western analysts; and the Chinese themselves, while asserting that Liaoning is a devel-
opmental platform, nonetheless tout their entry into the club of navies that have aircraft 
carriers.1 Now that Liaoning is conducting sea trials and an initial series of flight opera-
tions with the J-15 fighter (a derivative of the Russian SU-33), it is appropriate to assess 
the prospects that the PLAN will achieve a useful deck-aviation capability.
The U.S. Navy’s development of carrier aviation has been well chronicled, and of course 
is a success story of legendary proportions. However, this development process required 
two decades leading up to World War II and four decades afterward to achieve a true 
marriage of jet propulsion and aircraft carriers.2 The PLAN can leapfrog much of the 
agony and bloodletting the U.S. Navy experienced in that process, but certain aspects of 
carrier aviation are inherently challenging and must be confronted through an insti-
tutional learning process. The PLAN will not be able to proceed solely on the basis of 
adopted technology, U.S. Navy (USN) doctrine, or stolen patents and secrets. It will have 
to learn on its own, and its ability to do so is not a given.3
The Limits of Leapfrogging
There are big lessons the PLAN does not have to learn that have contributed and will 
contribute to a massive leapfrog. First and foremost is the adoption of the angled flight 
deck. All aircraft carriers that employ an arrested landing system have this feature. The 
angled deck was not a self-evident solution to the catastrophic accident rates the U.S. 
Navy experienced from the late 1940s through the early 1960s; however, the introduc-
tion of the angled deck led to an almost halving of the USN aviation accident rate, from 
776 in 1954 to 360 in 1960. Other technological developments such as the optical land-
ing system also contributed.4 Moreover, early jets had difficult handling characteristics 
and poor engine response; these caused many mishaps. The PLAN will be able to avoid 
all these problems. Looking at videos of flight operations on Liaoning, one clearly sees 
the adoption, almost from whole cloth, of USN flight deck procedures.5 Thus, in many 
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fundamental ways the PLAN will be able to enter the deck-aviation business at a techni-
cally sophisticated level and avoid the costs the U.S. Navy incurred.
While technical leapfrogging is a considerable advantage, in a number of areas the 
PLAN will be on its own—no amount of imitation will help. The first is night and all-
weather operations. Up through World War II, aircraft carriers generally operated only 
during the day and in good weather. With the advent of nuclear weapons and the U.S. 
Navy’s desperation to make its aircraft carriers viable nuclear strike platforms, night and 
all-weather operations were initiated—also at a terrible cost in aircraft and lives.6 Of 
course, the technology for conducting such operations has gotten vastly better, both in 
the aircraft and on the ship, but “come-last” crews actually have to develop proficiency in 
such operations, and they are anything but risk-free.
To understand the challenges and risk of all-weather and night carrier operations, we 
have to examine the USN experience. Night operations are perhaps the easier of the two 
conditions, assuming the weather is decent: ceiling and visibility are sufficient for pilots 
on final approach to sight the landing area visually from at least three-quarters of a mile 
behind the ship on glide path; and the seas are relatively smooth.7 Before digital cockpits 
and heads-up displays, pilots had to become proficient at scanning a least five separate 
gauges (instruments) to keep the airplane upright and on the desired course, altitude, 
and speed. Instrument (or “blind”) flying is not easy and requires constant practice to 
maintain proficiency. This is especially the case at sea, where, except for clear, moonlit 
nights, there is no discernible horizon to orient the pilot. Digital cockpits and heads-up 
displays consolidate information and ease the challenge quite a bit, but disorientation is 
still a constant threat, and any electronic or other system failure raises the risk level con-
siderably. However, for night operations the Chinese at least have the leapfrog advantage 
of adopting the latest Western technology for cockpit displays, navigation, and precision 
final landing approach. Yet even with all this equipment, the U.S. Navy has experienced 
multiple losses of planes and aircrews: an aircraft launches, goes out on a mission, and 
is not heard from again. Pilot disorientation is a suspected cause. Moreover, ejection or 
ditching at night reduces the prospects for crew recovery.
Adverse weather is the real foe of carrier operations. Day or night, rough seas will cause 
even a hundred-thousand-ton Nimitz-class carrier to roll, pitch, and heave. The last-
named term refers to the vertical up-and-down motion of a ship—the brute lifting and 
dropping of the ship by the sea. This movement creates difficulties for pilots on final 
approach, as optical glide-slope indicators, even if stabilized, have limited ability to com-
pensate for heave. The ship’s roll further complicates the difficulties of heave because the 
glide-slope indicator is located over a hundred feet from the ship’s centerline. Pilots who 
“chase” the resulting errant glide-slope indications—a reflexive tendency—risk going too 
low and crashing into the ship’s stern or going too high and missing the arresting wires. 
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In the U.S. Navy, a landing signal officer (LSO) is positioned near the landing area to talk 
the aircraft down under these conditions.8 Still, even with a reasonably good landing ap-
proach, a little too much aircraft sink rate combined with an upward-moving ship’s deck 
can collapse landing gear at touchdown.
The other hazard is missing the wires. Because fighter jets can only have so much fuel 
aboard when they land on a carrier and because they use that fuel rapidly, failure to 
catch a wire more than once can lead quickly to a fuel emergency. USN carriers have 
tanker aircraft that can conduct air-to-air refueling, and normally one orbits overhead 
during landing operations to refuel aircraft that have trouble getting aboard. If the 
Chinese do not have such a capability, the risks of operating at night or in rough seas 
escalate considerably. The alternative is to have a “divert airfield” available on shore. In 
this case a “bingo” fuel state is calculated that, when reached, causes the pilot to abandon 
attempts to land on the ship and instead head to shore. However, linking carrier opera-
tions to a divert field limits the operational maneuverability of the carrier.
In theory, U.S. carriers can operate in zero-ceiling, zero-visibility conditions. Whether 
owing to low clouds, fog, or heavy rain, pilots are unable to see the landing area until at 
or just before touchdown. They rely on a combination of radar guidance, a microwave 
glide-slope indicator, and verbal commands from the LSO, who actually can see the 
airplane’s landing light well before the pilot can see the ship. In practice, carrier skippers 
are reluctant to operate in these conditions, because of the increased risks, but doing so 
is occasionally necessary if the weather worsens while aircraft are in the air. Even with 
the most sophisticated equipment, success requires the utmost in pilot proficiency and 
complete trust and confidence between pilots and LSOs. This results only from extensive 
experience. This is the problem: weather conditions can change rapidly at sea and the 
carrier moves, so unless a commander takes an ultraconservative approach to opera-
tions, at some point conditions likely will deteriorate while aircraft are airborne, and if 
the ship and air wing are not proficient, losses will result.
Although it occurred in 1950, an incident involving several U.S. carriers in the Far East 
is still a good illustration of how quickly things can go wrong. The battle force was 
attempting to swap out sixty-four jet fighters from one carrier to another when bad 
weather moved in, both at sea and at shore-divert fields. An officer who was on the bat-
tle group staff at the time relates: “We had a lot of these fighters in the air. Then we tried 
to bring them down and it was a tough job of getting them on board. They were running 
out of fuel and there was no base on the beach to send them to. We had to get them back 
on board those two carriers, and we broke up those planes in some numbers.”9
The discussion of flying in adverse conditions leads to consideration of the matter of 
aircrew and ship’s crew proficiency. To assess the overall capability of a force, it must be 
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understood as a system that is composed of both human and machine elements. The 
human element must be understood as a composite of selection, training, and culture—
especially organizational culture. Proficiency at the “tip of the spear” is the result of the 
influences of all these factors, and more. This article will focus on just two. First, what 
degree of risk will the PLAN accept to generate true proficiency in its forces? Second, 
will the PLAN be able to move beyond a relatively small elite cadre of crews to a larger 
force that must count on “average” pilots?
Modern technology has produced high-quality aircraft simulators. These machines are 
being used more extensively all the time to substitute for actual flying time, and in some 
cases, especially in the airlines, crews can qualify on a new airplane using only simula-
tors. In carrier operations, however, no simulator can substitute for the kind of actual 
situation described previously. Individuals can be partially trained in simulators of 
various kinds, but night and foul-weather operations at sea require the development of 
teamwork and confidence that only actual operations in these conditions can produce. 
This imposes on any navy the requirement to accept risk in a peacetime training envi-
ronment. Conditioned by World War II to embrace risk, the U.S. Navy could tolerate the 
grievous losses experienced as its aviation arm endeavored during the 1950s to develop 
an endemic night/all-weather capability. The question is whether the PLAN organiza-
tional culture, corporately, is capable of accepting these risks, and whether, on an officer-
by-officer basis, it can produce leaders with sufficient nerve to make risk-incurring 
decisions. If it cannot, PLAN naval aviation operations will be constrained severely.
The second issue includes but transcends night and foul-weather flying. It is one thing 
to have a small, elite cadre of highly selected and trained aircrews, but quite another to 
field a large force that is populated by average personnel. Military flying is a Darwinian 
activity; the weak or maladapted either die or drop out. The more challenging the flying 
environment, the fewer crews will make it to highly experienced and proficient status. 
The Israeli Air Force is an example of an almost pure meritocracy in which brutal selec-
tion, training, and evaluation produce a relatively small corps of truly outstanding fliers. 
Fielding one or two small air wings can be pursued on this basis, but at some larger force 
size the selection and evaluation criteria must be relaxed enough to produce sufficient 
training throughput.
The challenge then becomes how people with second- or third-tier talent levels can be 
made useful members of the force. Here again risk is introduced. It permeates decision 
making from top organizational levels down to unit commanding officers, and corporate 
culture is paramount. Is the PLAN still a centralized and risk-averse organization, or can 
it change its stripes and empower both itself as an institution and its individual leaders 
to accept risk? There is a recent Chinese movie called Skyfighters that is a knockoff of the 
American movie Top Gun. In it, the analogue of Tom Cruise’s “Maverick” character is an 
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aggressive, risk-taking commander who tries to push the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) into 
becoming a more progressive organization. The fact that the PLAAF saw fit to sponsor 
such a film indicates that there are indeed cultural problems to overcome within the 
Chinese military.10
Armed with an understanding of how organizational culture, with its effect on training, 
can empower or constrain the proficiency of a carrier aviation force, we can evaluate 
better the prospects for PLAN carriers being able to adopt various operational roles and 
contribute to the achievement of presumed Chinese strategic missions.
Doctrinal Roles
Since the conversion of the collier Jupiter into the first U.S. aircraft carrier, Langley, 
the operational doctrinal roles of the ship type have evolved and proliferated. Aircraft 
carriers represent a concentration of both national resources and offensive combat 
power, so the conditions and circumstances under which they are committed to use 
and potentially subjected to risk must be understood clearly and reconciled with both 
their characteristics and the benefits to be gained from their use.11 The articulation of 
doctrinal roles is a way of analyzing capabilities, benefits, and risks. While the U.S. Navy 
has never published such a categorization formally, most naval aviation flag officers have 
a tacit grasp of them. Whether PLAN leadership will develop a similar understanding 
is open to question at this point. U.S. aircraft carriers, over their history, have played six 
doctrinal roles. The prospects for the adoption of each role by a force of Chinese carriers 
will provide some insight into how the PLAN might use them and perhaps also about 
the practical limits of Chinese sea power.
The first doctrinal role to examine is that of capital ship. The term “capital ship” is used 
quite often in conjunction with aircraft carriers—naturally enough, given the history of 
the epic sea battles in the Pacific between the navies of Japan and the United States. Tra-
ditionally, the capital ship has been that ship type capable of defeating all other types—
typically the ship with the most guns, in the age of sail, or the biggest guns, in the age of 
dreadnoughts. Once naval aircraft attained sufficient performance capability to deliver 
bombs that were the equivalent of major-caliber gun shells, the aircraft carrier became 
the principal arbiter of what floated and what did not, submarines notwithstanding. 
Aircraft carriers became true capital ships: those that, when concentrated, could defeat 
an opposing fleet and seize command of the sea.
After World War II, by virtue of America’s unchallenged dominance of the seas and the 
particular characteristics of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, the nature of command 
of the sea and the concomitant role of capital ships changed. Instead of being concen-
trated to defeat an enemy fleet, U.S. aircraft carriers were dispersed along the Eurasian 
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littoral to deter war and to provide security for the international order.12 Thus, the U.S. 
aircraft carrier became a capital ship insofar as it was a concentration of resources and 
power; but it was its ability to bombard inland targets, not its ability to sink other ships, 
that associated it with the exercise of command of the sea.13
In an age of nuclear submarines, long-range antiship missiles, and lethal antiaircraft de-
fenses, it is hard to envision the PLAN being able to employ its carriers in the doctrinal 
role of capital ship in either sense of the term. Submarines are the likely arbiters of what 
floats and what does not. In addition, there is virtually no prospect of China finding 
itself in a set of strategic circumstances analogous to those of the United States in the 
post–World War II period. Thus, regardless of the number of aircraft carriers China 
builds or their pattern of operations, the doctrinal role of capital ship is likely to be ir-
relevant to them. Moreover, the risk profile of the capital ship role does not seem to be 
compatible with the risk-averse culture of the PLA. In the traditional capital ship mode, 
one must risk all to win all. In decisive sea battles from Salamis to Midway, at least one 
admiral was reluctant to seek battle but either was ambushed or was pushed into battle 
by a higher commander; or, when opportunity offered, as it did at Jutland in World 
War I, he bailed out. Given modern means of search, it is doubtful any Chinese admiral 
would allow himself to be drawn into a fight “for all the marbles,” so the capital ship role 
has no strategic meaning for him.
The dropping of two nuclear bombs on Japan precipitated the end of World War II in 
the Pacific. After the war a nasty internecine struggle broke out within the U.S. military 
between airpower advocates and the Navy. The U.S. Navy—desperate to fend off the 
arguments of those who believed the strategic bomber would render the aircraft carrier 
obsolete, and possessing a genuine belief that the large, slow, long-range bomber would 
not survive Soviet air defenses—pushed ahead, at dreadful cost in aircraft and lives, to 
establish carriers as nuclear-strike platforms. By the late 1980s this role had been made 
obsolete by the robust nuclear triad, and nuclear weapons were removed from carrier 
magazines. However, this capability remains inherent in the aircraft carrier, and we 
cannot discount the possibility, admittedly highly unlikely, that a desperate future China 
might put nuclear bombs on its carriers, perhaps hoping that we would not consider this 
option, allowing them to sidestep robust U.S. missile defenses.
Early in World War II, U.S. carriers were dispatched on hit-and-run raids at various 
points within the Japanese oceanic defensive perimeter, the most notable being the 
Doolittle raid on Tokyo. These operations were meant to disrupt Japanese rear-area 
operations, provide intelligence on Japanese dispositions, and boost the morale of the 
American public. In this way the carriers functioned not unlike the cavalry of Civil War 
general Nathan Bedford Forrest. Although this doctrinal role slid into the background 
after the war, there were still instances during the Cold War when American carriers 
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would dodge around and show up by surprise somewhere within Soviet ocean surveil-
lance zones in an effort to shake the USSR’s confidence in its ability to find and attack 
U.S. naval forces. One also might regard the 1986 El Dorado Canyon strike on Libya 
as a form of augmented cavalry raid from the air. PLAN carriers might be able to pull 
off this kind of raid on an unsuspecting neighbor; but it seems unlikely, as U.S. recon-
naissance probably would be used to tip off the incipient victim. Generally speaking, a 
sky full of satellites, an increasingly instrumented ocean, and the proliferation of drones, 
cell phones, and over-the-horizon radar will make it very hard for any carriers to “get 
lost” at sea and show up by surprise somewhere. On the other hand, if the Chinese could 
manage the operational security and deception, this role is suited to a small, elite aircrew 
cadre, which would be easiest for the PLAN to establish.
The original doctrinal role envisioned for the aircraft carrier, especially by battleship 
officers, was to serve as the “eyes of the fleet.” Carrier aircraft not only would scout 
ahead to locate the enemy fleet so our own battle line could maneuver to engage with 
advantage; they also would spot the fall of major-caliber shells so as to correct aim more 
rapidly and accurately. As the carrier assumed more-critical doctrinal roles, scouting was 
subsumed into the overall security posture of the carrier task force, where it remains to 
this day. However, the advent of networked warfare, with its dependency on satellites, 
may serve to resurrect this doctrinal role. Assuming a capable enemy can neutralize 
satellites, the need arises for line-of-sight relay services. It is not difficult to envision 
long-endurance drones being launched off carriers to provide these services as well as 
persistent, long-range reconnaissance and surveillance. Presumably the PLAN would be 
as interested in this role and as capable of performing it as the U.S. Navy, so we should 
not be surprised, given the superior agility of the Chinese procurement system, to see 
unmanned aircraft operating from PLAN carriers sooner rather than later.
Although Horatio, Lord Nelson, advised that “a ship’s a fool to attack a fort,” when condi-
tions are right, i.e., there is little or no threat, the carrier may be employed usefully as 
an airfield at sea to support landward operations. The carrier’s big advantage in this role 
is that it carries its own logistics, so it is “ready on arrival.” This characteristic proved 
critical in the defense of the Pusan perimeter in the early going of the Korean War and 
in the first weeks of Operation Desert Shield, right after Saddam invaded Kuwait. 
U.S. carriers functioned frequently in this role during the Vietnam War and Operations 
Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, among others. This could be 
a natural role for PLAN carriers—but they would have to deal with a number of caveats 
and challenges.
The first issue is the total force requirement. Unlike hit-and-run raids, an airfield at sea 
presumably either is supporting troops ashore or is conducting some type of air cam-
paign. The amount of firepower the carrier can put over the beach per unit time must 
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be sufficient, and the level of effort must be sustained for a possibly indefinite period. To 
supply enough airpower, U.S. practice has been to group two to six carriers—but these 
carriers carry seventy to eighty aircraft, fifty of which are strikers. Liaoning can carry 
perhaps thirty planes—but not the additional support aircraft such as early warning, 
electronic warfare, and tanking. Such support functions, along with logistics and combat 
search and rescue, are critical for sea-based airfield combat operations. The first genera-
tion of Chinese carriers will fall short in this aspect. Moreover, depending on the nature 
of operations ashore, around-the-clock operations as well as sustained bad-weather 
flying may be required, thus invoking all the cultural and training issues previously 
discussed. Even to have a chance at successfully fulfilling this doctrinal role, the PLAN 
would need at least two and more likely three carriers operating as a cohesive group, 
something that is likely a decade or more away.
Sustained airfield operations demand a constant flow of logistics. Nuclear-powered 
Nimitz-class carriers do not compete with their air wings for fuel tankage aboard, but 
the Liaoning class will. Refueling interrupts flight operations, and the smaller the total 
fuel capacity, the more often this happens. Assuming robust usage of weapons, these also 
will have to be replenished. If Chinese carriers operate relatively close to base, maintain-
ing the supply train of fuel, weapons, food, and parts may be feasible; but any attempt 
to adopt this doctrinal role outside the first island chain would require a substantial lo-
gistics infrastructure. Aircraft maintenance and battle damage repair constitute another 
challenge of sustained airfield operations. A small wing of thirty fighters can shrink 
quickly to impotence through equipment malfunctions that cannot be made good.
Finally, there is the matter of force protection for the “sea base.” When a carrier acts as 
an airfield at sea, it loses its protective mobility. Limited aircraft range imposed by ski-
jump launch constricts movement even more, as does the requirement to turn into the 
wind at regular intervals for launch. The proliferation of modern area-denial weapons 
will make this role increasingly dangerous, at least in certain waters. In the Falklands 
War, the Royal Navy was forced to keep its carriers far enough from the amphibious 
landing site to avoid detection and attack by Argentine Exocet missiles. This meant 
that its Harriers were unable to set up defensive patrols and could launch only on alert, 
preventing them from intercepting Argentine air raids until after they pulled off target. 
There is increasing recognition even in USN circles that a carrier no longer may be able 
to set up in an optimum position to function as an airfield; PLAN carriers, with their 
short-range aircraft, will be in a worse situation.
The final role of the aircraft carrier is that of geopolitical chess piece. The symbolic 
nature of the aircraft carrier was well established over the course of the Cold War and 
afterward. President Obama directed the Navy to maintain eleven carrier groups despite 
the service’s recommendation to drop to a lower number because, reportedly, he found 
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them “broadly useful.” U.S. carriers have been a staple of naval diplomacy, and there 
is every reason to think that China eventually will use its carriers in a similar way. On 
the benign side of this role, port visits, joint exercises, disaster relief, and humanitarian 
assistance are all elements of naval diplomacy that can be undertaken without having to 
face the rigorous operational demands the other roles impose. Liaoning and its sisters 
can operate in conditions of their choosing, and the logistics are manageable wherever in 
the world they elect to cruise.
The coercive side of the role gets more complicated. The most benign element of this 
side of the role would be general deterrence deployments, and this is the most likely 
use of the Chinese carriers—to complicate the calculations of Vietnam, India, or other 
nations that have conflicting territorial claims or other issues with China. However, 
when a crisis erupts, the calculus gets more difficult for an aircraft carrier. To be effective 
at deterrence or posing a threat, the ship must be visible and in a position from which 
its airpower plausibly could be brought to bear. However, it is in precisely this position 
that it becomes vulnerable to the kinds of area-denial weapons that even a weak nation 
might bring to bear. This sets up a difficult dilemma for the nation using its carrier as 
a crisis-management tool. Keeping the carrier on the required station to threaten other 
states makes it vulnerable and potentially a political hostage. On the other hand, mov-
ing it to a safer position means abandoning, at least temporarily, the threat position, 
which may be seen as evidence of weakening resolve. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, 
U.S. carrier groups found themselves in this kind of dilemma when face-to-face with a 
strong, missile-equipped Soviet fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. Whether Chinese 
naval and political leadership will be sufficiently astute to avoid such dilemmas or will 
have enough nerve to manage carrier movements properly during a crisis is anything but 
certain.
Building and maintaining a deck-aviation capability that is more than symbolic are an 
expensive and risky business, even with today’s advanced technology. The United States 
committed to an aircraft carrier–centric fleet structure as a matter of strategic impera-
tive, and now must decide whether that legacy structure will remain viable in the future. 
China is coming from the opposite direction. There is little in the way of external threat 
driving it toward deck aviation. Rather, it is a combination of nationalistic pride and 
niche functionality that seems to be propelling the development of Chinese aircraft 
carriers.14 Once some minimum level of credible operational capability is attained—and 
that may await the launch of Chinese carriers with catapults—the push and pull of spe-
cific events will shape the trajectory of Chinese carrier aviation development thereafter. 
What that trajectory will look like is harder to predict than it would have been to fore-
cast the vector of American carrier development during the 1920s.
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Technology evolution tends to produce a seesaw relationship between defense and of-
fense. George Friedman, in his book The Future of War, advanced the notion of weapons 
system senility: the erosive process in which the cost of protecting a weapons system 
such as an army tank or aircraft carrier comes to outweigh the value of the system’s 
offensive capability.15 The proliferation of quiet diesel submarines armed with potent 
antiship missiles, unmanned systems, smart mines, and other ambush-type weapons 
may constitute an environment, especially in the littorals, that brings on a case of air-
craft carrier senility. If we took this seriously, we would seek ways of distributing naval 
power-projection capability into a larger number of smaller platforms—missile ships, 
perhaps—and cease building carriers. In any case, whether owing to increasing threat or 
increasing cost, it is hard to predict a future of ascendancy for the aircraft carrier. Thus 
we might envision a graph on which the horizontal axis is time and the vertical axis is 
aircraft carrier strategic utility. Following Friedman’s argument, we would draw a line 
starting way up on the vertical axis and sloping down to the right over time to a point at 
which the carrier has gone the way of the dreadnought. A second line would start at the 
intersection of the two axes and slope up to the right, representing the thrust of Chinese 
carrier development. Where these lines cross would constitute the point at which China 
should cease investing in carriers.
Chinese geopolitical imperatives also will modulate the ultimate character of PLAN 
carrier aviation. The U.S. carrier force became a strategic tool for maintaining a liberal 
world order and defending the global system of commerce and security from various 
kinds of disruptions.16 It is hard to envision any such expansive role for the PLAN’s car-
riers. More likely, the PLAN will attempt to establish security barriers within the first or 
second island chain and support territorial claims. It also on occasion may sortie into the 
Indian Ocean to counter what China sees as threats to its interests. These strategic tasks 
require a lesser naval aviation establishment than that of the United States, and quite 
possibly one that is feasible, at least in structure, for China to build.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has chosen to make the aircraft carrier a potent 
symbol of national pride. This will spur the construction of more and presumably more- 
advanced hulls and the development of more-balanced and more-capable air wings. We 
must understand that Chinese foreign policy and security strategy are intimately con-
nected to a more central CCP objective: maintaining power. This connection deepens 
the influence of corporate culture and ethos on the difficult leadership decisions at all 
levels needed to move Chinese naval aviation from a symbolic and niche force to an 
actual operational and strategic fighting asset. This eventuality is anything but certain.
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The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has the third-largest fleet of auxiliary and logistic-support vessels in the world, just behind those of the United States and 
Russia.1 An examination of the PLAN’s order of battle reveals that development of this 
fleet began more than three decades ago with the completion of four fleet-support ships 
and similar numbers of large submarine tenders and oceanographic vessels.2 Despite the 
coastal and defensive nature of the Chinese navy, a number of oceangoing auxiliaries 
were needed to support growing numbers of destroyers, frigates, and submarines at their 
bases or at sea within their two-hundred-nautical-mile operational range.
For many years, this auxiliary fleet did not seem to change much. But in its 2009 public 
assessment of the PLAN, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) noted an evolution 
over the previous decade, with newer and larger auxiliaries: Anwei (oceangoing hospi-
tal ship, for humanitarian relief), Danyun (for island resupply), Dalao (for submarine 
rescue), Wuhu (a test platform), and Fuchi (for fleet support).3 The planned completion 
of four additional Fuchis in the 2013–16 period seems to confirm this trend and foretell 
more blue-water operations.
But for what purpose? Trends in naval auxiliary vessel construction appear to reflect 
both China’s naval capabilities and its intentions. More fleet-support ships reveal China’s 
commitment to robust naval diplomacy aimed at cultivating naval “soft power” while 
providing effective means to protect Chinese trade, as exemplified by the Gulf of Aden 
patrols since 2008. The trend toward larger intelligence-collection vessels points to a 
change in policy toward monitoring developments in distant waters, out of necessity 
or in retaliation for U.S. intelligence operations near China, or both. However, a lack of 
large, seagoing repair ships suggests that the PLAN, despite mounting far-seas opera-
tions, will continue to focus its combat capabilities on the near seas.
Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix
Supporting a Blue-Water Navy in the Far Seas?
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Categories of and Designations for PLAN Support Vessels
Chinese auxiliary vessels are divided into two main categories: large, oceangoing ves-
sels—numbered since 2007 in the 800- and 80-block series—and smaller support vessels 
designated by function and fleet.
The large, oceangoing vessels are subdivided into six categories, with three-digit or two-
digit numbers, all starting with 8:
 • Intelligence and survey ships, named after planets and stars (numbers in the 850s, 
with one vessel in the 900s)
 • Hospital ships and submarine tenders (潜艇招标), named after islands (860s)
 • Oceanographic research ships, named after scientists (870s)
 • Fleet-replenishment ships (补给舰) and supply ships, named after lakes (880s)
 • Experimental ships, named after inventors and scientists (890s)
 • Training vessels (in the 80 series)
This numbering system seems to restrict the large auxiliary category to a maximum of 
about fifty ships. So far, fewer than half of those numbers are being used, although the 
fleet-support ship category now seems to be full, the PLAN having so far not reused 
pennants of decommissioned ships.
The smaller, or coastal, support vessels are divided into categories whose characters 
follow the fleet designations bei (北), north; dong (东), east; and nan (南), south. Fifteen 
categories have been identified.
The PLAN also has a number of fishing vessels it uses for reconnaissance and intel-
ligence. They wear pennant numbers with the prefix zhanyu (湛渔) for deepwater 
fishing.
Organization and Order of Battle
Overall, major auxiliary vessels are distributed equally among the three fleets. Missile-
test ships are concentrated in the North Sea Fleet (NSF) and acoustic-research vessels 
in the South Sea Fleet (SSF). More reconnaissance vessels are based in the north and in 
the south, where they can deploy better (bearing in mind that the PLAN also fields a 
number of smaller trawlers dedicated to intelligence collection whose whereabouts are 
more difficult to follow).
In 2004, the PLAN altered its organizational structure to improve its logistics support to 
its combat units by creating one combat-support ship flotilla (作战支援舰支队) in each 
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fleet. Existing support-ship squadrons (大队) were resubordinated to combat-support 
ship flotillas to serve the PLAN’s three fleets better.4
The NSF, headquartered in Qingdao, is responsible for the Bo Hai Sea, the Yellow Sea, 
and the northern portion of the East China Sea. Since 2004, the NSF has been supported 
by the 1st Combat Support Ship Flotilla, headquartered in Qingdao. This flotilla com-
prises five dedicated squadrons.5 The Reconnaissance Squadron’s presence in Qingdao 
gives it easier access to the Sea of Japan and the western Pacific.
The East Sea Fleet (ESF), headquartered in Ningbo, covers the majority of the East 
China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Created in 2004, the ESF’s 2nd Combat Support Ship 
Flotilla is headquartered in Zhoushan. It comprises five squadrons.
The 264th Auxiliary Squadron in Zhoushan is by far the largest in the PLAN. See “Main 
Auxiliary Vessels of the East Sea Fleet” in the sidebar for a list of ESF auxiliary vessels.
The SSF, headquartered in Zhanjiang, is responsible for the South China Sea. The SSF is 
assisted by the 3rd Combat Support Ship Flotilla. It is headquartered in Zhanjiang and 
comprises six squadrons.6
See “Main Auxiliary Vessels of the South Sea Fleet” for a list of SSF auxiliary vessels.
Hull Pennant Pinyin Function U.S. Designation U.S. Abbreviation
测 ce survey surveying ship AGS
测量 celiang research/measure oceanographic research ship AGOR
调 diao signal intelligence collection ship AGI
交 jiao transport cargo ship AK
救 jiu salvage submarine tender AS
浚 jun dredge dredger
康 kang hospital hospital ship AH
缆 lan cable cable repairing ship ARC
勤 qin degaussing degaussing ship ADG
水 shui water distilling ship AWT
拖 tuo tug oceangoing tug AT
修 xiu repair repair ship AR
研究 yanjiu research surveying ship AGS
油 you oil light oiler AOL
运 yun transport torpedo retriever AT/YT
Table 1. Characters Displayed on the Hulls of Smaller Auxiliary Vessels
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Type NSF ESF SSF
Replenishment oiler (AOR) 2 3 2
Oiler (AO) — 5 2
Light oiler (AOL) 13 20 14
Repair ship (AR) — 1 2
Submarine tender (AS) 9 7 8
Hospital ship (AH) — 1 —
Ambulance vessel (YH) 1 2 4
Water tanker (AW) 6 10 7
Cargo ship (AK) 8 4/8? 3?
Oceanographic-survey-intelligence ship (AGOR/AGS/AGI) 7 5 9
Cable ship (ARC) 5 5 4
Degaussing vessel (ADG) 2 4 2
Torpedo retriever (AT/YT) 4 4 4
Test ship (AGE) 2 — 2
Fleet tug 4 — 3
Table 2. Distribution of PLAN Auxiliary Vessels
Squadron Location
251st Reconnaissance/Survey Squadron (侦测船大队) Qingdao
254th Auxiliary Squadron Qingdao
188th (or unknown) Salvage Squadron Qingdao
257th Auxiliary Squadron Lüshun
188th (or unknown) Salvage Squadron Lüshun
Table 3. NSF Auxiliary Organizational Units
Squadron Location
264th Auxiliary Squadron Zhoushan
223rd Reconnaissance/Survey Squadron Ningbo
258th Auxiliary Ship Squadron Shanghai
263rd Auxiliary Ship Squadron Ningde
188th Salvage Squadron Fenghua
Table 4. ESF Auxiliary Organizational Units
Squadron Location
224th Reconnaissance Squadron Zhanjiang
255th Auxiliary Squadron Zhanjiang
225th Survey Squadron Guangzhou
236th Auxiliary Squadron Guangzhou
221st Auxiliary Squadron Yulin
188th Salvage Squadron Yulin
Table 5. SSF Auxiliary Organizational Units
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Category (designation) Class Tons 
(full load)
Vessels (year commissioned, 
if known)
9 submarine tenders (AS)
1 Dajiang 925 11,975 Changxingdao 861 (1979)
1 Zhonghua 922  3,400 Bei Jiu 403
2 Dalang 922 II  4,200 Bei Jiu 122 (1987), 138 (1988)
2 Dalao 926  9,500 Haiyangdao 864 (2010), 
Liugongdao 865 (2013)
1 Dazhou 946  1,100 Bei Jiu 137 (1977)
2 replenishment oilers (AOR)
1 Fuqing 905 21,740 Hongzehu 881 (1979)
1 Fuchi 903A 23,500 Taihu 889 (2013)
13 light oilers (AOL)
3 Fuzhou  2,100 Bei You 555, 560, 563
10 various  2,200 Bei You 400, 561, 562, 565, 
566, 571, 576, 581, 590, 593
6 water tankers (AW)
1 Fuzhou  2,100 Bei Shui 557
5 various  2,200 Bei Shui 572, 576, 581, 582, 
583
8 cargo ships (AK)
1 Yantai 073 II  2,000 Luliangshan 938 / Lushun 
(1979)
2? Hongqi  1,950 Bei Yun 443, 528
4? Danlin  1,290 Bei Yun 531, 591, 592, 594
1 Sichang  9,105 Dalian 82 (1996)
1 carrier-support ship (AG) 1 Dagan 16,500 88
1 hospital ship (AH) 1 Nankang   300 Bei Yi / Qingdao
4 torpedo retrievers (AT)
4 Damen/
Dandao 917
 1,600 Bei Yun 455, 484, 485, 529
5 cable ships (ARC)
2 Youdian 911 II  1,350 Bei Lan 764, 765
3 Yunan   135 Bei Lan 767, 768, 769
2 degaussing vessels (ADG) 2 Yanci 912 III   750 Bei Qin 735, 736 (1976)
7 survey-intelligence ships
(AGS/AGOR/AGI)
1 Yanlai 635 III 1,100 Bei Ce 943
1 Type 639 1,500 Bei Diao 991
1 Type 992 Bei Diao 992 / Shiyan 1
1 Type 993 2,300 Bei Diao 993
1 Type 814 2,500 Bei Diao 900 (1987)
1 Type 636A 6,000 Qian Sanqiang 873
1 Xiangyanghong 4,445 Xiangyanghong 09
2 test ships (AGE)
2 Dahua 909 6,000 Bi Sheng 891 (1997), 
Hua Luogeng 892 (2008)
4 tugs
1 Tuzhong 3,600 Bei Tuo 710
3 Hujiu/Dinghai 
837
1,500 Bei Tuo 622, 711, 717
Main Auxiliary Vessels of the North Sea Fleet
Sources: Stephen Saunders, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2014–15 (Coulsdon, Surrey, U.K.: IHS Jane’s, 2015); Prézelin, Flottes de 
Combat 2012.
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Category (designation) Class Tons 
(full load)
Vessels (year commissioned, if 
known)
7 submarine tenders (AS)
1 Dajiang 925 11,975 Chongmingdao 862 (1976)
2 Dalang 922  4,200 Dong Jiu 311 (1987), 332 
(1989)
1 Dadong 946A  2,800 Dong Jiu 304 (1982)
3 various Dong Jiu 331, 333, 334
3 replenishment oilers (AOR)
1 Fuqing 905 21,740 Poyanghu 882 (1979)
2 Fuchi 903/
903A
20,500
23,500
Qiandaohu 886 (2004),
Chaohu 890 (2013)
5 oilers (AO)
3 Jinyou  4,800 Dong You 622, 625, 675 (1990)
1 Type 640 Dong You 640 (2003)
1 Dong You Dong You 637 (2004)
20 light oilers (AOL)
1 Shengli  5,000 Dong You 620 (1981)
5 Fuzhou  2,100 Dong You 606, 607, 626, 628, 
629
14 various  2,200 Dong You 609, 624, 630, 631, 
632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 638, 
639, 641, 642, 645
10 water tankers (AW)
2 Fuzhou  2,100 Dong Shui 643, 644
8 various  2,200 Dong Shui 610, 636, 641, 648, 
646, 647, 649, 650
4 (8?) cargo ships (AK)
1 Dayung 904 10,575 Jingpo Hu 884 (1992)
1 Yantai 073 II  2,000 Dong Yun 757 (1979)
2/3? Hongqi  1,950 Dong Yun 755, 756, 771
3? Danlin  1,290 Dong Yun 827, 834, 835
3 hospital ships (AH)
1 Anwei 920 14,000 Daishandao 866 (2008)
2 Nankang   150 Dong Yi 12, 13
4 torpedo retrievers (AT)
4 Damen/
Dandao 917
 1,600 Dong Yun 758, 759, 802, 803
5 cable ships (ARC)
4 Youdian 911 II  1,350 Dong Lan 868, 873, 874, 882
1 Yunan   135 Dong Lan 884
2 Youzhong   750 N2304, N2404
1 repair ship (AR) 1 Type 648  3,500 Dong Xiu 911
4 degaussing vessels (ADG)
1 Type 911  2,000 Dong Qin 870
3 Yanci 912 III   750 Dong Qin 860, 863, 864
5 survey-intelligence ships (AGOR/
AGS/AGI)
1 Type 636A  5,800 Zhu Kezhen 872
2 Yanlai 635 III  1,100 Dong Ce 226, 227
2 Dongdiao 
815/815G
 6,000 Beijixing 851 (2000), 
Tiangwangxin 853 (2013)
Main Auxiliary Vessels of the East Sea Fleet
Sources: Saunders, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2014–15; Prézelin, Flottes de Combat 2012.
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Category (designation) Class Tons 
(full load)
Vessels (year commissioned, if 
known)
2 repair ships (AR) 2 Dayung 904A 10,975 Yangcheng 883, Jingpo 884
1 cargo ship (AK)
1 Dayung (Mod.) 
904B
16,500 888 (ex-88)
8 submarine tenders (AS)
1 Dajiang 925 11,975 Yongxingdao 863 (1982)
1 Dalang 922  4,200 Nan Jiu 510 (1990)
1 Dalao 926  9,500 Changdao 867 (2012)
1 Dazhou 946  1,100 Nan Jiu 502 (1977)
1 Hudong 930  2,500 Nan Jiu 512
3 various Nan Jiu 507; Yulin 508, 509
2 replenishment oilers (AOR)
1 Komandarm Fedko 37,000 Qinghaihu 885 (1996)
1 Fuchi 903A 23,500 Weishanhu 887 (2004)
2 oilers (AO) 2 Type 640 Nan You 968, 972 (2003)
14 light oilers (AOL)
3 Fuzhou  2,100 Nan You 932, 940, 941
11 various  2,200 Nan You 954, 957, 958, 959, 
961, 962, 963, 969, 970, 973, 
976
7 water tankers (AW)
3 Fuzhou  2,100 Nan Shui 913, 937, 938
4 various  2,200 Nan Shui 963, 964, 965, 967
3? cargo ships (AK)
1 Yantai 073 II  2,000 Nan Yun 745 (1979)
1 Hongqi  1,950 Nan Yun 835
1? Danlin  1,290 Nan Yun 975
4 hospital ships (AH)
2 Nankang   150 Nan Yi 10, 11
2 Qiongsha   150 Nan Yi 9, 832
4 torpedo retrievers (AT)
3 Damen/
Dandao 917
 1,600 Nan Yun 841, 844, 845
1 various Nan Yun 846
4 cable ships (ARC)
2 Youdian 911 II  1,350 Nan Lan 233, 234
1 Yunan   135 Nan Lan 235
1 Youzhong   750 G2693 (1982)
2 degaussing vessels (ADG) 2 Yanci 912 III   750 Nan Qin 203, 205
9 survey-intelligence ships 
(AGS/AGI)
1 Xiangyanghong 
645/813
4,435 Qimingxing 852 (1982)
1 Yanlai 635 III 1,100 Nan Ce 427
3 Ganzhu 635 II 1,000 Nan Ce 420, 426, 428
2 Type 625C 3,320 Nan Diao 411, 412
1 Kanhai Nan Ce 429
2 acoustic test ships (AGE) 2 Type?
5,800 Zhan Tianyou 893 (2012)
6,080 Li Siguang 894 (2014)
3 tugs
1 Tuzhong 3,600 Nan Tuo 154
1 Hujiu II (Mod.) 837 1,495 Nan Tuo 185
1 Tuqian 3,800 Nan Tuo 181
Main Auxiliary Vessels of the South Sea Fleet
Sources: Saunders, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2014–15; Prézelin, Flottes de Combat 2012.
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Supporting Far-Seas Operations
Four classes of auxiliary ships provide especially useful insights into Chinese intentions 
in the far seas: replenishment ships, hospital ships, surveillance ships, and submarine 
tenders.
Replenishment Ships
China constructed its first fleet-support ships in the late 1970s. Each of the four 21,740-
ton Fuqing-class replenishment oilers (AORs) is capable of carrying 10,550 tons of fuel 
oil, one thousand tons of diesel fuel, two hundred tons of feed water, two hundred tons 
of potable water, and fifty tons of lube oil. Four oil-refueling stations and two stores sta-
tions allow replenishment of three vessels simultaneously. However, China transferred 
one AOR to friendly Pakistan and another to the merchant fleet, signaling a relative lack 
of interest in blue-water operations.7
To have at least one large support ship in each fleet, in 1988 China launched a program 
to develop a new-generation multiproduct replenishment ship (AOE). According to 
retired chief designer Zhang Gang, costs delayed the program, so in November 1992 
China decided instead to acquire a very capable uncompleted former Soviet Komandarm 
Fedko–class AOR from Ukraine. Towed to Dalian Shipyard in May 1993, the AOR was 
commissioned in 1996 as Nancang (later renamed Qinghaihu) and was transferred to 
the SSF.8
Thailand placed an order for China to build it a support ship for its light aircraft carrier 
group, giving chief designer Zhang Gang an opportunity to complete the designing of an 
AOE. Delivered in 1996, Similan served as a basis for China’s current six Type 903/903A 
Fuchi-class AOEs, built in Shanghai and Guangzhou in 2004–2005 and 2011–15, respec-
tively.9 The Fuchis’ primary role is to provide underway replenishment for destroyers 
and frigates. They are the first Chinese multiproduct replenishment ships capable of 
resupplying fuel, water, stores, and ammunition.
The Fuchis’ main differences from ships of the Fuqing class lie in their multiple func-
tions (missiles, ship and helicopter fuel), increased capacities (four times more solid 
cargo and three times more liquids), compartmented design (double-hull structure and 
separate, optimized ammo and oil compartments), and better equipment (stabilized 
cranes, advanced alongside-replenishment system). Notwithstanding the impressive 
capabilities of these six new ships, they are only up to the task of supporting near-seas 
operations, a conclusion made obvious when we consider the PLAN’s large numbers of 
destroyers and frigates and the future enormous needs of the fossil-fueled aircraft carrier 
Liaoning.
china’s evolving surface fleet 101
The PLAN’s distant deployments started in 1980 for research and development and mis-
sile tracking and increased in 1985 with the beginnings of China’s naval diplomacy. With 
their large displacements and ability to operate helicopters, Fuqing supply ships and 
Dajiang submarine tenders were the PLAN’s first auxiliaries to operate in the far seas. In 
May 1980, Fuqing X615 (ESF) and its sister ship X950 (NSF), together with the then J121 
Changxingdao (NSF) and J302 Chongmingdao (ESF), participated in an eighteen-ship 
deployment to recover China’s first DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile in the South 
Pacific.10 In November 1984, Changxingdao accompanied the research vessel Xiangyang-
hong 10 to Antarctica to establish China’s first scientific station there.11
In November 1985, the Fuqing-class AOR X615 and two destroyers were the first PLAN 
vessels to cross the Strait of Malacca and enter the Indian Ocean, on an inaugural good-
will tour. Between 1985 and 2012, the PLAN made forty-eight deployments with one 
hundred port calls in forty-three countries.12 Auxiliaries played a key role. Eighteen of 
those deployments were supported by an AOR, with eight deployments supported by an 
older Fuqing, five by newer Fuchis, and five by the former Soviet Komandarm Fedko / 
Qinghaihu (ex-Nancang). Since its commissioning, Qinghaihu has set sixteen PLAN rec-
ords, including visiting twenty-five countries successively while completing China’s first 
circumnavigation of the globe. On this voyage, stretching over 132 days from May to 
September 2002, the ship sailed a total of 33,000 nautical miles, during which it transited 
the Panama Canal, the first PLAN ship to do so.13 Between 1989 and 2014, another aux-
iliary, the training ship Zheng He, made seven out-of-area cruises without a support ship.
Since 2008, consecutive antipiracy patrols have tested the PLAN’s auxiliary fleet’s ability 
to support long-distance deployments. Only the new Fuchi-class fleet-support ships 
and Qinghaihu have been used. The support ship generally remains in the Gulf of Aden 
for two consecutive tours. As of February 2015, AOR Qinghaihu (885) had made three 
deployments (ninth to tenth and thirteenth patrols); AOR Fuchi Weishanhu (887) 
had made seven (first to second, fifth to sixth, eleventh, fourteenth, and nineteenth); 
its sister ship Qiandaohu (886) had made five (third to fourth, seventh to eighth, and 
twelfth); and the newest, Taihu (889) and Chaohu (890), had made two each (fifteenth 
to sixteenth and seventeenth to eighteenth, respectively). The PLAN has combined its 
antipiracy missions with classic naval diplomacy, taking advantage of the deployment of 
its flotillas to send them to the Mediterranean as a symbolic gesture, including a single 
frigate’s presence during the 2011 Libyan evacuation, and as ambassadors of goodwill in 
the Black Sea (2012), in the Mediterranean (April 2013), and around Europe (December 
2014–February 2015).14
The PLAN’s permanent antipiracy patrol has given and continues to give opportunities 
to expand China’s soft power through naval diplomacy and military operations other 
than war (MOOTW). Liu Jingjin and Qiu Caizhen, from the Wuhan Naval University of 
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Engineering, explain that “escort operations have provided a new platform for the mili-
tary diplomacy of our navy, helping to enhance trust and clear up doubt between China 
and other countries, furthering mutual understanding and cooperation and building the 
international image of China as a peace-loving and civilized force and as a responsible 
stakeholder.”15 Chinese researchers also point out the necessity of shaping an external 
environment favorable to the PLAN via the “harmonious ocean philosophy,” in which 
the navy and its auxiliaries—including its hospital ships—play a central role.16
Hospital Ships
Following the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, when the world was watching, China 
was unable to participate in the naval assistance effort led by the United States, which 
deployed one of two large Mercy-class hospital ships. This deficiency was remedied by 
the commissioning of the 23,369-ton Anwei (Peace Ark) hospital ship. Laid down in 
2006, in the context of mounting pressure against independence-leaning Taiwan, Anwei 
apparently was not built with MOOTW as a primary focus. However, its MOOTW role 
was acknowledged at commissioning:
In wartime, the “maritime field hospital” can provide early treatment and some special 
treatments to the wounded, while in peacetime, it can serve as a permanent medical 
mechanism for middle- and long-distance waters, being able to sail to military ports in 
various sea areas for medical exchanges, play an important role in supporting the local 
government in disaster rescue and relief, participate in international medical cooperation, 
fulfill international humanitarian aid missions, and undertake the task of international 
humanistic medical rescue [sic].17 
On September 1, 2010, Anwei initiated this new kind of naval diplomacy during a 
three-month mission to the Gulf of Aden called Mission Harmony 2010. With its 
428 crew members, including one hundred medical personnel, Anwei visited Djibouti, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Bangladesh.18 In October 2011, Anwei embarked on a 
three-month deployment to the Caribbean—Mission Harmony 2011—involving port 
calls in Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica.19 In both instances, Anwei 
provided medical support to local populations, while collecting data on foreign blood-
supply programs.20 In November 2013, Anwei deployed to Tacloban, Philippines, to 
assist in the recovery from Typhoon Haiyan.21 The ship also participated in exercises at 
RIMPAC 2014, alongside its American counterpart USNS Mercy.
According to Chi Zhiyan, Shao Ren, and Shi Jiazhu from the department of politi-
cal science of the Dalian Naval Academy, Anwei inaugurated a new kind of naval 
diplomacy. These scholars see the “harmonious ocean philosophy”—exemplified by 
Mission Harmony 2010 and 2011—as “an ideological weapon for shaping a favorable 
environment for the PLAN.”22 Liu Hui and Liu Jiefeng from the Wuhan Naval University 
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of Engineering stress the need to develop military soft power in MOOTW to augment 
China’s influence in the world and improve its standing in world opinion.23
Surveillance Ships
In response to the West’s growing strategic submarine fleet and nuclear-armed aircraft 
carriers in the 1960s, the Soviet navy converted survey ships (AGSs) and fishing trawlers 
before building dedicated platforms to conduct ocean surveillance and reconnaissance. 
Displacing 1,200–5,000 tons, the new ships were seaworthy, relatively fast, and able to 
conduct long deployments. They packed aboard radio, electronic, acoustic, and non-
acoustic sensors to intercept signals and signatures emitted by ships and submarines. 
From 1961 to 1975, the Soviet fleet of intelligence collectors (AGIs) grew from five to 
fifty, reaching over sixty by 1991. The results of their close-range surveillance off West-
ern naval ports and other key facilities, such as Cape Canaveral, allowed the Soviet navy 
to monitor space launches and study Western tactics, operational patterns, underway 
replenishment, and carrier flight operations. The trawlers were tasked by their respec-
tive fleet intelligence departments with maritime reconnaissance or by the central Soviet 
military intelligence agency (known as the GRU) with general intelligence collection.24
By contrast, China’s maritime intelligence surveillance has remained focused mainly on 
the country’s immediate neighbors. In 1976, China’s Central Military Commission and 
the State Council approved a project to build a dedicated electronic surveillance ship 
(Type 813) after a failed attempt at converting a survey ship.25 Designed by the No. 708 
Institute and completed at Hudong Shipyard in September 1980, the 4,445-ton Xiang-
yanghong 21 (later Qimingxing [852]) successfully completed its trials in April 1983 
before joining the SSF (and later China Marine Surveillance).26 On March 25, 1980, the 
PLAN agreed to a follow-on 1,500-ton (later 2,500-ton) project (Type 814 Dadie class), 
laid down on December 22, 1983, in Wuchang as Xiangyanghong 28 (now Bei Diao 
90027) and completed in October 1986.28 One hundred seventy specialists from the NSF 
and civilian agencies tested the ship’s optical, acoustic, radar, and radio communications 
systems, drawing experience from the first two Yuanwang space-event ships to resolve 
acute electromagnetic compatibility issues. Commissioned in 1987, Dadies became 
frequent observers of U.S.–South Korean Team Spirit exercises.29
Follow-on reconnaissance vessels appeared less sophisticated. Completed during 
1982–87, Xing Fengshan (5,500 tons) and the armed icebreakers Yanbing 723 and Yanha 
519, 721, and 722 initiated regular patrols, including ice patrols, into the Sea of Japan 
and the Yellow Sea, monitoring U.S., South Korean, Japanese, and Russian naval activi-
ties, together with the NSF oceanographic vessel Xiangyanghong 09 (4,445 tons).30
Meanwhile, Xiangyanghong 14, attached to the South China Sea Branch of the State 
Oceanic Administration, focused on the Taiwan Strait. In 2002, Xiangyanghong 14 was 
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found inside Taiwanese waters and was driven away by the Republic of China’s navy.31 
Deployed in October 1987 to the South China Sea together with Xiangyanghong 05, 
Xiangyanghong 09 played an important role in preparing for China’s successful occupa-
tion of Yongshu / Fiery Cross Reef in March 1988. Operated in conjunction with the 
China Academy of Sciences, Xiangyanghong 10 (10,975 tons) occasionally used its large 
log-periodic antennae for communications intelligence (i.e., COMINT).32 In July 1999, 
Xiangyanghong 10 was recommissioned as a space-tracking ship under the name of 
Yuanwang 4.
While junks and fishing boats long have constituted the core of Chinese coastal surveil-
lance assets, survey vessels also have been used for oceanographic and acoustic research. 
The main classes of survey vessels were built in 1970–72 (Type 635 and Type 635 I [A] 
Yanlai class), 1975 (Type 635 II [B] Ganzhu class), 1982–83 (Type 635 III [C] Yanlai 
class, and Type 646 Yankang class),33 and 1998–2008 for the three large (six-thousand-
ton) Type 636As: Li Siguang (871), Zhu Kezhen (872), and Qian Sanqiang (873), one for 
each fleet. In February 2012, the catamaran survey ship Nan Ce 429 was commissioned 
into the Ocean Survey Squadron at Guangzhou. Three vessels built in Dalian—the 
catamarans Bei Diao 991, 992, and 993—are subjects of speculation. Their prefix—
“diao” (调), instead of “ce” (测) for naval research vessels—suggests a role as acoustic 
intelligence vessels, the better to protect China’s approaches in the context of reported 
American and Australian submarine activities in a very noisy underwater environment. 
Bei Diao 991, 992, and 993 and their towed arrays may operate in conjunction with the 
old Soviet Volkhov harbor defense active/passive sonar sensors (built for China by the 
Leningrad hydroacoustic institute Morphyspribor in 1959) or more likely with successor 
fixed-array systems on the sea bottom.34 An interesting development would be future de-
ployments near U.S., Japanese, South Korean, Vietnamese, and Indian submarine bases, 
following the practices of U.S. Military Sealift Command ocean surveillance (T-AGOS) 
vessels.
Since 1999, Japan’s defense yearbook, published by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, has 
reported annually on Chinese reconnaissance activities taking place within forty nautical 
miles of Japan’s coasts—well within the Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ), con-
travening China’s own position rejecting foreign military activities in its EEZ. However, 
most of those activities have taken place near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands claimed by 
China and now are being performed by China’s coast guard. Japan claimed that those 
patrols increased from four in 1997 to thirty in 1999.35 In May 2000, Yangbing 723 
passed for the first time through the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido and 
through the Tsushima Strait off Kyushu, two very important international sea-lanes.36
In the last fifteen years, the PLAN has completed five state-of-the-art signals intelligence 
(i.e., SIGINT) and electronics intelligence (i.e., ELINT) collection vessels, and one more 
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may be under construction. Commissioned into the ESF and SSF in 1999 and 2009, 
respectively, the six-thousand-ton Dongdiao 851 (ex-232, renamed Beijixing) and  
Tiangwangxin 853 (Type 815 and 815G) are both capable of tracking missiles and  
satellites.37
In 2011, the Indian media accused China of sending trawlers as well as an unnamed 
larger intelligence-collection vessel to the Bay of Bengal to monitor India’s missile tests. 
The unnamed alleged Chinese spy ship purportedly was detected in July near the coast 
of Little Andaman Island within India’s EEZ—again, in contravention of China’s own 
policy. Indian sources claimed the ship had spent more than twenty days in the sensitive 
location before being located. Then the ship—which had always remained in interna-
tional waters—supposedly docked in Colombo. Again, neither the ship’s name nor any 
photographs taken at sea or in Colombo were made public, although the ship was said 
to have had twenty-two laboratories, suggesting a large oceanographic vessel. An In-
dian television program added that the United States had warned India of the spy ship’s 
presence.38
Beijixing frequently has operated near and within Japan’s claimed EEZ and was an 
uninvited guest at RIMPAC 2014, in which three other Chinese vessels participated for 
the first time.39 Beijixing’s deployment likely reflected a long-standing frustration at con-
tinual American maritime surveillance off Chinese coasts and a new policy of reciproci-
ty despite the technological inferiority of the PLAN’s surveillance platforms. Three more 
Type 815s were launched in 2014 at Hudong Shipyard in Shanghai, signaling a probable 
intention to conduct more intelligence collection in distant waters, most likely around 
Guam and Hawaii—within America’s unclaimed EEZ.40
Submarine Tenders
With the largest conventional submarine force in the world—and the second largest 
during the last two decades of the Cold War—it is no surprise that the PLAN made a 
huge investment in submarine salvage vessels and tenders: sixteen major units have been 
completed since 1966, including three in the 2010–13 period. However, in tonnage, most 
of those tenders cannot compare to their U.S. and Soviet/Russian counterparts, confirm-
ing that China would use them mainly in its near seas.
The first purpose-built submarine tender was the Type 922 Bei Jiu 403, built by 
Zhonghua in 1966 (Zhonghua class), followed by the smaller Type 930 Nan Jiu 512, built 
by Hudong in 1969 (Hudong class).41 Both were scrapped and succeeded by the Type 922 
II Nan Jiu 503 (Dalang class).42 Guangzhou built two smaller Type 946 (Dazhou class) 
in 1977–78, while Jiangnan produced the three largest Type 925s (Dajiang class, 11,975 
tons)—Changxingdao (861), Chongmingdao (862), and Yongxingdao (863)—followed 
by four smaller Type 922 IIIs (Dalang class) and a single Type 946A (Dadong class) in 
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1982.43 Zhonghua and Hudong also delivered twenty-five ocean salvage tugs (three  
Tuzhong class, fourteen Hujiu/Dinghais, five modified Hujiu IIs, and three Tuqians).44 
Construction resumed on larger submarine tenders late last decade at Guangzhou. The 
9,500-ton Haiyangdao (864) (Type 926 Dalao class) was commissioned in 2010, followed 
by two more in 2013–15 to replace the Dazhou and Dadong classes. Despite these addi-
tions, the PLAN still lacks the numbers of oceangoing repair ships that would be neces-
sary to establish distant stations and support combat operations in distant waters.
When the Soviet navy started to deploy overseas in 1964, it had many more repair ships 
than the PLAN currently possesses. These included six Don-class, nine-thousand-ton 
submarine tenders (supplemented during 1963–72 by seven Ugra-class, 9,500-ton 
variants), five Dniepr-class (5,300-ton) repair ships, supplemented by forty-one follow-
on ships of the Oskol and Amur classes during 1964–88, fifteen small rescue ships 
(supplemented by four more during 1964–68), and six 6,700-ton Andizhan-class missile 
transports (supplemented by eleven more of the Lama, Amga, and Brykin classes dur-
ing 1964–87).45 Chinese submarines now have been deployed at least three times to the 
Indian Ocean, with the second Han nuclear attack submarine calling in Colombo, Sri 
Lanka, in November 2014, together with one of the three largest submarine tenders, the 
Dajiang-class Changxingdao.46 While the PLAN’s newest class of submarine tenders (the 
9,500-ton Haiyangdao/Dalao class) matches in tonnage the Soviet Don and Ugra classes, 
the ship’s low freeboard and high superstructure do not suggest the good sea-keeping 
qualities that characterized its Soviet equivalents in their day, nor those of the three 
Dajiangs.
At first glance, the PLAN’s current situation appears similar to that of the Soviet navy 
in 1964 when Moscow started to deploy its forces worldwide. Both navies were born as 
coastal-defense forces, progressively expanding their areas of operations by use of large 
auxiliary vessels that made up for a lack of foreign bases. Soviet out-of-area operations 
grew from fewer than four thousand ship-days in 1964 to about 48,000 in 1976.47 With 
China’s permanent deployment of three vessels to the Gulf of Aden and its hyperactive 
naval diplomacy, the PLAN’s current out-of-area deployments probably approach the 
1964 Soviet figure of four thousand ship-days.
But will the PLAN follow the Soviet curve? Despite a shortage of large AORs in 1964, 
the Soviet auxiliary fleet was by then three to four times the size of the current Chinese 
auxiliary fleet, with numerous oceangoing tenders and repair ships that could support 
continuous nuclear and conventional submarine deployments.
At this point, the PLAN does not have sufficient support ships to help sustain a perma-
nent combat-ready presence in distant waters, starting with the Indian Ocean and the 
eastern and western coasts of Africa. While the newest Fuchis may be replacements for 
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the older Fuqings, the construction of a follow-on AOR/AOE in Shanghai (perhaps of 
the rumored forty-thousand-ton class) would allow the PLAN to match the numbers 
of its destroyer/frigate flotillas and help support the deployment of one carrier group. 
If China wishes to acquire three to four carriers, as rumored, it would need at least one 
dedicated AOR/AOE per carrier group, and more if China wanted to change its self-
imposed restrictive policies and maintain fleets in distant waters. The PLAN also would 
need more and larger submarine tenders and rescue ships if it wished to deploy subma-
rines overseas continuously.
On the basis of currently available evidence, China’s ultimate aspirations may align 
most closely with the French model: supporting a distant presence for low-tier police 
operations that can be augmented in times of need to deal with a regional crisis via 
deployment of a carrier air group. Such a model is not sufficient to support an overseas 
confrontation with the surface fleet of a major international actor such as the United 
States, or even a major regional actor such as India.
The PLAN surveillance fleet also has a long way to go to achieve the capabilities of the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War era. With about twenty AGIs/AGSs, mainly used for 
coastal surveillance or operations against its neighbors, China has not yet embarked 
on the massive maritime collection effort that characterized the Soviet navy and that 
indicated global operations. China’s AGI deployments in the Bay of Bengal or off Hawaii 
mark a departure from the self-imposed restrictive policy that conformed to China’s 
interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the country’s opposition 
to intelligence operations in its EEZ. And yet it can be argued that those Chinese AGI 
deployments serve defensive purposes against India’s new nuclear strategic submarine 
program and U.S. maritime dominance in the western Pacific.
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As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) works to meet the PLA’s “New Historic Missions” and protect Chinese interests abroad, the PLAN surface force 
has confronted the challenge of sustaining a growing number of ships on extended op-
erations away from home port. Since 2008, the PLAN has supported units in operational 
deployments lasting, in some cases, over six months without the benefit of a network of 
permanent overseas bases. Images of PLAN logistics vessels replenishing PLAN surface 
combatants under way at sea, seldom seen before 2010, have become routine, a staple of 
PLA press releases.
Most studies of PLAN sustainment have focused on either PLAN mastery of underway 
replenishment techniques or the adequacy of the logistics vessels that support underway 
delivery of fuel and stores. These units are the critical last step in delivering logistics 
support at sea, and the ability to employ them consistently represents a fundamental 
level of seamanship accomplishment. However, mobile logistics forces are only the most 
visible expression of the PLAN’s efforts to adapt its logistics support to a higher tempo 
of operations at greater distances from the Chinese mainland. The PLA recognizes that 
changes in the logistics-support structure ashore are also a key part of meeting this chal-
lenge. The service’s official newspaper, People’s Navy, describes the overall PLAN support 
construct as “a shore-sea integrated support system with strategic home ports at the core 
and with at-sea comprehensive support groups as the focal points.”1
Extended deployments and an increasing emphasis on regular, year-round surface-force 
readiness have placed new demands on the PLAN surface-force maintenance system as 
well. Combined with the growing technical complexity of PLAN surface-force payloads 
and platforms, these extended deployments have caused the PLAN to develop new 
maintenance approaches. This chapter examines the PLAN’s systematic effort to address 
its logistics and maintenance challenges and the place of these initiatives within larger 
efforts to improve logistics and maintenance throughout the PLA.
In studying recent conflicts, the PLA has recognized the centrality of logistics and main-
tenance support to modern combat operations.2 Chinese military studies of the British 
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naval campaign to retake the Falkland Islands discuss the importance of the Royal Navy 
logistics train in supporting combat operations.3 The U.S. ability to amass an “iron 
mountain” of supplies before each Gulf war, much of which was transported by sea, as 
well as the ability of the U.S. Navy and other coalition navies to sustain naval forces on 
sanctions duty indefinitely, reinforced the PLA’s impression that its logistics support 
required a new reach and tempo. “Winning local wars under the conditions of informa-
tization” is only possible if the PLA can deliver material support to the fight of the type 
and quantity that modern operations require. The Chinese military press reported that 
the PLA made logistics reform a key element of the eleventh five-year plan (2006–10). 
In 2007, the Central Military Commission (CMC) issued an Outline for Building Modern 
Logistics in an All-Around Way. The document remains the senior-level guidance to the 
PLA on logistics support. Many key PLAN reform initiatives—including informatization 
of logistics functions and “military support socialization”—are guided by this document.4
The PLAN faces an additional challenge distinct from the overall question of support 
modernization that the PLA faces. The PLA is still wedded to a geographic command 
structure. Despite the promise of recent reforms to the PLA’s organizational structure, 
it remains a challenge to support robust operations away from China’s coastline.5 Other 
than the most basic coastal-defense functions, the PLAN’s missions—whether character-
ized as New Historic Missions or as traditional naval missions in “distant seas”—take 
place at increasing ranges from the Chinese mainland and require surface forces to 
remain on station for extended periods. These new requirements must be met with 
forces that deploy from all three fleets, crossing oceans and sometimes combining forces 
to carry out their missions. Even regional surface-force missions, such as assertion of 
Chinese maritime claims in the South and East China Seas, require year-round respon-
siveness and sustained operations beyond what is required of other arms of the PLA. 
PLAN surface-force support must move beyond the strictures of the larger PLA system 
if it is to enable these mobile operations.
Taking its guidance from larger efforts to reform PLA logistics, the PLAN has focused 
since 2006 on creating administrative frameworks, shore structures, and at-sea capabili-
ties that allow its forces, including the surface force, to conduct a full range of missions. 
Both PLA and PLAN logistics and maintenance efforts have been characterized by three 
significant lines of effort: 
 • Informatization. The PLAN recognizes that modern information technology enables 
logistics and maintenance agility and efficiency. The 2011 PLAN work plan called for 
the PLAN to “quicken the process of logistics informatization building in the Navy.”6
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 • Attention to regulatory, budget, and audit controls. PLAN logistics and maintenance 
modernization has included efforts to create a regulatory framework to guide PLAN 
efforts, apportion resources, and monitor the use of money and assets.
 • Reliance on civilian support. For its first fifty years, China’s low level of development 
and the Maoist “People’s War” doctrine placed the PLA in the position of manufac-
turing and supplying its own stores and arms. Since the end of “PLA Inc.” in the late 
1990s, the PLA has moved away from being the creator of its own support to manag-
ing the acquisition of support from other sectors of society. In recent years the PLAN 
has embraced “military support socialization”—essentially privatization—of key sup-
port services as a means of creating efficiencies and improving service to the fleet. 
Service-Level Logistics
The PLAN Headquarters Logistics Department establishes policy and regulations for 
budgets and resources and thus is a critical node in modernizing the naval logistics sys-
tem. During the eleventh five-year plan, the department reported that it “implemented 
reform of the budget system, centralized the disbursal of funds, and tied together asset 
management and budget management.”7 The theme of administrative rectification 
continued in the twelfth five-year plan (2011–15). In 2011, the CMC issued “opinions 
on further strengthening the military’s asset management” that provided direction to 
the PLA on the administration of military resources, both physical and budgetary.8 In 
a late 2011 interview, Chen Yihao, director of financial affairs in the Navy Logistics 
Department, explained that the PLAN’s goal in implementing this CMC guidance was 
more-efficient use of existing resources and control and supervision of assets. This effort 
was challenged by what Chen called “prominent contradictions in budgetary supply 
and demand”—budget shortfalls—that required improved efficiency. Toward that end, 
the director indicated that the PLAN Logistics Department would standardize support 
measures for major tasks, such as antipiracy deployments, extended operations, and 
joint military exercises.9
Conservation of Resources—Addressing Corruption
The handling of money and resources naturally creates opportunities for illegal personal 
enrichment. Most Western observers agree that corruption within the People’s Libera-
tion Army is endemic and has a significant impact on resources and personnel policy, 
and thus military readiness.
The PLAN is no stranger to high-level corruption. In 2006, Vice Adm. Wang Shouye, 
PLAN deputy commander, was arrested for “economic crimes” allegedly involving land 
deals. Wang was sentenced to death, a penalty later commuted to life imprisonment.10
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Chinese sources on naval logistics only hint at corruption issues, but a measure of of-
ficial concern can be found in their reports of ongoing progress against corrupt prac-
tices. For example, a 2009 report noted that the Navy Logistics Department had “banned 
and punished the lawbreaking activities of issuing and using false purchase receipts and 
invoices, examined and rectified the practice of handling and managing assets, [and] 
tightened supervision over financial management.”11 The management of military real 
estate, a key element of numerous military corruption scandals, appeared to receive spe-
cial attention. One of the key tasks completed in 2009 was a review of unused PLAN real 
estate, followed by realignment of these assets under correct management. The PLAN 
reported that these efforts “returned 1,600 units of housing inappropriately occupied by 
cadres and other personnel at and below the division level.”12 
President Xi Jinping has made the fight against official extravagance one of his most 
public policy initiatives. His most prominent efforts to curb PLA abuses have centered 
on lavish official entertainment and abuse of military license plates. However, an ex-
panded government-wide anticorruption campaign will both push PLAN headquarters 
logisticians to take a more central role in regulating PLAN assets and place the regula-
tors themselves under increased scrutiny.
Fleet-Level Logistics Support
In late 2011 the PLAN established a fleet logistics department in each of its three fleets. 
In many ways, this reform marked a return to a previous pattern of PLAN organiza-
tion. The three fleets had logistics departments until 1985, when PLAN commander 
Adm. Liu Huaqing ordered them disestablished. Liu also moved responsibility for shore 
installations as well as surface-force shore support to shore-based support commands, 
allowing fleet headquarters and subordinate operational units to focus on at-sea opera-
tions.13 This construct functioned well in a service that was tied closely to shore, con-
ducting distant voyages only in exceptional cases. People’s War coastal-defense concepts 
emphasized small combatants conducting operations from numerous dispersed locations 
along the entire coast; specialized, geographically based support commands could focus on 
mobilizing wartime resources. However, the increase in PLAN distant-seas operations ar-
gues strongly for integrating logistics by operation rather than geography. Establishing fleet 
logistics departments while reducing the shore logistics command structure aligns logistics 
support directly with the commanders responsible for conducting naval operations.
The task of integrating logistics with operations is challenging in any navy, and the new 
fleet logistics departments have confronted issues of authority, duplication, and training. 
One of the new East Sea Fleet Logistics Department’s first tasks was to issue regulations 
establishing the relationship among the fleet, the shore-based vessel-service commands, 
and the subordinate operational units. The department reported that many cadres 
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initially did not believe the new department would lead to fundamental changes in the 
logistics process. Reportedly, efforts to introduce new directives rapidly changed this 
view.14
Centralized control of fleet logistics also appears to be driving centralization of some 
support functions. In one example, the East Sea Fleet Logistics Department assessed that 
among members of medical staffs assigned to afloat units “enthusiasm toward their work 
was low.” Given their extended at-sea assignments, afloat medical cadre had no opportu-
nities for advanced education. In response, the new logistics department removed afloat 
medical personnel from surface units and assigned them to two local hospitals, dispatch-
ing them to afloat units as required to support operations.15
The fleet logistics departments also focused on increasing the level and fidelity of 
logistics play in PLAN exercises. People’s Navy reported that only two weeks after its 
establishment the East Sea Fleet Logistics Department confronted a major exercise in 
which most logistics support was assumed or scripted rather than exercised in earnest. 
Participating vessels would be supplied fully before departing port and would not re-
quire resupply during the exercise. While the exercise plan called for logistics personnel 
to accompany the ships, the exercise manning document was incomplete. The exercise 
was cited in the official PLA press as an example of the scope of change necessary for the 
PLA to implement the training required to conduct modern logistics operations.16
Development of the Comprehensive Support Base
Shortly after the reestablishment of the fleet logistics departments the PLAN created a 
number of comprehensive support bases. The exact number of these new commands 
is unclear, but there is likely at least one per fleet. The North Sea Fleet Comprehensive 
Support Base, headquartered in Qingdao, has received the most attention in the Chinese 
military press, largely owing to its mission of supporting the new aircraft carrier Liaoning.
The comprehensive support bases differ from the bases established in the mid-1980s. 
Until recently, bases formed the bulk of the PLAN surface-force shore-support structure. 
These older-pattern bases could be compared more properly to a U.S. naval district or 
maritime defense zone. They controlled not only installations and tenant logistics units 
but also small combatants, and appeared to have a coastal-defense function.
In contrast, the comprehensive support bases have been modeled on the “large strategic 
mother ports” that major foreign navies tend to use. People’s Navy reported that the staff 
of the North Sea Fleet Comprehensive Support Base repeatedly consulted an intelligence 
database on foreign ports to discern the essential functions the new PLAN base would 
need to provide.17
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Investment in Shore Support to the Surface Force
In setting out to provide Liaoning, the PLAN’s highest-profile surface platform, with a 
world-class level of support infrastructure, the PLAN is continuing a long-term invest-
ment in improving surface-ship shore support. Modern naval bases provide to ships not 
only moorage and shelter from the sea but utilities necessary for basic maintenance and 
housekeeping on board. During the eleventh five-year plan, the PLAN established the 
goal of providing these utilities (commonly referred to as shore services) to PLAN sur-
face units in their home ports. The PLAN dubbed these services—fuel oil, potable water, 
shore electrical power, heat (steam), high-pressure air, and air-conditioning—the “six 
supplies.”18 People’s Navy emphasized that providing the six supplies in PLAN ports was 
a personal goal of PLAN commander Adm. Wu Shengli. In many cases, the provision of 
these services required extensive renovation or complete replacement of piers, as well as 
construction of central facilities for utilities management and distribution.19
Providing these essential services from central locations has a number of advantages for 
the surface force. First, it reduces wear and tear on the ships’ own equipment. In its ex-
tensive coverage of this effort, People’s Navy suggested that, prior to these improvements, 
much of the surface force was continually “auxiliary steaming”: generating its own 
utility services using the ship’s engineering plant. Second, central utilities reduce crew 
workload. If electrical power or water is provided from a pierside connection, the crew 
is not required to maintain an around-the-clock watch on generators or distilling plants. 
Third, shore services allow ships to resupply faster. In one case, hard potable water 
lines replaced two trucks that had shuttled water to surface ships, allowing the units to 
resupply with water in half the time. Fourth, the six supplies save money. Bases reported 
consistent savings under the new program, largely because central production of utili-
ties is more efficient than burning fuel oil on board each vessel to provide services. In a 
number of cases, shore-power risers are connected to centralized energy-management 
systems. Shipboard personnel use smart cards to authorize closing the breakers after 
connecting shore-power cables, and the base centrally monitors the amount of power 
each unit uses. If the central base notes excessive consumption, it notifies the shore 
support centers in near-real time and puts controls in place. By 2011, the PLAN could 
report with pride that “six-supply support” was available for all major combatants at 
their home ports.20
Beyond providing better support to PLAN surface units, the PLAN recognizes the role 
of its bases in supporting the quality of life for its personnel. In an increasingly prosper-
ous China, PLAN personnel have expectations for their material comfort and standard 
of living that are vastly different from those of their Maoist-era predecessors. As the 
PLAN works to attract high-quality volunteers to replace its conscript personnel, it rec-
ognizes that quality-of-life matters affect the retention of long-service personnel.
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Housing is recognized as an important quality-of-life element. When not at sea, PLAN 
surface-force sailors are housed in barracks ashore. A retrospective of the accomplish-
ments during the eleventh five-year plan noted significant improvement in these 
facilities: the PLAN reported completion of 244 billeting-support projects in sixty-three 
different units. People’s Navy reported that the investment in these quarters had “brought 
to an end the era of officers and sailors from surface ships ‘arriving in port but not going 
ashore, eating while squatting on deck, hanging up a hammock to sleep.’”21 However, 
room for improvement remains, and the 2011 PLAN logistics work meeting made 
improving living-support conditions for personnel one of the five priority areas for the 
year.
In addition to housing, the PLAN’s efforts to improve base infrastructure have included 
better laundry facilities—in some cases, covered areas to line-dry laundry—as well as 
telephone and Internet access. In many cases, provision of these amenities has been 
contracted to civilian providers.
Food services—both dining facilities and supplying of food to naval units—have been 
a focus of logistics-improvement efforts, with fifty-six new-model canteens built in 
nineteen naval units during 2009 alone.22 Since military food services have few unique 
requirements not found in civilian institutional food services, there are few barriers to 
PLAN units “relying on society for support.” During the eleventh five-year plan, the 
PLAN civilianized seventy dining facilities located in thirty-three units.23 Food services 
have been cited consistently as a successful example of military-support socialization.
However, reliance on civilian suppliers makes food services more sensitive to increases 
in food prices. In late 2011, People’s Navy reported that at some PLAN commands infla-
tion in food prices had caused meals to be reduced from the normal three meats and two 
vegetables to two meats and two vegetables. In this case, People’s Navy commended the 
solution of one East Sea Fleet unit, which lowered its food costs through open bidding 
with local firms and supermarkets, gaining the added benefit of direct delivery of food 
to the units.24
Relying on the civilian food supply carries real concerns over quality and safety. Under-
scoring its concern for the welfare of sailors, the Yulin Support Base Coastal Logistics 
Department reported in 2011 that it had issued food-testing devices at the unit level. Ad-
ditionally, the base employed eight food inspectors and had a military depot doing some 
food processing for the service. While having military facilities pickling vegetables for 
the PLAN is contrary to the idea of military-support socialization, it may increase the 
confidence of the troops that their food is safe, fresh, and professionally prepared.25
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Asset Management
Like any military, the PLAN faces the challenge of efficiently and effectively manag-
ing large amounts of property and equipment. Chinese businesses export goods to 
cost-conscious importers across the globe and have developed logistics expertise while 
participating in highly developed state-of-the-art global logistics chains. The PLA is 
interested in applying this commercial expertise to military asset management.
Key to commercial logistics agility is maintaining real-time visibility on the total assets 
of an organization through modern information technology. One of the PLAN’s goals in 
the twelfth five-year plan was to implement a Navy Asset Management Informatization 
System that integrates the inventory management functions of all levels of command.26
At the base level, the system appears to be managed by the base Integrated Support 
Command Center. This center, which monitors and coordinates all logistics functions, is 
the same base center that monitors electrical power consumption and other six-support 
services to surface units. To illustrate the center’s role in resolving routine logistics prob-
lems, a reporter recounted that during his visit to the center the watch received a report 
that a computer belonging to the political department of a flotilla had broken. After 
receiving the application for a new computer, the base finance section checked the Navy 
Asset Management Informatization System, discovered the computer was past its service 
life, and approved the new purchase in about thirty seconds.27
Maintenance Support to the Surface Force
The growing technical complexity of PLAN surface vessels and the requirement to con-
duct year-round operations have increased demands on the PLAN maintenance system. 
In 2011, the PLAN put in place a “Ship Support Path with Chinese Characteristics.” This 
plan outlined responsibilities for both maintenance management and the conduct of the 
actual maintenance across the PLAN.28
Maintenance management is conducted at three levels within the PLAN. At the highest 
level—likely within the Naval Armament Department—the PLAN conducts the policy 
and force-wide planning work that facilitates maintenance across all three fleets. These 
efforts include the following: 
 • Programmatic planning
 • Equipment work program planning
 • Issuance of rules and regulations
 • Aircraft carrier repairs at the ship-equipment level
 • Plans for major ship repairs
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 • Coordination of major imported and domestic parts and materials
The national importance of the PLAN aircraft carrier program is reflected in the fact 
that ship-equipment-level repairs for Liaoning are managed at the navy headquarters 
level.
Each fleet has a fleet armament department that implements PLAN policy and plans for 
its assigned forces. These functions include these elements: 
 • Planning management
 • Planning of campaign-oriented equipment work
 • Refinement and execution of rules and regulations
 • Implementation of repairs
 • Organization of materials sourcing
The fleet armament departments were established in late 2011 at the same time as the 
fleet logistics departments. They have similar responsibilities for integrating support 
with military operational planning for both peacetime and wartime operations. The East 
Sea Fleet’s Fleet Armament Department has established three major “expert groups” to 
manage fleet-support operations: two equipment technical support groups, dedicated 
to surface ships and submarines, respectively, and a ship-equipment repair office. In 
February 2013, these three groups were augmented by six system-technology units, each 
dedicated to the inspection and assessment of a specific category of shipboard equip-
ment. These six units comprised over 180 experts and technicians.29
Under the fleet armament departments, individual units manage the execution of 
planned and emergent repairs. This includes both execution management and ship-level 
repair work through at-sea support. Under the 2011 system, actual maintenance is con-
ducted at three levels, paralleling the maintenance-management system. In this construct, 
bases provide the highest level of maintenance support. Assigned tasks include these: 
 • Dry dock repairs
 • Assistance to “relay-level” repairs
 • Embarking support ships accompanying ships carrying out major missions
 • Undertaking wartime repairs, as directed by higher authorities
The “relay level” likely refers to specialized personnel from ship-equipment repair of-
fices. While these units are subordinate to the fleet armament departments, there may 
be a separation between fleet-subordinate planning functions and base-subordinate 
maintenance execution. The relay level will
 • Use shore bases to provide at-sea mobile repairs
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 • Work difficult issues that are beyond a ship’s force
 • Machine parts for crew-level repairs
 • Repair equipment removed and turned in by a ship’s force
 • Provide initial charge to and overhaul of storage batteries
 • Assist ship’s force maintenance
 • Embark in support ships accompanying ships carrying out major missions 
A number of PLAN sources reference the responsibility of ship-equipment repair of-
fices to provide specialists to deploying ships. It is not clear to what extent this reflects 
internal assessment that PLAN crews have a limited capability to conduct their own 
maintenance. In the case of the PLAN, it appears that these specialists will deploy both 
to support vessels and to deploying combatants, augmenting their ability to assess and 
repair equipment casualties. While it is possible that PLAN surface ships are limited by 
their onboard repair capabilities, it is also important to remember that most navies rely 
on shore assistance for complex surface-ship repairs and scheduled maintenance.
Members of the crew of each PLAN surface vessel are the critical deckplate-level 
stewards of their ship and equipment. Shipboard personnel are tasked with conducting 
maintenance in accordance with the Naval Vessel Repair Regulations and the Naval Vessel 
Equipment and Technology Management Work Regulations. Accounts of shipboard main-
tenance suggest that there are three levels of ship’s force repairs: peacetime maintenance, 
repair-period maintenance, and “wartime crew-level maintenance.” The latter suggests 
that PLAN surface units are authorized in combat situations to undertake maintenance 
that otherwise would be referred to a higher-level maintenance organization.30
When official Chinese media discuss surface-ship maintenance, their stories generally 
center on “heroic repairs” a ship’s crew has made in the face of considerable challenges 
or urgent operational need. For example, in 2012 People’s Navy highlighted Jiangkai II 
guided-missile frigate (FFG) 572. Frigate 572 suffered a casualty to its number 2 aux-
iliary engine, resulting in excessive vibration and high exhaust temperature. The crew 
spent nine hours in a successful effort to repair the machinery, allowing the ship to make 
a scheduled replenishment the next day.31
While heroic repairs make good headlines, good maintenance management seeks to 
minimize catastrophic equipment failure and maximize equipment availability. It is 
not clear from PLAN accounts to what extent the PLAN has implemented a system of 
planned scheduled maintenance, or whether such a system is standardized across surface 
platforms. A planned-maintenance regime can be implemented with little or no automa-
tion, but requires a high degree of attention to the administration of the work at the unit 
level.
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What is clear from PLAN sources is that surface-force maintenance in the future 
increasingly will be based on automated equipment diagnostics. The Luyang-class 
destroyers, and likely the Jiangkai II–class frigates, are equipped with an electronic 
equipment-management system, and such systems likely will be standard on all future 
PLAN surface combatants. The system monitors and collects key equipment parameters 
such as oil quality, bearing vibration, noise, temperature, and rotation rate. The mainte-
nance history files are used to provide feedback to equipment manufacturers.32 Shore-
based equipment technical-support groups also can access this information and manage 
dynamically the maintenance requirements of key pieces of shipboard equipment. In one 
East Sea Fleet frigate flotilla, implementation of this dynamic maintenance management 
model reportedly increased equipment readiness rates by 20 percent.33
When equipment does fail unexpectedly, the crew may not have the expertise to effect 
repairs. In some cases, it may not be able even to determine the nature of the fault. When 
the ship is in port, expert assistance can be accessed from higher-level maintenance 
activities or industry. Coordinating access to these experts is the responsibility of the 
fleet armament departments. In March 2012, the East Sea Fleet Armament Department 
signed an agreement with thirty-six local support units. It also established relationships 
with more than a hundred civilian firms and institutions for on-call equipment support. 
These firms are “able to quickly transition from peacetime to wartime activities to serve 
as a backup force for when emergencies arise.” A Fleet Civil-Military Combined Equip-
ment Support Command Center provides access to these resources when required.34
During at-sea operations, these shore-based experts are not close at hand. In these cases, 
the PLAN surface force is increasingly able to rely on “reach back” support using mod-
ern communications links to provide virtual assistance. The PLAN maintains a “blue-
print and information center” that is able to provide repair blueprints electronically to 
deployed units.35 For more-complex repairs, assistance from shore-based naval experts 
and manufacturers is available. One South Sea Fleet–associated electronics factory estab-
lished an “emergency response support team” that could assemble within ten minutes to 
provide remote technical support to PLAN surface units deployed to the Gulf of Aden. 
In 2010, the factory reported providing remote assistance for ten technical casualties on 
units conducting distant operations. The North Sea Fleet reported that prior to support-
ing its first Gulf of Aden deployment it worked with the PLAN Navy Equipment Depart-
ment to assemble a network of over four hundred technical experts from military shore 
commands, institutes, and industry who were available to provide remote maintenance 
advice. As a result, when the Jiangkai II FFG Yantai suffered an automatic radar plotting-
aid failure while in the Gulf of Aden in May 2012, experts based in Shanghai—outside 
the North Sea Fleet’s usual support base—were available to assist in resolving the fault.36 
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As People’s Navy crowed, “the use of long-distance diagnosis is like putting wings on the 
factory.”37
Underway Support
To provide both logistics and maintenance support to deployed units, the PLAN is mov-
ing to comprehensive support groups. Called the “focal points” of the “shore-sea inte-
grated support system,” these groups appear to integrate shoreside support centers with 
an at-sea component of underway logistics vessels and support ships. Their development 
is a key element of improving all aspects of surface-force combat support.
Each comprehensive support group is intended to integrate multiple support special-
ties within its afloat group. This includes logistics, maintenance technical support, and 
medical services as well as reconnaissance, survey, and search-and-rescue functions. 
Support-group units will vary their support pattern to fit the operational requirement, 
in some cases accompanying combat formations and in other cases acting as a logistics 
shuttle between the underway formation and the shore infrastructure. PLAN commen-
tators note that for the units to integrate with combat formations, they must possess a 
command-and-control capability that integrates seamlessly with the operations com-
mand system.
Support groups also must be prepared to embed with combat forces operating in high-
threat environments and to share in the force’s defense. One East Sea Fleet Comprehen-
sive Support Group political officer noted, “In a condition of fighting against an oppo-
nent that uses large quantities of long-range precision-guided weapons . . . the maritime 
operation logistic support forces may be facing serious threats. . . . It is necessary to 
establish an integrated defense system to merge the operation logistic support forces and 
the combat forces into a whole entity.”38
Logistics and Maintenance in Combat
A key distinguishing characteristic of PLAN logistics and maintenance planning is its 
emphasis on carrying out support functions while under direct attack. Judging from the 
official press, PLAN logistics and maintenance exercises routinely are carried out under 
conditions of simulated air raids in which key roads and piers are destroyed or damaged. 
In other cases, simulated special operations forces menace the prompt deployment of 
critical support to PLAN units. In one case, People’s Navy cited the increased integration 
fostered by the new East Sea Fleet Logistics Department as essential for success in a base 
damage-repair exercise that featured bomb damage affecting pierside services.39
This emphasis on support under direct attack creates an ongoing emphasis on deploy-
able support services. To some extent, this emphasis is likely a legacy of a heritage of 
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supporting a navy comprising mainly small coastal patrol boats. Under the Maoist 
People’s War at Sea model, during a conflict these small combatants would disperse 
away from their bases, requiring their support to travel to them and operate from crude 
or unimproved coastal locations. However, the PLAN continues to invest in deployable 
support systems, indicating a belief that offering a potential adversary a moving target 
and having the ability to reconstitute damaged services remain worthwhile investments. 
Naval logistics units possess at least one mobile field headquarters, and such complex 
services as degaussing have been made mobile and can be offered when piers are not 
available.40
Ship-repair shelters are a key element of deployable maintenance support. Managed by 
the ship equipment–repair offices, these modified shipping containers appear to be de-
ployed by truck in groups to offer advanced repair capabilities in remote locations. One 
South Sea Fleet group reportedly included ten trucks and sixty personnel. The shelters 
offered hull repair and welding capability as well as the ability to conduct specialized 
repairs of weapons and electronics. While the shelters could have a role in bringing 
advanced repair equipment pierside during routine operations, PLAN media emphasize 
these systems’ capabilities for conducting battle-damage repair.41 As the PLAN surface-
force shore-maintenance infrastructure becomes more advanced, these shelters likely 
will shift to a strict battle-damage repair role.
Embarked Aviation Support
As the PLAN builds larger, multimission surface combatants equipped with flight decks 
and hangars, embarked aviation support has become a critical function for the PLAN 
surface force. In earlier years, helicopters were visitors, spending minimal time aboard 
the surface unit and drawing their logistics and maintenance support from their home 
airfields. Today, surface action groups conducting operations beyond the “first island 
chain” or in fleet training areas routinely feature embarked helicopters and, in some 
cases, unmanned aerial vehicles, all of which must be supported for months on board.42 
Successful maintenance and logistics support requires cooperation between the aviation 
and surface forces.
In any navy, small aviation-capable vessels are challenged to hold sufficient spare parts 
on board to keep their helicopters operational. After two years of antipiracy operations, 
the South Sea Fleet made a concerted effort to rationalize the spare parts supply on 
board its deploying units. The fleet realized that deploying units too often were requir-
ing repair parts to be sent from China to repair aircraft. Less than 10 percent of the 
spare parts held on board were being expended during a deployment, but the availability 
rate of the helicopters suggested much more extensive repairs. In one case, an aircraft 
cracked a tail-drive shaft. The replacement was sent from China. When the same aircraft 
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cracked a tail-drive shaft again, a spare still was not held on board. Aircrews were taking 
as many spare parts as possible—even spare engines and rotor blades—but were not 
taking the correct parts. In many cases, items with limited shelf lives were being wasted 
because they “expired” before being used. On the basis of lessons learned, the South Sea 
Fleet compiled a detailed plan for spares support. This Standards for Helicopter Parts, 
Components, and Material to Be Taken on Long Voyages is now the standard reference for 
surface units preparing for antipiracy operations.43
In the ability of shipboard personnel to support flight operations—representing a more 
complex challenge than stocking the right spare parts—the PLAN surface force has 
faced fundamental shortcomings. For example, ship’s company personnel have been 
unfamiliar with the exacting fuel-testing requirements necessary to ensure the quality of 
aviation fuels delivered to embarked aircraft. In a shipboard environment, it is easy for 
fuel to become contaminated, which becomes a serious safety problem that can result in 
the loss of aircraft and lives at sea. The PLAN’s solution has been to embark an aviation-
fuels expert from the fuels department of the helicopter unit’s home airfield. However, 
surface units on extended operations struggled because airfield personnel were not part 
of the helicopter unit and there were no regulations covering their deployment to the 
surface vessel. While this problem was addressed on a case-by-case basis, similar prob-
lems were encountered supporting flight meteorology, aviation medicine, communica-
tions, and navigation for embarked flight crews—all essential functions of an air-capable 
surface unit.
Ultimately, the PLAN recognizes that these problems represent a surface-force training 
issue. Ensuring that PLAN surface units have the ability to embark and support helicop-
ters without dedicated personnel augmentation means the PLAN must—in the words of 
one South Sea Fleet aviation political commissar—“get one person to act as two.” Until 
that is achieved, guided improvisation appears to be the order of the day.44
How Effective Is PLAN Surface Logistics and Maintenance?
The most difficult question in assessing PLAN surface-force logistics and maintenance is 
effectiveness. Short of gaining access to the PLAN equivalent of the U.S. Navy’s Board of 
Inspection and Survey reports, estimates of PLAN logistics and maintenance rely on im-
pressions, anecdotes, and Chinese accounts of the navy’s efforts to improve its systems.
In the end, the measure of maintenance and logistics is in the sustainment of fleet opera-
tions. Since the first task force left China on December 26, 2008, the PLAN has sus-
tained a constant deployed presence supporting antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. 
While the PLAN had conducted previous long-range “goodwill” cruises, the antipiracy 
operations represented China’s first-ever effort to maintain a naval presence beyond its 
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own coast. Not surprisingly, initial efforts to sustain the formation did not go well. Basic 
lessons about food preservation, overseas support contracting, and replenishment meth-
ods were learned through hard experience. Through this process, the PLAN avoided 
catastrophic material casualties or complete logistics failure, while improvising a support 
system on the fly. The ultimate arrangement, characterized by People’s Navy as “supply 
ships as the platform, foreign ports as the backing, domestic cargo ships as the supple-
ment,” has become routine. In many ways, the system is as robust as those of U.S. allies 
deployed to the region, if not more so.45
It is possible, however, that operations in the Gulf of Aden represent an exceptional 
case, a single focus of national effort that is not reflective of the PLAN surface force’s 
capabilities. However, the scope and tempo of recent PLAN surface operations belie that 
suggestion.
In March and April 2013, a four-ship task force made up of the Yuzhao (Type 071)–class 
dock landing ship Jinggangshan, the Luyang II–class destroyer Lanzhou (DDG 170), and 
the Jiangkai II–class frigates Hengshui (FFG 572) and Yulin (FFG 569) made an extended 
patrol in the South China Sea. The force conducted a well-publicized small-island 
seizure exercise and a ceremony at James Shoal—the submerged feature that marks the 
southernmost limit of China’s South China Sea claims. On their return, the ships were 
visited by President Xi Jinping and PLAN commander Wu Shengli. Seven days later, 
Lanzhou and Hengshui departed port for an eleven-day patrol that included passage 
through the Miyako Strait and near the disputed Senkaku Islands.
Lanzhou’s political officer recalled to People’s Navy that in the 1990s ships were permit-
ted an extended in-port period to prepare for each underway operation. “Now, our high-
sea training missions are all scheduled so densely that we are required to have sustained 
combat capabilities.”46
The ability to support a rapid turnaround of high-end naval combatants in support of 
national requirements—in this case, enforcement of Chinese maritime claims—is an 
indication that the PLAN surface force is increasingly ready to conduct operations. That 
force will continue to be challenged by the level of maintenance its complex new systems 
require, as well as by the logistics demands imposed by increasing operations in distant 
seas. These are, however, challenges that the PLAN has identified and will address on a 
basis of solid progress established over the last two decades.
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